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Taking Information More Seriously:
Information and Preferences in International Political Economy
Sung Eun Kim
The key underlying question of this dissertation is how individuals develop informed
views about the open international economy and make informed decisions as con-
sumers, workers and voters. Globalization has generated competing interest groups
that are highly informed about its effects. Each of these groups can exploit its informa-
tional advantage and strategically provide information to less informed individuals in
order to shape their policy preferences and economic and political behavior. Focusing
on this informational discrepancy among domestic actors, this dissertation investigates
the mechanisms and the effects of information dissemination from three different angles.
The first chapter examines the role of product-related information provided by the news
media, biased in favor of domestic firms, in shaping consumer behavior. In the second
chapter, I examine the role of trade-related information provided by interest groups in
altering the trade preferences of workers. In the third chapter, I examine the role of trade-
related information provided by political elites in shaping their constituents’ attitudes
toward trade. These essays contribute to the extant international political economy lit-
erature by introducing an actor that has been largely neglected, illuminating new causal
mechanisms with information at the center, and clarifying the causal effect of certain
economic groups in trade policy preference formation.
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The most challenging questions in the study of international political economy, as Frieden
and Martin (2002: 119) write, “have to do with the interaction of domestic and interna-
tional factors as they affect economic policies and outcomes.” Exploring those interactive
effects is made especially difficult by the strategic interaction among states and non-state
actors, but scholarship on these fronts has advanced remarkably in a number of ways.
At the core of this scholarship are three key factors: domestic actors’ preferences, the
nature of domestic political institutions, and the distribution of information domesti-
cally (Milner, 1997; Frieden and Martin, 2002). The literature to this point has given
considerable attention to the first two–how changes in the global economy affect the
preferences domestic actors, and how those changes impact domestic institutions, which
then shape foreign economic policymaking (e.g. Rogowski (1989); Rodrik (1997)). On the
role of information, however, the scholarship is limited. Many scholars have recognized
its importance and incorporated the domestic informational structure in modeling the
domestic-international linkages (Milner and Rosendorff, 1997; Milner, 1997; Mansfield,
Milner, and Rosendorff, 2000). Yet, while these models shed important light on the ef-
fects of information asymmetry among domestic actors, they give less attention to the
mechanisms through which domestic actors strategically provide information to other
actors and how the provision of information shapes the preferences and decisions of
other domestic actors.
In this dissertation, I explore the ways in which domestic actors disseminate informa-
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tion on diverse aspects of globalization to individual citizens, and how such information
shapes individuals’ economic and political responses to globalization. The key underly-
ing question of this dissertation is how individuals develop informed views about the
open international economy and make informed decisions as consumers, workers and
voters. The role that information plays in the globalized economic setting is particularly
important for two reasons. On the one hand, globalization makes it difficult for indi-
viduals to acquire and process all relevant information about their economic conditions
by exposing them to rapid and multidimensional changes in the labor, consumer and
capital markets, as well as in the social and cultural environments. On the other hand,
globalization has generated competing interest groups that are highly informed about
its effects. Each of these groups can exploit its informational advantage and strategi-
cally provide information to less informed individuals in order to shape their policy
preferences and economic and political behavior.
Focusing on this informational discrepancy among domestic actors, this dissertation
investigates the mechanisms and the effects of information dissemination from three
different angles. The first chapter examines the role of product-related information pro-
vided by the news media, biased in favor of domestic firms, in shaping consumer be-
havior. In the second chapter, I examine the role of trade-related information provided
by interest groups in altering the trade preferences of workers. In the third chapter,
I examine the role of trade-related information provided by political elites in shaping
their constituents’ attitudes toward trade. Overall, the three chapters in this dissertation
contribute to the extant international political economy literature by introducing a factor
that has been largely neglected, illuminating new causal mechanisms with information
at the center and clarifying the role of certain economic groups in trade policy preference
formation.
The first chapter demonstrates that the news media can serve as one channel for
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governments to indirectly favor domestic industries by influencing the coverage of do-
mestic versus foreign products. The news media is a key channel through which con-
sumers gain product-related information. Some governments can therefore influence
how consumers think about national and foreign products by disseminating favorable
information about domestic products and unfavorable information about foreign prod-
ucts. Focusing on the Chinese news coverage of domestically-produced versus imported
automobiles, I reveal a systematic government-driven bias against foreign automakers.
I assess home bias in the Chinese news media using an original dataset comprised
of media coverage of auto recalls in the country between 2005 and 2013. By conducting
an automated text analysis of thousands of articles from 121 Chinese newspapers under
varying degrees of government control, I demonstrate a systematic bias against foreign
automakers in those newspapers under strict government control, but not among com-
mercial newspapers. I further analyze subnational reporting patterns, exploiting varia-
tion in the level of regional government interest in the automobile industry to conclude
that official newspapers in areas where local governments own automotive enterprises
exhibit a strong home bias. This is not observed in commercial newspapers based in the
same areas or in official newspapers from other areas. The analysis suggests that the
media’s home bias is driven by the government’s protectionist interests, rather than by
the nationalist sentiment of readers. Furthermore, I show that this home bias in news
coverage has a meaningful impact on actual consumer behavior, combining automobile
sales data and information on recall-related web searches. The findings presented in this
chapter suggest that while the rules of international trade regimes prevent governments
from employing protectionist instruments directly, other less visible means are available
to governments seeking to protect domestic industries.
The second chapter turns the focus to the role of labor unions as information providers
for workers. Most studies on the sources of individual policy preferences assume that
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individuals form their preferences based on self-interested motivations, without explain-
ing how those interests are crystallized by the individuals (Facchini and Mayda, 2009;
Scheve and Slaughter, 2001b). By illuminating an informational mechanism through
which labor unions shape workers’ policy preferences by providing policy-relevant in-
formation, this chapter offers new evidence to substantiate the link between self-interest
and policy preferences.
To evaluate the effects of information on union membership, this chapter combines
unique survey data of American workers and a novel set of inferential strategies. I exploit
two sources of variation–namely, the legal choice that workers face in joining or opting
out of unions, and the over-time reversal of a union’s policy position–to demonstrate
that unions influence their members’ policy preferences in a significant and theoretically
predictable manner. In contrast, self-selection into membership accounts for at most a
quarter of the observed “union effect”. The study thus illuminates the impact of unions
in cohering the voice of workers, and it provides insight into the role of information
provision in shaping how citizens form trade policy preferences.
The third chapter investigates the role of political elites as information providers
for individual citizens. Despite well-established evidence of simultaneous influence be-
tween elites and voters, the literature on trade policy preferences has disproportionately
focused on bottom-up models while rarely noting the potential for top-down influence. I
address this deficiency by examining how political elites communicate their trade policy
positions to constituents, and how such communications shape public attitudes toward
trade. Utilizing a unique dataset constructed from an original collection of press re-
leases along with a survey of a large sample of American workers, I offer new evidence
on the effect of elite communication on trade policy attitudes. The analysis suggests that
representatives’ pro-free trade messages are systematically associated with a decrease in
protectionist attitudes among co-partisan constituents in their districts. Exploiting the
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difference in political information environments across the states, created by different
senator electoral cycles, I further demonstrate that this association is mainly driven by
elite influence. Overall, this chapter provides important implications for trade policy by




Media Bias against Foreign Firms as a Veiled Trade Barrier:
Evidence from Chinese Newspapers
1.1 Introduction
What measures can states employ to protect domestic industries against foreign compe-
tition when traditional measures become costly? Two core principles of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), non-discrimination among other members (the “most-favored na-
tion” principle) and treating foreign goods no less favorably than local products (the
“national treatment” principle) increase the costs of employing traditional protectionist
measures for member states. Nonetheless, many (if not most) governments continue
to exhibit interest in protecting domestic industries. As increasing tariffs has become
more difficult, states have resorted to subtler non-tariff barriers (Mansfield and Busch,
1995). In response, trade regimes have strengthened regulation of these non-tariff bar-
riers, leading some member states to seek out other, more indirect means of supporting
their national industries.
In this chapter, I argue that the news media can serve as one means of protecting
domestic industries. In countries where the government controls the media, it can es-
tablish a veiled trade barrier by affecting media coverage to present domestic firms in
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a more favorable light than their foreign counterparts. Such a strategy is unlikely to be
challenged at the WTO due to the absence of explicit regulations regarding this issue
and the difficulty of establishing evidence of deliberate government involvement. In-
fluencing media coverage is also an attractive option for governments since the news
media, as a major source of product-related information for consumers, plays a key role
in shaping consumption patterns. In fact, firms doing business in foreign markets have
expressed concern over unfavorable coverage they receive in the local media.1
Testing this claim, however, raises an empirical challenge. Recent developments in
automated text analysis substantially reduce the costs of analyzing large collections of
texts, but a significant challenge lies in developing an objective measure of home bias –
a tendency to favor domestic firms over foreign ones. Suppose that a media outlet were
found to have released more negative stories on foreign products than on domestic ones.
This finding does not necessarily substantiate the existence of a systematic home bias be-
cause the difference in coverage may result from differences in the types of products or
the quality of goods manufactured by domestic versus foreign firms. I therefore focus on
one sector and examine instances of faulty production in the same sector to account for
differences in product quality. An examination of news coverage of automobile recalls is
an ideal test because product recalls have obvious negative implications with regard to
the quality of the products in question, and their characteristics are comparable across
different cases. Recalls of automobiles are particularly well suited for this type of com-
parison because they occur frequently and garner more media attention than recalls of
other products.
A further challenge arises in identifying the source of media bias. While my argu-
1For instance, see Laurie Burkitt, “Foreign Firms Feel China’s Heat.” The Wall Street Journal, October
19, 2011; Kazunori Takada and Samuel Shen, “China Media Train Fire on U.S. Food Giants over Chicken
Scare.” Reuters, January 17, 2013; David Barboza and Nick Wingfield, “Pressured by China, Apple Apolo-
gizes for Warranty Policies.” The New York Times, April 1, 2013 .
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ment focuses on governments’ protectionist incentives, media home bias can be influ-
enced by other factors such as the nationalist sentiments of readers. Ruling out this
alternative explanation is difficult because it is not easy to separate government’s pro-
tectionist influence from public attitudes against globalization: newspapers under the
influence of protectionist governments may tend to have readers with nationalist atti-
tudes. In order to pin down the effect of governments’ protectionist interests, I utilize a
set of inferential strategies to address this challenge. With an empirical focus on Chinese
newspapers, I distinguish government-driven bias from demand-driven bias by exploit-
ing variation in the level of government control over different newspapers. I further
delineate the effect of governments’ protectionist interests on media bias by exploiting
sub-national variation in regional governments’ ownership of automotive enterprises.
My analysis, based on 6,578 news articles on auto recalls published in 121 Chinese
newspapers between 2005 and 2013, reveals that newspapers, especially those under
strict government control, exhibit a systematic bias against foreign automakers. Official
newspapers controlled by the central government are nearly twice as likely to cover re-
calls by foreign automakers and publish longer news stories about such events than they
do in the case of recalls involving domestic automakers. Commercial newspapers, on
the other hand, do not discriminate between domestic and foreign automakers in their
recall coverage. This finding is consistent with the expectation that governmental pro-
tectionist interests drive bias in the media. A sub-national analysis further corroborates
that the bias is driven by the government’s interest in supporting the domestic industry.
Official regional newspapers in provinces in which the local governments own automo-
tive enterprises exhibit a home bias in their recall coverage, but this tendency toward
bias is observed neither in commercial newspapers located in the same provinces nor
among official newspapers in other provinces where the regional government has no
direct stake in the automotive industry.
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Further, I assess the effect of home bias on consumer behavior, focusing on recall-
related web searches and automobile sales. My analysis of recall-related web searches
demonstrates that recalls of foreign cars receive more public attention than those of do-
mestic cars, especially in provinces where official newspapers exhibit home bias. Ana-
lyzing the effect of recalls on automobile sales, I find that recalls have a negative effect on
sales by foreign firms, but their effects on domestic firms are unclear. These findings are
consistent with the pattern of media bias. Because the news media is more likely to cover
foreign recalls than on domestic ones, the public is more aware of foreign recalls, and
foreign firms face more negative consequences. This suggests that government-driven
bias may constitute a serious barrier to foreign firms’ business.
The finding of a government-driven bias in the Chinese news media has direct impli-
cations for challenges faced by automakers in the world’s largest auto market. China’s
accession to the WTO in 2001 attracted keen interest from global automakers due to
the enormous and fast-growing market, which in 2009 surpassed the U.S. to become
the largest in the world. Despite its broad commitment to tempering its protectionist
policies, the Chinese government has demonstrated a continued interest in promoting
its automobile industry (Gerth, 2012; Noble, Ravenhill, and Doner, 2005; Saikawa and
Urpelainen, 2014). In fact, opening its market did not result in a surge of foreign vehicle
imports. The Chinese tariff on vehicles was gradually lowered from 101.1% in 1996 to
34.3% in 2004, and has remained at 25.0% since 2007, but the share of imported cars
among total car sales only increased slightly, from 2.2% in 1998, to 3.5% in 2004, and
5.9% in 2012.2 This sluggish increase in automobile imports in the wake of trade lib-
eralization can be explained in part by the presence of joint-ventures in China, but my
2The tariff data are based on the HS code 8703 (motor cars and other vehicles principally designed for
the transport of persons) from the WTO Tariff databases at http://tariffdata.wto.org/. The imports
rate is based on the author’s own calculation based on the China Auto Market Almanac (Zhongguo qiche
shichang nianjian) series and denotes the share of the number of imported cars to the number of total
vehicle sales in China.
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findings on media bias also provide a potential explanation for this phenomenon. The
former chief negotiator for China’s WTO accession, Long Yongtu, once asserted that
encouraging Chinese consumers to purchase Chinese products “will violate neither the
WTO rules nor the market economic rules” (Gerth, 2012: 213). While he did not elabo-
rate on precisely how China might do so, this study demonstrates that the utilization of
government-controlled media provides a channel for influencing consumer decisions.
More broadly, the argument and the analysis presented here provide a two-fold
contribution to the study of international political economy. First, this study expands
the discussion of non-tariff barriers by illuminating an indirect protectionist mechanism
through which the governments affect the flow of of product-related information. Previ-
ous research on non-tariff barriers has focused on ways governments can directly affect
demand, supply and prices of domestic and foreign goods (Kono and Rickard, 2014;
Mansfield and Busch, 1995; Naoi, 2009; Rickard, 2012; Rickard and Kono, 2014). This
study, in contrast, demonstrates that governments may protect domestic industries by
indirectly fostering a consumer preference for domestic goods. Individual consumers
play a significant role in international trade relations, since their demand for domestic
and foreign products ultimately determines the flow of trade. Thus, a systematic gov-
ernment effort promoting consumer preference for domestic goods over their foreign
counterparts could indeed constitute a serious barrier to trade and must be examined as
a non-tariff barrier.
Second, this study adds its voice to a chorus of pessimistic views regarding the ef-
fectiveness of international trade institutions. The findings here suggest that states can
pursue concealed indirect measures to protect domestic industries when trade policy
is otherwise constrained. While indirect protectionist measures may not be as effec-
tive as direct measures such as tariffs or quotas, they may exacerbate the difficulties of
monitoring and regulating protectionist behavior by international trade institutions. A
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number of studies have suggested that international institutions are not particularly ef-
fective at addressing indirect or disguised protectionism (Kim, 2015; Rickard and Kono,
2014). Compared to government procurement or health and safety policies, the use of
news media as a protectionist tool is even more opaque, hindering the effective regula-
tion of this issue. Even if governments were to make an unlikely commitment to ensure
equal treatment of foreign goods in media coverage, it would be almost impossible for
international institutions to enforce.
In the next section, I further discuss the broader literature on protectionism in which
this study is situated and outline theoretical expectations regarding the sources of home
bias in the media. I then introduce my empirical strategy and describe the dataset. The
following section presents the findings and a series of robustness tests. Next, I explore
the implications of the findings by focusing on the difference in public attention toward
domestic and foreign recalls and on the differential effect of recalls on domestic and
foreign automotive companies. In the final section I discuss the applicability of my
findings beyond China, as well as related implications for the study of regime type and
trade policy.
1.2 Explaining Home Bias in the News Media
To explain the news media’s home bias, I consider the government’s incentive to use the
media as an indirect tool of protectionism. I argue that governments seek to employ less
visible trade barriers to gain the benefits of protectionism without violating the rules of
international trade institutions. I then discuss the mechanisms by which governments
can influence media coverage of national and foreign firms in order to achieve protec-
tionist goals. As an alternative explanation, I discuss the potential effect of readers’
nationalist sentiments on coverage. I then derive observable implications of these two
competing perspectives.
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1.2.1 Argument: Influencing News Media as a Protectionist Measure
A state has an incentive to protect certain domestic industries against foreign compe-
tition, either in response to domestic interest groups, or to promote national interests.
Despite the increasing influence of supranational economic institutions, protectionism is
likely to persist in various forms. The key question, then, is how states can protect their
industries while avoiding the costs that may be imposed on them by international trade
regimes. Non-tariff barriers, especially those that do not involve observable government
policy, are useful protectionist tools for skirting these international constraints. I sug-
gest that home bias in the media is an instrument states may use to protect domestic
industries.
International trade agreements have made imposing tariffs costly, and non-tariff bar-
riers have served as a substitute (Anderson and Schmitt, 2003; Baker, 2005; Kono, 2006;
Mansfield and Busch, 1995). Their use has become more pervasive among both advanced
and developing countries over the past few decades. As the WTO and other international
trade agreements have caught on to the increased use of non-tariff barriers (Rickard and
Kono, 2014; Staiger, 2012), the cost of employing these protectionist measures has also
increased, forcing leaders to find increasingly subtler ways of protecting domestic in-
dustries. That is, the sophistication of international trade regimes forces states to find
protectionist measures that can circumvent the rules and principles set forth by those
regimes.
The drafters of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) took a minimal-
ist approach to non-tariff barriers, while recognizing their potential use as a substitute
for tariffs. The WTO, however, took a more stringent stance. Specifically, the WTO’s
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement included substantial commitments
to limit the use of domestic subsidies and strengthened the prohibition on export sub-
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sidies. The WTO also significantly strengthened national treatment obligations through
the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement, both of which require member states to treat imported and locally-produced
goods equally once the foreign goods have entered the domestic market (Staiger, 2012).
Other international trade agreements began to pay more attention to the use of non-tariff
barriers as well. Some recently concluded preferential trade agreements have an explicit
rule restricting government procurement practices that discriminate against foreign pro-
ducers (Rickard and Kono, 2014).
The costs of violating these rules may not be prohibitive, but member states are
certainly discouraged from employing visible protectionist instruments because other
member states can challenge them on policy measures that are inconsistent with the
WTO rules. Since the inception of the WTO, the use of a dispute settlement mechanism
has become very common especially in cases challenging subsidies, countervailing mea-
sures, anti-dumping duties, and safeguard measures. A dispute in most cases results in
more openness. In eighty-nine percent of the 152 dispositive reports on WTO dispute
cases initiated before 2001, at least one national measure was ruled WTO-inconsistent
(Goldstein and Steinberg, 2008). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that a country, once
challenged at the WTO, would be required to correct its protectionist practices. The
respondent country in a dispute also pays a reputational cost when its violations be-
come widely known by other third parties (Maggi, 1999), as well as the monetary cost of
engaging in formal litigation, which can reach $500,000-$1 million (Davis and Bermeo,
2009). These costs deter member countries from implementing trade barriers that may
be disputed. As Chaudoin, Kucik, and Pelc (2013: 28) note, “the mere possibility of a
WTO dispute might deter a country from implementing a harmful protectionist barrier
in the first place. Alternatively, a dispute between countries i and j might deter country
k from erecting trade barriers. A dispute against country i over product s might deter
13
country i from erecting trade barriers for another product, t.”
With restrictions on the use of protectionist instruments increasing, member coun-
tries are forced to abandon their protectionist policies or to continue to use traditional
protectionist measures at the risk of being challenged at the WTO. If they abandon their
protectionist policies, they forgo the domestic political benefits (e.g. political support
from protected industries) they once earned from protectionism. If they continue to em-
ploy traditional protectionist instruments, they enjoy the domestic political benefits as
long as they remain unchallenged at the WTO, but there remains a high possibility of a
costly trade dispute. A third option is to find alternative protectionist instruments that
evade WTO restrictions. If this is feasible, it is in governments’ interests to use these
measures because it allows them to gain political benefits without paying any costs.
What are these alternative protectionist instruments? While a wide array of pol-
icy instruments are subject to the rules and regulations of trade regimes, governments
can still indirectly protect domestic firms against foreign competition. Besides restrict-
ing the flow of imports or offering subsidies, governments can favor domestic firms by
promoting the consumption of their products. Government procurement is one use-
ful instrument, but governments can also encourage their citizens to buy domestically
produced goods. Governments can change how consumers think about national and for-
eign products by appealing to their patriotism or by disseminating favorable information
about domestic products and/or unfavorable information about foreign products. Shap-
ing the information provided to consumers can be an effective protectionist tool because
consumers are uncertain about the quality of products, especially experience goods (Nel-
son, 1970), and must rely on outside information to determine the quality of the goods.
If they received information biased in favor of domestic products, they would consume
more domestic products and fewer foreign goods than they normally would. As a conse-
quence, demand for foreign products would decrease, and this would have “voluntary”
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protectionist effects.
The news media is a key channel through which consumers gain product-related
information, and thus a potential target for protectionist manipulation. I suggest two
mechanisms by which governments can exert influence on the news coverage of firms.
The first mechanism is through direct censorship. In places where press freedom is
limited and governments are heavily involved in micromanaging news content, gov-
ernments can suppress the publication of negative stories about domestic companies
or goods. When a government has a direct stake in domestic industries through state-
ownership of enterprises, for instance, government officials can try to censor negative
stories because they may undermine national economic interests.
Second, governments can affect news content by maintaining a “cozy” relationship
with the media. In the case of state-owned media, influencing news coverage is straight-
forward. Since state ownership induces newspapers to take government interests into
account, governments can also easily suppress negative news on the pages of state-
controlled newspapers. Even when formal press freedom is guaranteed, journalists and
editors may have financial and political incentives to abstain from undermining govern-
mental interests. Some governments have the authority to appoint top-level managers
of media companies. Journalists themselves may find it beneficial to maintain a good
relationship with the government for their career prospects. Colluding with the govern-
ment can also be profitable for media firms. Direct monetary payments are an extreme
form of this; governments can also exert subtle influence through administrative deci-
sions or legislative interventions that reward certain news companies (Besley and Prat,
2006). Thus, when political leaders openly strive to promote domestic industries, jour-
nalists learn these leaders’ policy priorities and may reflect those priorities in their story
selection.
There is one important qualifier that warrants a brief discussion with regard to a
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state’s ability to manipulate information. A state with strong control over civil society
can more effectively use the news media as a protectionist tool than can states where
government’s function in civil society is weaker. For instance, liberal democracies such
as the United States have a marketplace of ideas where government-issued information
is thoroughly tested and challenged. Governments in such countries are not necessar-
ily able to maintain “cozy” relationships with the media, and thus may not be able to
collude with the media to hide negative information about domestic firms. Therefore,
attempts to use news media as a protectionist instrument would be observed more often
in states with a weak civil society.
1.2.2 Alternative Explanation: Nationalist Sentiments
While I argue that government’s protectionist interests are responsible for home bias
in the media, there is an alternative explanation: that the media’s home bias reflects
economic nationalism or anti-globalization attitudes among newspaper readers. Inter-
national economic integration has adversely affected many individuals, generating dis-
content among those who are not among its beneficiaries or who perceive economic inte-
gration to be harmful to their own well-being or national interests (Rodrik, 1997; Stiglitz,
2002). The social and cultural consequences of globalization also lead some people to
oppose international economic integration (Margalit, 2012). These anti-globalization atti-
tudes may generate negative sentiment toward foreign companies, and as a consequence,
may compel newspapers to present the activities of foreign firms less favorably.
The demand-side theory of media bias suggests that newspapers, as profit-maximizing
firms, have an incentive to offer consumers what they want and distort stories accord-
ingly in order to reflect the preferences of readers (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008, 2010).3
3Theoretical literature on media bias can be grouped into two primary perspectives: a supply-side
perspective and a demand-side perspective. Theories on the supply side posit that media bias could
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According to this perspective, newspapers may exhibit bias against foreign firms when
their readers embrace economic nationalism and hold negative views about foreign eco-
nomic influence. These readers would prefer to read negative stories about foreign firms
than about domestic firms, and thus newspapers would be incentivized to provide more
negative stories on foreign firms to satisfy reader demand.
This conjecture focused on the demand-side is consistent with Friebel and Heinz’s
(2014) study of German media coverage of downsizing. Friebel and Heinz (2014) found
that German newspapers tend to cover the downsizing of foreign firms more intensely
and in a more negative manner, and suggested that this pattern is driven by consumers’
discontent with regard to the effects of globalization. They arrived at this conclusion
because this biased tendency was found in all of the newspapers they examined. The
newspapers they examined, however, were all commercial newspapers and thus, from
their work it cannot be determined how a government’s protectionist attitudes might
play a role in news coverage. To better test this demand-driven perspective against my
own argument, I outline the following competing hypotheses and test them using a
sample of both government-owned and commercial newspapers.
1.2.3 Hypotheses on Media’s Home Bias
Both of the above explanations suggest the existence of a home bias in media, but they
diverge on the source of this bias. While my argument views a government’s protection-
ist motives as the key factor driving home bias in media, the demand-side explanation
reflect the preferences of suppliers such as owners of news organizations, journalists, and editors. Baron’s
(2006) model shows that journalists may have incentives to exhibit bias in their coverage in order to
increase the probability that their stories are published, or to promote their world view. Baron (2006) also
suggests that news organizations may allow them to write biased stories because it helps to lower wage
costs. Theories on the demand side suggest that profit-maximizing newspapers supply the slant preferred
by their consumers. Gentzkow and Shapiro’s (2006) model shows that bias even arises when a media
firm strives to build a reputation as a provider of accurate information because providing information
consistent with consumers’ priors is sometimes the best way to establish a firm’s reputation.
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focuses on reader discontent toward foreign companies. To distinguish between these
two explanations, I form two competing hypotheses, one that suggests government in-
fluence drives home bias, and the other that suggests home bias is a response to reader
demand.
If government influence were the primary driver of media bias, it would be expected
that media outlets under tighter government control would be more biased in favor of
domestic companies. The degree of government control over news media varies greatly
across countries, but even within a country, some media outlets are under more strict
government control than others due to different ownership and financing structures.
When media outlets are financially dependent on or directly owned by the government,
they have various incentives to represent government interests through their news re-
porting, and governments can exert influence over these newspapers more easily. Thus,
government-controlled newspapers are expected to exhibit more bias in favor of domes-
tic companies.
Hypothesis 1. (Government-driven bias) Government-controlled newspapers are more likely
than non-government media to exhibit bias in favor of domestic companies.
Alternatively, if popular discontent toward foreign companies drives media’s home
bias, we should observe bias also from commercial media that cater to their readers’
interests. As commercial newspapers rely on circulation numbers and advertising sales,
they have strong incentives to satisfy reader demand and to provide stories with the slant
preferred by their readers. Thus, commercial newspapers would exhibit bias against for-
eign companies when economic nationalism or anti-globalization sentiments are preva-
lent among newspaper readers. Government-controlled newspapers, on the other hand,
have weaker incentives to slant news stories in response to popular discontent. They
may exhibit home bias to pander to nationalist sentiments, but only when it is deemed
in government interests, because they mainly cater to government interests. From this
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discussion, we can draw the following hypothesis that diverges from the government-
driven bias hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. (Demand-driven bias) Commercial newspapers are equally or more likely to ex-
hibit bias in favor of domestic companies compared with government-controlled newspapers.
One key assumption implicit in this hypothesis is that readers of commercial newspa-
pers hold nationalistic attitudes. The empirical validity of this assumption in the context
of this study will be discussed in detail in the Section 6.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
1.3.1 Empirical Scope: News Coverage by Chinese Newspapers
The main hypotheses of this study center on the ownership of newspapers: the difference
between government-controlled newspapers and commercial newspapers. In order to
empirically test these hypotheses, we need a sample of newspapers that differ in the
degree to which they are under government control but share other economic, social
and political characteristics.
For these purposes, Chinese newspapers provide an excellent opportunity. Due to
the highly localized and fragmented nature of the Chinese newspaper industry, more
than 1,700 registered newspapers were operating in China as of 2013. While all newspa-
pers in China are ultimately under state control, the degree of this government control
varies substantially across newspapers, especially between official newspapers and non-
official newspapers. Official newspapers are directly owned by party organizations and
reflect the party’s position in their news reporting. These publications are supported
with public money and are circulated in offices, classrooms, and factories. Commercial
newspapers, on the other hand, are financially reliant on newsstand sales and are pri-
marily oriented toward their readership rather than the state (Stockmann, 2013: 68-73).
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The differing levels of government control over newspapers which otherwise operate
within common economic, social and political environments allows us to differentiate
government-driven bias from demand-driven bias.
1.3.2 Measuring Media Bias: News Coverage on Auto Recalls
Media bias can be defined as a systematic tendency to favor a certain party over others in
news coverage. A media outlet that is biased in favor of a certain party may slant infor-
mation in various ways by, for instance, selectively reporting positive news and omitting
negative news involving the given party. It may also use language that conveys a posi-
tive impression of the party. Many existing studies measure bias by examining whether
these two types of behaviors are observed in a media outlet’s reporting patterns.4 This
framework can be also applied to measure home bias in the news media.
In choosing a measure for home bias in the media, however, a challenge arises, be-
cause, in evaluating coverage of foreign versus domestic firms, it is necessary to take
into account differences in product and service quality across these firms. Some firms
produce better-quality products than others, and they naturally receive more favorable
coverage from the news media. Therefore, some newspapers that appear to treat do-
mestic firms more favorably may actually offer unbiased reporting if domestic firms
outperform foreign ones in product quality. For this reason, merely looking at whether
newspapers present favorable or unfavorable coverage of domestic or foreign firms is
not a suitable way to study bias.
One way of addressing this challenge is to focus on a newspaper’s selective omis-
4Scholars of media bias have measured bias in various ways. A study of partisan media bias by
Puglisi and Snyder (2011) focuses on the news media’s selective reporting, comparing the relative extent
of coverage of political scandals involving Republican and Democratic politicians. Other studies examine
the language of news coverage to examine media bias. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) study partisan bias
by analyzing the use of language that sways readers to the right or to the left on political issues (e.g.
“death tax” and “tax relief” identified as strongly Republican; “estate tax” and “tax break” identified as
strongly Democrat).
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sions: when similar types of negative or positive events affect firms, how likely is a
newspaper to cover the story when it involves a domestic versus a foreign firm? While
an unbiased newspaper would be equally likely to cover negative or positive events in-
volving domestic or foreign firms, a newspaper with a home bias might selectively omit
coverage of negative events affecting domestic firms while covering positive events, and
vice versa for foreign firms. With this approach, one can establish an objective mea-
sure of media bias without explicitly taking into account differences in product quality,
because comparable types of events have similar implications for product quality.
Based on these considerations, I examine the reporting on auto recalls affecting Chi-
nese and foreign firms and measure home bias according to the frequency and intensity
of news reporting devoted to the domestic car recalls relative to the foreign ones. Prod-
uct recalls have obvious negative implications for the quality of the products in question,
and their characteristics are comparable across different cases. A newspaper’s failure to
cover such a negative event involving a certain party would indicate its bias toward
that party. The recall of automobiles is particularly well suited to this study’s purpose
because these happen frequently and get more media attention than the recall of other
products (i.e. toys, electronics, or drugs), allowing an empirical examination of reporting
patterns over various time periods. The next section provides a detailed description of
the dataset on auto recalls and their media coverage in China.
1.3.3 Data
In order to carry out the empirical analysis, I constructed an original dataset containing
information on 472 auto recall incidents announced in China between 2005 and 2013,
including more than 5,000 news reports on these incidents by 121 Chinese newspapers.
Auto Recalls I compiled a list of auto recalls announced in China between 2005 and
2013 from the website of the Chinese government agency in charge of disseminating
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recall-related information.5 For each announced recall, the website provides the name of
the manufacturer, the estimated number of affected cars, and the reason for the recall. In
addition, I classified recalls into three categories according to the manufacturer: domes-
tic, domestic-foreign joint venture, or foreign. The joint venture category includes cars
produced in China by foreign investors partnering with Chinese companies (foreign au-
tomakers investing in China are allowed to produce vehicles only through a 50-50 split
ownership with Chinese partners). The foreign producers category exclusively captures
imported vehicles produced abroad by foreign automakers.6
Table 1.1 compares the characteristics of recalls across the three types of manufactur-
ers. Among 472 recalls of passenger cars, excluding recalls of trucks or buses, 62% of
recalls were by foreign automakers, 26% were by domestic-foreign joint ventures, and
12% involved cars produced by domestic manufacturers. The number of cars affected
varies considerably across the recall incidents, from a single car to 1,200,000. Among the
three types of producers, recalls by joint venture producers, on average, tend to involve
the highest number of affected cars, followed by domestic and foreign automakers. The
reason for the recalls also varies among the three types of producers to some degree,
but defects in electrical systems, engines, or steering represent the three most common
reasons, accounting for roughly 60% of recall cases for each type of producer.
Newspapers The primary empirical focus of this study is news coverage of auto
recalls by Chinese newspapers. I examine news coverage by 121 daily general-interest
5I choose this time period due to the data availability. Recall announcements in China are available
at www.qiche365.org.cn. The website provides information on recalls announced only from June 2004
around at a time when the Chinese government announced the introduction of the Provision on Regula-
tions on Defective Automobile Products Recall in March 2004, which took into effect from October 2004.
The Provision required automobile manufacturers to recall products that are found to be defective.
6I code recalls announced by a joint venture producer in the foreign producer category when the recall
announcement explicitly states that the recalled cars are imported ones. This is when the domestic-foreign
joint automakers are in charge of recalling cars produced by foreign automakers and then imported to
China. The results are not sensitive to this coding decision.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Recalls Announced in China
Domestic Cars Joint Venture Cars Foreign Cars
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Recall Size
Affected Cars 25,470 49,194 87,794 182,782 6,599 25,465
Recall Type
Air Bag/Seat Belt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10
Brake 0.16 0.37 0.19 0.39 0.13 0.34
Electrical System 0.11 0.31 0.34 0.47 0.22 0.41
Engine 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.39 0.25 0.43
Powertrain 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.09 0.29
Steering 0.22 0.42 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36
Structure/Body 0.16 0.37 0.08 0.27 0.16 0.37
Others 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.15
Observations 55 125 292
Note: Recall type variables are binary indicators for whether the recall happened due
to the specified reason (e.g. air bag/seat belt, brake, or electrical system). These
variables are not mutually exclusive because one recall event could involve multiple
reasons.
newspapers, including the state press agency, the Xinhua News Agency (Xin-hua she).
I exclude newspapers with a narrow scope, such as International Finance News (Guoji
jinrong bao) or China Construction Newspaper (Zhongguo jianshe bao). I also restrict the
sample to daily newspapers, excluding semi-weekly, weekly, or monthly papers since
these non-daily newspapers tend to have different reporting patterns.
I acquired the newspaper articles published in 120 newspapers through WiseNews,
the Hong Kong based newspaper data provider, and the articles by Xinhua News Agency
through Factiva’s newspaper archive. WiseNews covers the whole period under exam-
ination (2005-13) for most newspapers. Where WiseNews’ subscription to a particular
newspaper starts later than 2005 or ends earlier than 2013, my data coverage is neces-
sarily limited to a shorter period. This set of newspapers covers 29 provinces, including
province-level municipalities and autonomous regions.7
For each newspaper, I collected information on the newspaper’s ownership to iden-
7The dataset does not cover Hong Kong, Macau, Guizhou Province, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region, or the Tibet Autonomous Region.
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tify the degree to which it is party-controlled.8 I classified newspapers into two cate-
gories: official newspapers and non-official newspapers. Official newspapers are owned
and strictly controlled by party committees at different administrative levels, CCP divi-
sions, or party-sponsored mass organizations. They mostly rely on mandatory subscrip-
tion by government departments, government-affiliated organizations, and state-owned
enterprises, and are consumed in offices, classrooms, and factories. Non-official newspa-
pers include evening newspapers that are allowed more managerial autonomy despite
sponsorship by party committees and commercial newspapers that are subsidiaries of
other newspapers or press groups. Non-official newspapers are distinguished from offi-
cial newspapers by their reliance on advertising revenues and on street vendors for circu-
lation. They also have greater editorial autonomy than official newspapers. A previous
analysis of the level of political control over Chinese newspapers also found a signifi-
cantly higher degree of party control over official newspapers compared to evening or
subsidiary newspapers, which I broadly group as non-official newspapers (Qin, Ström-
berg, and Wu, 2014). The list of newspapers along with their sponsoring institutions and
classification is available in the Appendix.
I then collected newspaper articles published by these newspapers that mention an
auto recall event. I first searched for all newspaper articles published between 2005
and 2013 that included the word “recall” (zhaohui) in the headline, returning more than
40,000 articles. I excluded irrelevant articles that involved non-auto product recalls or
that featured the word “recall” in other contexts. I then constructed the dataset with
newspaper-recall as a unit of observation. For each observation, I created a binary in-
dicator Report scored as 1 if a newspaper published an article on a given recall event
8I acquired sponsorship information from the 2006 Chinese Newspaper Directory (Zhongguo baozhi
minglu) published by the General Administration of Press and Publication, the agency that issues licenses
for newspaper publication. This information is current for 2013 because the newspaper sponsors rarely
change.
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within two weeks of the recall announcement and 0 otherwise, matching the name of
the newspaper, the name of the automaker, the date of publication and the date of recall
in the newspaper dataset and the newspaper-recall dataset.
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Auto-Recall News Reporting
Min. Mean Max.
Total 0.0% 14.7% 66.1%
By Manufacturer
Domestic 0.0% 12.2% 58.2%
Joint Venture 0.0% 18.5% 70.4%
Foreign 0.0% 13.7% 67.1%
By Recall Size
# < 10,000 0.0% 13.1% 64.9%
# > 10,000 0.0% 20.7% 69.4%
By Recall Type
Electrical System 0.0% 16.0% 69.4%
Engine 0.0% 14.2% 65.1%
Steering 0.0% 14.6% 67.6%
Brake 0.0% 15.4% 65.3%
Note: Entries indicate the statistics for the proportion of
recalls covered by a newspaper out of all recalls. The unit
of observation is newspaper, and the statistics is based on
the observations of 121 newspapers.
Table 1.2 provides a brief overview of auto recall reporting patterns, which vary
widely across newspapers. On average, newspapers covered 15.0% of all auto recalls
announced in China between 2005 and 2013. While 10 of the 121 newspapers examined
never published a story on the announced recalls, Nan Fang Daily (Nan Fang Ribao) wrote
recall-related articles most frequently, covering 66.1% of the incidents, followed by the
Beijing Times (Jinghua Shibao) and the Beijing News (Xin Jing Bao), covering 61.6% and
60.8%, respectively. I also examine reporting patterns across different characteristics of
auto recalls. The number of affected cars appears to be a key determinant of newspapers’
reporting decisions. Newspapers on average reported 20.7% of recalls that involved
more than 10,000 vehicles, but only 13.1% of those involving fewer than 10,000 vehicles.
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In order to account for this difference, I control for the size and type of the recall in the
empirical analysis.
Provincial-Level Indicators I identified the location of each newspaper’s headquar-
ters and identified province-level demographic and economic variables that could influ-
ence the reporting patterns of newspapers operating in the region.9 Namely, I extracted
variables relating to the total yearly population of the province, regional gross domes-
tic product, car ownership, retail sales of automobiles, passenger car production, and
foreign direct investment flow from the Access China database of the Economist Intelli-
gence Unit.10 I also acquired data on the annual province-level newspaper advertising
revenue variable from the China Advertising Yearbook (Zhogguo guang gao nian jian) series
to account for the overall level of newspaper commercialization in each province.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
1.4.1 Government-Driven vs. Demand-Driven
In order to examine whether newspapers discriminate against foreign automakers, and
to explore the source of this bias, I begin by analyzing differences between official and
non-official newspapers in their coverage of domestic and foreign auto recalls.
Analyzing the Selective Omission of Recall Incidents I first examine whether news-
papers are more likely to cover recalls involving foreign automakers than recalls involv-
ing domestic ones. In this analysis, the dependent variable Yijkt is a binary indicator
Report that is coded 1 if the newspaper i located in a province j published a news story
about the recall event k announced in a time period t, and 0 otherwise. I use the binary
9Address information for each newspaper’s headquarter is listed in the Chinese Journalism Yearbook
(Zhongguo xin wen nian jian) series.
10Detailed information about the database is available at http://www.eiu.com/public/accesschina/
marketing.aspx.
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indicator instead of focusing on the number of newspaper articles written per recall k
because most recall events are covered only once by each newspaper. The binary probit
models are specified as follows:
Pr(Yijkt = 1) = Φ(α + β1Foreignk + β2Officiali + β3Official*Foreignik + δZk + µj + τt)
where Foreign takes the value of 1 if the recall involves imported foreign cars, or 0 if
the recall involves domestic or domestic-foreign joint venture cars; Official is a binary
indicator for official newspapers; vector Z denotes control variables at the recall level; µ
is a vector of province fixed effects; and τ is a vector of half-year fixed effects. In con-
structing the binary indicator Foreign, I treat both domestic firms and domestic-foreign
joint ventures as non-foreign automakers because domestic companies, which are usu-
ally state-owned, have at least a 50% stake in the operation of joint ventures.11
The main parameter of interest is β3. The coefficient for the interaction term of
Official and Foreign indicates if bias is government-driven or not. If the media’s home bias
reflects the government’s interest in protecting domestic industry, we should observe the
bias mainly in official newspapers, and β3 should be positive and statistically significant.
A positive and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term would mean
that official newspapers tend to selectively write about recalls of imported cars.
The specification also controls for several recall-specific factors. I include Recall Size
(Logged), the logged number of affected cars in each recall incident k, since a recall
involving more cars would attract more media attention. I also include seven binary
indicators of recall type (e.g. engine, brake, or electrical system) across all estimations,
because some types may receive more coverage than others. I also include province-
specific fixed effects to control for any unobservable factors leading newspapers located
11I also estimate the models separating purely domestic companies from joint-venture companies, as
presented in the Appendix.
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in a specific province to devote more coverage to auto recalls. In some models, I include
the newspaper fixed-effect instead to control for unobservable factors that may affect the
newspaper’s reporting decisions. Additionally, I include half-year-specific fixed effects
to capture any temporal trends in the news value of auto recall. I include recall-specific
fixed effects in some models instead of half-year specific fixed effects. Throughout the
estimations, standard error is clustered by recall in order to account for the dependence
between different newspapers’ observations of the same recall event. I also experiment
with different clustering – by recalls or by the two-dimensions of newspapers and recalls
as a robustness test.
Table 1.3: Probit Models Estimating News Coverage Probability of Auto
Recalls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Foreign 0.036∗∗ 0.026+ 0.024+ 0.035∗∗ 0.026+ 0.024+
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Official -0.011∗∗ -0.029∗∗ -0.041∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Official * Foreign 0.031∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Central Party Official 0.021∗ -0.034∗∗
(0.009) (0.012)
Central Party Official * Foreign 0.103∗∗ 0.098∗∗ 0.141∗∗
(0.021) (0.020) (0.033)
Regional Party Official -0.017∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.009
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Regional Party Official * Foreign 0.018∗ 0.020∗ 0.020∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Province FE No No Yes No No No Yes No
Newspaper FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Halfyear FE No No Yes No No No Yes No
Recall FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 35246 35246 35246 32886 35246 35246 35246 32886
Marginal effects; Standard errors clustered by recalls in parentheses
All models include recall-level controls: the logarithm of recall size (number of cars affected by recall) and binary
indicators for recall type (i.e. airbag, brake, electrical system, engine, powertrain, steering, and structure/body).
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.3 presents the estimation results with marginal effects in the main entries and
clustered standard errors in parentheses. The results are consistent with the government-
driven bias hypothesis. Foreign recalls generally receive more media coverage, and
official newspapers drive this tendency. The first column shows the estimate for Foreign
and Official variables. Foreign appears to be positive and significant at the 0.01 level,
yet its significance becomes weaker as its interaction term with the Official variable is
added in models 2-4. The interaction term is always positive and statistically significant
at the 0.01 level. This suggests that official newspapers are more likely to report foreign
recalls than domestic recalls, while non-official papers tend to devote more or less equal
coverage to domestic and foreign recalls.
To further investigate the mechanism by which home bias occurs, I estimate addi-
tional models presented in columns 5-8, where I include separate indicators for Central
Party Official and Regional Party Official variables and their interaction terms with the
Foreign indicator. Official newspapers have different sponsoring institutions, from the
central party to various province or municipal-level parties. We would expect official
newspapers sponsored by the central party to exhibit more bias against foreign automak-
ers. As the central party is the main decision-making organization dealing with trade
liberalization, it would be under more pressure from interest groups seeking protection
than regional governments would be. In addition, the Chinese automobile industry is
dominated by state-owned companies, and the central party owns the majority of them.12
Among provincial governments, only seven out of thirty-one own automobile companies
and thus, regional parties in general do not have a significant direct stake in protecting
12Among the 47 passenger car companies listed in the 2009 China Large Corporation Yearbook, 22 com-
panies are owned by the Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State
Council, or their joint ventures with foreign companies, 16 companies are owned by the SASAC of the
provincial or municipal parties or their joint ventures with foreign companies, and the rest are privately
owned. I collected the ownership information from the annual reports of each company, available on
the Shanghai Stock Exchange website http://www.sse.com.cn, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange website
http://www.szse.cn/main/, and from companies’ own websites.
29
the domestic automobile industry. From the perspective of the government-driven bias
hypothesis, then, central party-controlled newspapers would exhibit more bias against
foreign automakers than regional official newspapers. The estimation results presented
in columns 5-8 are consistent with this hypothesis: central party-controlled newspapers
are more likely to cover foreign recalls than domestic ones. The estimated coefficient
for the variable Central Party Official * Foreign is always statistically significant at the
0.01 level and substantively meaningful in the expected direction. Note also that the
estimated coefficient for the variable Regional Party Officials * Foreign is positive and sta-
tistically significant, but its magnitude is much smaller.
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I assess the substantive effects of an automaker being foreign across three types of
newspapers. Figure 1.1 describes the predicted probability that each type of newspaper
covers a recall event depending on the recall size and the domestic/foreign classifica-
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tion.13 As the figure illustrates, holding the size of a recall and other factors constant,
all three types of newspapers are more likely to report foreign recalls, but the substan-
tive effect appears to be the largest for central party officials, followed by regional party
officials. For example, consider a recall incident involving 1,100 cars (ln(1, 100) ≈ 7).
While a central party-sponsored official newspaper has a 12.5% probability of report-
ing the recall when it involves a domestic automaker, this probability almost doubles to
23.6% when the recall involves a foreign automaker. A regional official newspaper has,
on average, a 13.4% probability of reporting a domestic recall and a 16.9% probability
of reporting a foreign recall. On the other hand, the substantive effect of an automaker
being foreign is marginal in a commercial newspaper that has, on average, a 15.7% of
probability of covering a domestic recall and a 17.8% probability of covering a foreign
one.
This result reveals a selective coverage pattern among official newspapers. An auto
recall does not always make it into the newspaper headlines, and journalists and edi-
tors use their discretion in selecting which news stories to deliver. Among the many
factors considered, whether the firm in question is domestic or foreign appears to have
a considerable effect on whether the recall is reported by local media, especially official
media, with recalls by domestic firms less likely to be covered. The estimated substan-
tive effect suggests that readers of these newspapers get to read almost twice as many
news articles on foreign recalls as domestic recalls if the two types of recalls occur with
similar frequency. Given that foreign companies have announced more recalls in China
in recent years, the number of articles on foreign recalls relative to domestic recalls that
readers are exposed to today may even be higher than this estimate suggests. In 2013,
for instance, 59 foreign and 39 domestic recalls were announced in China. According to
13I calculated the probability using 1,000 simulations based on the estimation results from the sixth
model, setting the type of recall to engine.
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the calculated predicted probability of reporting by central-party officials, this translates
into the publication of roughly 14 news stories on foreign recalls, and only 5 on domestic
recalls.
Analyzing the Intensity of Recall Reporting Next I examine the media’s home bias
using an alternative measure, intensity of reporting. Newspapers with a home bias
would emphasize negative stories involving foreign companies: they would provide
more intensive coverage of recalls involving foreign cars. In order to explore this possi-
bility, I focus on the number of words per article as the main dependent variable indi-
cating intensity of coverage.14 Specifically, I estimate the following model focusing on
those cases in which newspapers covered a recall event:
Article Lengthikt = α + β1Foreigni + δZk + µi + τt + εikt
where Z denotes control variables at the recall level. A vector of newspaper fixed
effects, µ, and a vector of half-year fixed effects, τ, are also included to account for any
newspaper-specific and temporal factors that influence the length of articles.
Table 1.4: Length of Article as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Central Party Official Regional Party Official Non-Official
Foreign 27.642+ 25.328 31.220+ 16.177 16.237 9.924 5.882 6.952 3.390
(15.697) (15.496) (16.159) (14.936) (14.605) (14.926) (8.493) (8.223) (7.545)
Newspaper FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Halfyear FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 304 304 304 1323 1323 1323 3473 3473 3473
Marginal effects; Standard errors clustered by recalls in parentheses
All models include recall-level controls: the logarithm of recall size (number of cars affected by recall) and binary
indicators for recall type (i.e. airbag, brake, electrical system, engine, powertrain, steering, and structure/body).
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
14As words are not separated from one another in the Chinese language, I counted the number of words
after segmenting the sentence using the Stanford Word Segmenter (Chang, Galley, and Manning, 2008).
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Table 1.4 presents the estimation results: the results from central-party official papers
are placed in columns 1-3, from regional party officials in columns 4-6, and from non-
official papers in columns 7-9. Again, the results provide evidence of a government-
driven media bias. Central-party officials tend to publish longer stories on foreign auto
recalls. According to the third model, central-party officials write on average about 31
more words per article on foreign recalls than on domestic recalls, making articles on
foreign recalls about 16% longer than the average article on a recall. For other types
of newspapers, the effect of foreignness appears to be positive, but its magnitude is
marginal and not statistically significant at the conventional level.
On the whole, I find evidence of a home bias in official newspapers, especially those
controlled by the central party, and a lack of evidence for bias among non-official news-
papers. The finding that biased coverage is observed only in official newspapers (that
must take into account the interests of the party) and not in non-official newspapers
(that cater primarily to their readers’ interests) shows that government interests, not the
nationalist sentiments of newspaper readers, drive home bias.
1.4.2 State-Owned Enterprises and Party-Controlled Papers
The previous section demonstrated that official newspapers sponsored by provincial or
municipal governments are less biased. This finding is in line with the government-
driven bias hypothesis, because regional governments in general do not have a direct
stake in protecting domestic industries. However, some regional governments have a
greater interest in the automobile industry than others because they own automobile
companies (domestic or joint venture). If the government’s protectionist interest explains
the presence of a home bias in media, regional governments with a greater interest in
the automobile industry should exhibit more bias. This section conducts an empirical
investigation of this expectation.
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One key sub-national variation this study exploits is differences in the level of eco-
nomic interest regional governments have in the automotive industry. While the central
party owns most of China’s state-owned automotive enterprises (SOEs), a few provin-
cial and municipal parties have their own automotive SOEs. As a result, these gov-
ernments have a direct stake in the operation of their local enterprises, and they have
devised various protectionist measures to favor local companies. This protectionism has
continued even after China’s entry into the WTO. For instance, the Beijing municipal
government has proactively adopted various policies to promote the Beijing Hyundai
Motor Company–a joint venture between the state-owned Beijing Automotive Industry
Holding Company and Hyundai Motors, a South Korean company. These protectionist
policies include the Beijing government’s successful promotion of a Hyundai model for
Beijing’s taxi fleet change prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympics (Oh, 2013). This example
shows that some regional governments have an interest in promoting the domestic auto-
motive industry and that they seek to do so in a way that does not violate the regulations
imposed by the WTO. In this context, one would expect to observe a higher degree of
home bias among newspapers controlled by these regional governments.
I test this expectation by analyzing the reporting patterns of regional newspapers.
The localized nature of the Chinese newspaper industry allows for the examination
of variation across regions. The Chinese provinces and municipalities have official
newspapers that are controlled by provincial or municipal governments as well as non-
official newspapers that are commercial in nature. I would expect official newspapers in
provinces where the regional government has its own automotive SOE to exhibit a higher
degree of bias compared to non-official newspapers located in the same provinces or of-
ficial newspapers located in other provinces. Taking the same empirical approach used
in the previous section, I estimate the following model:
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Pr(Yijkt = 1) = Φ(α + β1Foreignk + β2Officials with Autoi + β3Officials without Autoi
+ β4Officials with Auto*Foreignik + β5Officials without Auto*Foreignik + γXj + δZk + µj + τt).
This specification is similar to the one estimated in the previous section, except that
here I focus primarily on regional newspapers and include two indicators of newspaper
type–Officials with Auto and Officials without Auto–and their respective interaction terms
with Foreign, the variable denoting recalls of foreign cars. Officials with Auto is a bi-
nary indicator, scoring 1 if newspaper i is an official newspaper in a province j where
the provincial or municipal government manages a state-owned automobile enterprise,
and 0 otherwise. Officials without Auto is a binary indicator coded 1 for official news-
papers located in a province j where the provincial or municipal government does not
own automobile enterprises and 0 for others. Taking for an example of newspapers in
Shanghai, Jiefang Daily (Jiefang ribao), the official newspaper controlled by the Shanghai
Municipal Party Committee, is coded 1 for the Officials with Auto variable and 0 for the
Officials without Auto variable, because this party committee owns the Shanghai Auto-
motive Group. The Shanghai Morning Post (Xinwen Chenbao) and the Shanghai Evening
Post (Xinwen Wanbao) are coded 0 for both Officials with Auto and Officials without Auto
variables because they are non-official papers sponsored by the press group.15 The main
goal of this analysis is to identify the effect associated with Officials with Auto and the
interaction term Officials with Auto*Foreign. Official newspapers with an interest in the
automotive industry are expected to show a greater tendency to cover recalls involving
15For the construction of this variable, I collected information on the ownership of passenger car com-
panies listed in the 2009 China Large Corporation Yearbook relying on various sources. The main sources
include the annual reports of each company, which are available on the Shanghai Stock Exchange web-
site http://www.sse.com.cn, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange website http://www.szse.cn/main/, and
companies’ own websites. As this yearbook does not contain information on medium-sized corpora-
tions, I also checked the list of state-owned companies available from the website of each provincial and
municipal government’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration to see if the list includes
any passenger car companies. For instance, the list of state-owned enterprises that Beijing supervises is
available at http://www.bjgzw.gov.cn/QtCommonAction.do?method=xxcx&type=0000006010&flag_qt=6,
which includes Beijing Automotive Group.
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foreign automakers than those involving domestic ones, and do so more than official
newspapers in regions without any direct stake in the automotive industry.
In addition to the control variables included in the previous analysis, I include the
following variables measured at the province level. First, I control for the log of the
regional gross domestic product and population by the million because auto SOEs might
be located in provinces with more wealth and a larger population. Second, I include the
FDI inflows as a percentage of the province’s gross domestic product. Those provinces
that have attracted more foreign investment might be more favorable towards foreign
companies. Conversely, those provinces exposed to more foreign influences might be
under more pressure to protect domestic industries. Either way, this factor may influence
newspapers’ relative coverage of foreign to domestic recalls. Third, the log of the value
of advertising revenue for each province is included. The media environment in Chinese
provinces varies, especially with regard to the level of commercialization, which can be
an important determinant of news coverage. I include the value of advertising revenue
reported by industry, which is a more accurate estimate of the commercialization of
local media markets than figures reported by the media itself (Stockmann, 2013: 223). I
also control for car ownership and the log of the value of automobile retail sales at the
province level because newspapers might cover auto recall incidents more frequently if
their readers are more interested in the automobile market. Lastly, I control for the log
of the value of passenger car production because auto SOEs are likely to be located in
provinces where the automotive industry plays a larger role in the regional economy.
Table 1.5 presents the estimation results. I first estimate the model without adding
the interaction terms. Official newspapers in provinces where local governments have
auto SOEs appear to cover more auto recalls in general compared to official newspapers
in other provinces. In order to examine these newspapers’ relative coverage of foreign
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Table 1.5: Probit Models Estimating Effect of Auto SOE Ownership on Recall News
Coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Foreign 0.032∗ 0.028∗ 0.026∗ 0.026∗ 0.024+ 0.029∗ 0.029∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Officials with Auto 0.060∗∗ 0.036∗∗ -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.628∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.061)
Officials without Auto -0.107∗∗ -0.099∗∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.025∗ -0.029∗∗ -0.013 -0.426∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.101)
Officials with Auto * Foreign 0.037∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.034∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Officials without Auto * Foreign -0.019 -0.015 -0.014 -0.009 -0.021 -0.014
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016)
Regional GDP, logged 0.142∗∗ 0.004 -0.111 -0.104
(0.051) (0.068) (0.088) (0.091)
Population -0.000 0.000 -0.030∗∗ -0.016∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
FDI Inflows, % of GDP 0.000 0.003 0.018∗∗ 0.013∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Advertising Revenue in Province, logged 0.003 -0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Car Ownership 0.020∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Retail Sales of Automobile, logged -0.077∗∗ -0.076∗∗
(0.020) (0.020)
Passenger Cars Production, logged -0.012 -0.005
(0.011) (0.011)
Province FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Newspaper FE No No No No No No Yes
Halfyear FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33455 33455 33455 33455 27575 24313 23758
Marginal effects; Standard errors clustered by recalls in parentheses
All models include recall-level controls: the logarithm of recall size (number of cars affected by recall) and binary indicators
for recall type (i.e. airbag, brake, electrical system, engine, powertrain, steering, and structure/body).
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
and domestic recalls, I add the interaction terms in models 2-7. Across the estimations,
the interaction term Official with Auto * Foreign appears to be positive and statistically
significant at the 0.01 level or the 0.05 level, but Official without Auto * Foreign is neg-
ative and far from statistically significant. In other words, regional newspapers under
the control of local governments seeking to protect the domestic automotive industry
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exhibit anti-foreign bias. This tendency, however, is not observed in official newspapers
controlled by governments with less of an economic interest in the automotive indus-
try. This suggests that not all government-owned newspapers are biased against foreign
firms. Rather, government-owned newspapers exhibit bias only when the government
has an interest in protecting domestic industries.
In order to better illustrate the result, Figure 1.2 describes the predicted probability
of reporting a foreign versus a domestic recall.16 As the left panel shows, newspapers
controlled by regional governments with a direct stake in the automotive industry are
more likely to report on auto recalls involving imported cars. Newspapers under the
control of other governments with no direct interest in the automotive industry, however,
cover foreign recalls about as often as domestic ones.
16I calculated the probability using 1,000 simulations based on the estimation result from the second
model. I set the type of recall to engine.
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1.5 Robustness Tests
I subject my results to a series of robustness checks. All robustness checks are variations
of the original Models 3 and 7 from Table 1.3 and Model 6 from Table 1.5. The results
presented in the Appendix demonstrate that the substantive findings of this analysis of
auto recall reporting patterns remain strong across various specifications.
First, I account for differences between domestic and foreign cars in order to ensure
that the findings are not driven by these differences other than “being foreign” vs. “being
domestic.” The major discernible difference is automobile price. Imported foreign cars
tend to be more expensive than domestically produced ones, partly because the foreign
category includes luxury brand cars. Thus, we may observe bias against foreign cars in
some newspapers simply because these newspapers tend to report on luxury cars more
frequently and intensely. In order to account for this, I additionally control for the price
of recalled cars in the empirical analysis. I also create a binary indicator for luxury brand
cars and include this indicator in the empirical analysis, and also estimate an additional
model excluding luxury brand cars from the sample. These additional variables appear
to have no meaningful effect on reporting decisions.
Another notable difference between domestic and foreign cars is the frequency of
recalls. Foreign automakers have announced recalls more frequently than domestic or
joint-venture automakers. This difference does not explain the empirical pattern by
itself, because my empirical focus is on the probability that a given newspaper will
report a recall, not on the absolute number of news reports on foreign versus domestic
recalls. It is plausible, however, that newspapers find recalls by foreign automakers
more newsworthy due to the reoccurrence of these recalls. I account for this possibility
by controlling for the cumulative number of recalls by a manufacturer in China from
2005 to the date of the recall announcement under analysis. Controlling this variable
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does not change my main findings.
Second, I exclude a subset of observations in order to ensure that my main substan-
tive results are not driven by a small set of observations. I successively exclude major
provinces or province-level cities, including Beijing, Guangdong, Hubei, Shanghai, and
Sichuan, one by one. The coefficients for the main variables and their substantive signif-
icance remain strong. I also exclude recalls by manufacturers in specific countries from
the sample, one by one, to check if the biased reporting targets a specific country. The
results show that the media’s home bias remains substantial even when I exclude subsets
of observations involving recalls by manufacturers based in France, Germany, Japan, the
U.S., and the U.K. This suggests that the news media do not make a clear distinction
among producers in different countries in making their reporting decisions.
Third, I estimate the same models with different clustering. I cluster the standard
errors by newspapers instead of by recalls. I also cluster by the two dimensions of news-
paper and recall to capture the unspecified correlation between observations of the same
newspaper in different recall reporting decisions and the dependence between observa-
tions of different newspapers in the same recall event. I follow a standard approach for
estimating standard errors clustered by multiple dimensions (Cameron, Gelbach, and
Miller, 2011; Petersen, 2009; Thompson, 2011). The main substantive findings remain
robust across the models.
Lastly, I experiment with a different coding of the Official variable by treating semi-
official newspapers as official newspapers. I originally treated evening newspapers
sponsored by party organizations as non-official papers because they mainly rely on
newsstand sales. As these newspapers are conventionally considered to be semi-official,
under less government control than official newspapers but more government control
than fully commercial newspapers, I revise the coding scheme. The analysis results
show that revising the coding scheme does not change the empirical results.
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1.6 Discussion of an Alternative Mechanism: Different Readerships
A plausible alternative mechanism of the main empirical findings could be the different
characteristics of readers of official and non-official newspapers. Official newspapers’
home bias could be explained by the nationalistic attitudes of their readers. Such a
mechanism, however, is unlikely to hold for the following reasons. Official newspapers
do not cater to their readers but only to government interests because they do not rely on
circulation or sales of newspapers. Thus, it is unlikely that the readership characteristics
account for the reporting patterns of official newspapers. Even if we assume that official
newspapers seek to cater to more nationalistic readers, this account is unable to explain
the sub-national variation: why regional official papers based in provinces with direct
stake in the automobile industry exhibit more bias than other regional official papers.
More importantly, official newspaper readers do not differ from non-official newspa-
per readers in their nationalistic sentiments. According to the 2004 Beijing Area Studies
survey data that included detailed questions on media consumption patterns, official
newspaper readers on average have higher income and include more CCP members, but
their nationalist attitudes do not diverge from non-official newspaper readers. Responses
to two questions can be used as a proxy measure for nationalistic attitudes of individ-
uals: if they would like to be born again as a Chinese citizen, and if they think China
is a better country than others. To these questions, a great majority of both official and
non-official newspaper readers answered “strongly agree” or “somewhat agree” (98.2%
and 86.0% of readers of only official newspapers, 94.2% and 81.6% of readers of only
commercial newspapers, and 94.4% and 80.0% of readers of both types of newspapers
to the first and the second questions, respectively; see the Appendix for detailed infor-
mation). This shows that nationalistic tendency is very prevalent among Chinese people
regardless of their news consumption pattern. As non-official newspaper readers are as
41
nationalistic as official newspaper readers, we should have observed bias in commercial
newspapers if nationalistic attitude explains the media’s home bias.
1.7 Further Examination of Media Bias Beyond Recall Reporting
While the main empirical scope of this study is limited to coverage of auto recalls, I
demonstrate that media bias is not unique to auto recall coverage, by expanding observa-
tions to include other automobile-related news articles. As these additional observations
include positive or neutral newspaper articles, I am able to demonstrate that newspapers
are less likely to cover positive or neutral stories when foreign automobiles are involved.
Figure 1.3: Difference in Topic Proportions: Domestic (-) vs. Foreign (+)
To conduct this analysis, I collected newspaper articles that contain the name of an
automaker in their headlines and the word “car” (che) or the word for measuring unit
for counting cars (liang) in their stories published by four newspapers in Beijing (Beijing
Daily, Beijing Youth Daily, Beijing Morning Post and Beijing Evening News) from 2000 to
2014. With these 15,141 newspaper articles, I estimated the Structural Topic Model (STM)
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that classify texts into a given number of categories incorporating structural information
about the texts (e.g. the year when the news article was published, or whether the news
article involves foreign cars) (Roberts et al., 2014). I estimated a 25 topic STM and exam-
ined the effect of being foreign on topic proportion. Figure 1.3 illustrates the difference
in topic proportion between foreign and domestic automobiles. I present the results for
substantively meaningful topics while excluding topics irrelevant to automobiles. The
figure demonstrates that newspapers are more likely to write on quality problems and
recalls, and less likely to write on brand promotion, price, sales-related information, or
store events for foreign cars compared to domestic counterparts (see the Appendix for a
detailed explanation of the empirical analysis). While the results cannot serve as an ob-
jective indicator for media bias (since foreign cars may have had more quality problems
or recalls, and released less information on sales or prices), they suggest that foreign
firms may find it harder to deliver positive stories about their companies or products
through the news media.
1.8 Media Bias and Consumer Behavior
Does the news media’s home bias affect consumer behavior? Inducing home bias in
the news media can work as a trade barrier only when the news media can change
consumer perception of domestic and foreign products and their consumption patterns.
In this section, I examine the effect of home bias in the news media by focusing on
recall-related web searches and automobile sales in the Chinese market.
1.8.1 Recall-Related Web Searches
I examine how the biased news reporting pattern is associated with individual awareness
of recalls by relying on web query data provided by Baidu, the largest search engine in
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China with more than 80% of market share. If the media’s home bias were to affect con-
sumer behavior, we should first observe that information provided through the news me-
dia reaches individuals. As a way of measuring individuals’ awareness of information,
I examine web searches data because individuals who become aware of product recalls
through the news media would seek to find more information through web querying.
The Baidu Index provides the daily volume of web searches for selected keywords for
all Chinese provinces from 2011 to the present.17 I collected this data for recall-related
web searches for different automakers (e.g. Great Wall recall, FAW-Volkswagen recall,
or BMW recall).
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With this recall-related web searches data, I examine if the following expectation
holds: as official newspapers controlled by the central party and the regional parties
with auto SOEs are more likely to report recalls involving foreign automobiles, individ-
uals are expected to be more aware of recalls of foreign cars than those of domestic ones,
17For more information about the Baidu Index, see index.baidu.com.
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particularly in regions where governments own auto SOEs. Figure 1.4 that compares
the average web-search volume for four different automakers across provinces is consis-
tent with this expectation. First, the average volume of recall-related web searches are
higher for foreign cars (BMW and Toyota) than for domestically produced cars (FAW-
Volkswagen and Great Wall). As the market share of FAW-Volkswagen is higher than
that of BMW (8.2% versus 1.0%),18 this difference cannot be explained by the difference
in market share.19 Second, the search volume is higher in provinces with auto SOE than
in other provinces with regard to foreign cars, but there is little difference between two
types of regions with regard to domestic cars. This pattern is consistent with my find-
ings on the pattern of media bias across provinces. The pattern also implies that bias
in official newspapers alone may affect consumer perceptions of domestic and foreign
products even when commercial newspapers remain unbiased or less biased.
1.8.2 Automobile Sales
I next turn to examine the differential effect of recalls on sales of foreign and domestic
automakers. A number of empirical studies have demonstrated the negative effect of au-
tomobile recalls on sales and stockprices of the automakers (Grafton, Hoffer, and Reilly,
1981; Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985). One key mechanism underlying this finding is infor-
mation: when an individual receives information about an automaker’s recall decision,
the individual’s perception of the automaker that produced defective cars changes, and
the individual would become less likely to purchase its products in the future. This infor-
mation mechanism, however, is less likely to work with regard to domestic automakers
18The market share is the author’s own calculation based on the number of imported BMW cars and the
number of sold FAW-Volkswagen cars using the data available in the 2014 China Auto Market Almanac
(Zhongguo qiche shichang nianjian).
19The difference may be explained by the brand effect because individuals may pay more attention to
foreign luxury brands than to joint-ventures. However, this alternative mechanism cannot explain the
sub-national difference between auto SOE provinces and others.
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in the context of China because their recalls are less likely to be reported, as suggested
by my findings on media bias. Thus, the effect of automobile recalls on sales is expected
to be limited for domestic automakers compared to its effect on foreign automakers.
I test this expectation by analyzing the effect of recall announcements on sales of do-
mestic and foreign automakers in China from 2007 to 2013.20 As the provincial level sales
data are not publicly available at the automaker level in China, my analysis focuses on
the yearly sales data of different automakers without exploring sub-national difference.
I estimate the following model:
∆ Log(Sales)it = α + β1Number of Recallsi,t−1 + β2Foreign*Number of Recallsi,t−1




t + υit + εit.
The dependent variable is the yearly change in sales, measured as the logged number
of cars sold or imported for an automaker i.21 The main independent variables are the
number of recalls announced by each firm i in year t-1, and its interaction term with the
binary indicator Foreign. The main variable of interest is the interaction term, which is
expected to be negative and statistically significant. The binary variable Foreign is not
separately estimated because I include a vector of firm fixed effects, µ, throughout the
models. A yearly time trend τ, its squared and cubed term along with a firm-specific
time trend υ are added to some models to account for any firm-specific temporal factors.
Table 1.6 presents the estimation results. The results suggest that a foreign firm that
announced a recall in the previous year would experience a negative effect of recalls
20I choose this time period because the data on the number of imports of foreign cars by automakers is
not available for the year 2006, while the recall announcement data are available from 2005.
21I use the number of car sales per year for domestic automotive companies and the number of imports
per year for foreign automotive companies due to the data availability (sales data are not available for
imported cars for each automaker). The data are from the the China Auto Market Almanac series, 2006-2014
(Zhongguo qiche shichang nianjian).
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Table 1.6: Regression Models Estimating Effect of Recalls on Sales: Foreign vs. Do-
mestic
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Recalls (t-1) -0.002 0.008 0.020
(0.025) (0.025) (0.045)
Foreign * Number of Recall (t-1) -0.127∗∗ -0.117∗ -0.106
(0.049) (0.050) (0.066)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Yearly Trend No Yes Yes
Firm-specific Trend No No Yes
Observations 904 904 904
Standard errors clustered by firms in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
on sales, as indicated by the negative significant coefficient on the interaction term. The
announcement of recalls, however, does not appear to bring substantially negative effects
on sales of domestic firms. The findings suggest that domestic firms may suffer less from
automobile recalls compared to foreign firms. The analysis presented here is far from a
complete anlaysis of automobile sales, which are influenced by many factors including
price, advertising, or other marketing strategy. Nevertheless, my findings show the
differential effect of recalls on automobile sales. While the effect of recalls appears to
be negative for foreign firms, my analysis reveals little effect of recalls on the sales of
domestic cars. Again, many factors may account for these findings, but this pattern
is consistent with the expectation that the effect of recalls on domestic firms would be
limited because their recall announcements are less likely to be known among consumers
due to the biased coverage of news media.
1.9 Conclusion
This study has demonstrated that newspapers in China, especially those under strict
government control, exhibit systematic bias against foreign automakers. The disadvan-
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tage of being foreign is substantial: auto recalls by foreign companies are more than
twice as likely to be reported by central government-controlled newspapers, and those
news reports tend to be more intense compared to those involving domestic automak-
ers. This study has also found suggestive evidence on the effect of such bias: foreign
recalls become more widely known than domestic recalls; and foreign firms experience
the negative effect of recalls on their market share while its effect is limited to domestic
firms.
This study’s empirical analysis pertains to China, but its implications for interna-
tional trade have broad applicability. Government ownership of news media is perva-
sive in other countries as well. A survey of media ownership in 97 countries by Djankov
et al. (2003) finds that the state, on average, controls about 29% of newspapers, 60% of
television stations, and 72% of top radio stations. This suggests that news media outlets
in other countries may also face political pressure to portray domestic firms in a more
positive light. One extension of this study would be to examine how other governments
use news media as a protectionist instrument. Another possible extension would be to
examine how the effect of WTO membership on import flows varies depending on the
media environment of member countries. Some governments can utilize news media to
protect their domestic industries when their trade policy is constrained by the rules of
the WTO. Thus, WTO accession may have limited influence to increase imports, espe-
cially in consumer goods, in countries where news media are under tight government
control. Exploring this question is timely and important given that recent members of
the WTO include authoritarian countries with limited press freedom such as Russia,
Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam.
Relatedly, this study contributes to the study of regime type and trade policy. Pre-
vious works show that democracy leads to more free trade agreements (Mansfield, Mil-
ner, and Rosendorff, 2002) and lower tariffs (Milner and Kubota, 2005), but democratic
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countries protect their markets through “behind-the-door” measures such as non-tariff
quality barriers (Kono and Rickard, 2014). As these studies suggest, democratic leaders
have greater incentives to use opaque measures in order to avoid the electoral costs of
employing visible protectionist measures. Despite these leaders’ preferences for using
opaque measures, however, my finding suggests that they may be less able to do so in
some areas, including the realm of news media, where government influence is limited.
In contrast, autocratic leaders, while having less of an incentive to employ opaque in-
struments, are better able to do so because their political systems are less transparent
than democratic systems. Thus, a full understanding of the impact of regime type on





The Impact of Unions on Workers’ Trade Preferences
(with Yotam Margalit)
2.1 Introduction
To what extent, and in what way, do labor unions shape workers’ political preferences?
The importance of unions is often attributed to their role in advancing the interests of
workers, allowing them to overcome problems of collective action and to generate an
effective “voice” (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Much has been made, therefore, of the
decline in the power of unions in recent decades and the impact of this trend on the
representation of the disadvantaged and less well-off.
Yet despite a decrease in membership rates, union members still represent very siz-
able shares in the electorates of most advanced economies: a quarter of all workers in
Britain, a third in Italy, and over half the workforce in countries such as Norway or Bel-
gium. Even in the U.S., a noted example of shrinking unionization rates, enlisted union
members still account for about 11% of the workforce (almost fifteen million workers), a
conservative figure that excludes non-members covered by union agreements, nor fam-
ily members whose livelihoods often depend on a unionized wage earner.1 Clearly, few
1Data is from: OECD and J.Visser, ICTWSS database, version 3.0 (http://www.uva-aias.net/208).
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organizations have the reach and ongoing access to such a significant share of the elec-
torate as labor unions do. A key question is whether and how this access translates into
political influence.
The importance of this question has gained added impetus in recent years, as scholars
have argued that the decline in union membership contributed to a host of regressive
labor market outcomes, including weakening labor protections in the face of growing
trade liberalization, erosion of the real minimum wage, and the overall rise in income
inequality (Bartels, 2009; Burgoon and Raess, 2006; Hacker and Pierson, 2011). One
factor potentially contributing to these developments is the influence that unions exert
on shaping the political views of their members. If unions are an institution that directly
affects the policy preferences of a large swath of workers, e.g. by providing policy-
relevant information to its members, the decline in union density could help account
for the relatively weak public opposition to a host of regressive policies advanced in
recent years. Yet this potential explanation rests on the assumption that unions exert
substantial influence on the political preferences of their members, a key assumption
that is empirically unsubstantiated. As a recent study summarizing the state of the
research on the topic concluded, “After 60 years of research on American unions, we
still lack convincing evidence of whether or how union membership affects political
attitudes” (Ahlquist, Clayton, and Levi, 2014).
This lacuna is due at least in part to empirical challenges that arise in evaluating
the political influence of unions on their members. The first is an absence of appro-
priate data. Standard national surveys do not include sizable samples of both union
members and non-members within the same industry, limiting researchers’ ability to
conduct comparisons with a meaningful control group. A second empirical challenge
arises from the fact that even if one overcame this data availability issue, and found that
union members in a given industry hold policy positions that differ from those of their
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non-unionized counterparts, the interpretation would still be unclear. It may be that par-
ticipation in the union itself causes workers to adopt certain positions (i.e., a treatment
effect), but it is equally plausible that workers who choose to join a union differ from
non-unionized workers in other characteristics that may also account for their divergent
political preferences (i.e., a selection effect).
We address these empirical challenges by combining a unique original survey that
includes large samples of American workers in a targeted set of industries together with
a set of inferential strategies that allow us to test the relative strength of the competing
explanations. Our analysis focuses on the policy views of workers regarding trade open-
ness, one of the few salient political issues on which unions across different industries
vary significantly in positions and strength of preferences. To explore the link between
the unions’ stance on trade and the preferences of their members, we generate a new
metric of each union’s policy position that is based on its official announcements and
lobbying efforts on trade-related bills in the years preceding the study.
Our findings provide evidence that unions exert influence on their members in a
clear and systematic manner. In contrast, our analysis suggests that self-selection into
unions accounts, at most, for less than a quarter of the observed difference between
union members and their non-unionized counterparts. More specifically, the analysis
points to the important role of unions as information providers, demonstrating a strong
relationship between the intensity of unions’ correspondence with their members, the
degree of information that members possess about the issue at hand, and the degree of
alignment between the unions and their members on the issue.
Exploiting differences across the U.S. in the legal choice that workers face in join-
ing or opting out of unions (a.k.a the ‘Right-to-Work’ law), we show that preferences of
union members and non-members are not consistent with the legal differences in selec-
tion mechanisms into unions. We estimate that union membership accounts for about a
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41% increase above the baseline rate in workers’ likelihood of opposing trade liberaliza-
tion, an effect comparable to the effect associated with obtaining a college degree, one
of the most studied and established predictors of trade policy preferences (Scheve and
Slaughter, 2001b; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006). In addition, we leverage the dramatic
change in the United Auto Workers’ stance toward a free trade agreement with Korea
and examine the impact of its reversal on the stance of its members. Using pre- and
post-shift data, we show that members had indeed become more supportive of trade ex-
pansion following their union’s change of position, while this change had no discernible
effect on non-members employed in the same industry.
The chapter contributes to the research on the political impact of unions, currently the
only organized interest group representing the interests of the low-skilled (Schlozman,
Verba, and Brady, 2012). Beyond the well-researched traditional routes of influence, such
as lobbying and investments in PACs (Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra, 2011; Masters and
Delaney, 2005), we show that unions are also able to influence the views of their mem-
bership in a meaningful and theoretically predictable way. The study also speaks to the
broader literature on organized interests (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Gais and Walker Jr,
1991; Kollman, 1998). In a major recent study of such organizations, Schlozman, Verba,
and Brady (2012) note that one of the prominent routes by which advocacies pursue
their objectives is by dissemination of information to members of the organization and
to the public, with the aim of communicating to public officials their favored political
stance. Yet as the authors acknowledge, systematic data on such activities is lacking,
a deficiency that limits our understanding of how organized interest groups use infor-
mation dissemination as a mechanism of influence. This study provides new insight
on how one prominent type of organized interest fills this function, and highlights the
substantial heterogeneity across unions (i.e. within the same type of interest group) in
both the mode of operation and its degree of influence.
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Finally, our analysis also adds to the work on the sources of voter preferences. In
particular, a prominent strand in the political economy literature attributes the positions
that individuals take on various policies (e.g. trade, immigration, taxation) to their
expectations regarding the likely impact of the policy on their own wellbeing (Facchini
and Mayda, 2009; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001b). Yet, most studies typically just assume
this link between perceived self-interest and policy preferences, without explaining how
those interests are crystallized by voters. By providing substantial new evidence on
the role and impact of unions as information providers, the chapter illuminates one
important mechanism that helps substantiate this key assumption.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the main insights from the liter-
ature and draws a set of expectations about the influence of unions on their members.
Section III describes our data and empirical approach. Sections IV and V present the
findings and a set of robustness tests. The final section discusses the broader impli-
cations of the findings for research on preference formation and the evolving role of
unions.
2.2 Preference Formation, Information, and the Impact of Unions
One prominent strand in the political economy literature on policy preferences focuses
on voters’ self-interested considerations. This line of explanation suggests that people’s
attitudes on a policy are largely determined by the utilities they expect to derive from
it (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001a). Critiques of the interest-
based approach center not only on the empirical support (or lack thereof) for some of
its predictions, but also on the mechanism underlying its core logic. In particular, some
question the basic, often implicit, assumption that individuals understand how their
personal well-being is influenced by government policy (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009).
The notion that voters can tease out the implications of a complex policy, which at times
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is a matter of debate even among the experts, seems questionable, particularly given
the wealth of evidence demonstrating citizens’ lack of knowledge or grasp of very basic
political and economic facts (Campbell et al., 1960; Ferejohn, 1990).
One response to this critique focuses on voter learning. Such learning could pre-
sumably occur in several ways, without requiring the (probably heroic) assumption that
voters actively seek out and process policy-relevant information. For example, individu-
als may draw on their everyday experiences to form policy opinions that largely accord
with their interests. Indeed, some studies show that voters update their political pref-
erences leftwards – even if only temporarily – in response to the experience of various
hardships such as loss of employment or of health care (Hacker, Rehm, and Schlesinger,
2013; Margalit, 2013). Another source of learning is exposure to information or cues.
According to this view, citizens acquire pertinent knowledge about the rationale and
preferences of friends, co-workers, or other groups that they believe to share interests
with them, and subsequently infer how a policy is likely to affect their own interests
(Lupia, 1994).
It is within this strand of arguments that the importance of labor unions is often
stressed. Unions have close access to their members via regular meetings, direct mail-
ings or mobilization drives, and thus could regularly communicate with their members
on the political issues of the day. If the members consider the union as a custodian of
their interests and a reliable source of information, these communications can potentially
influence and sway the political views of the member (Iversen and Soskice, 2015). Unions
can also encourage their members to invest more effort in acquiring policy-relevant in-
formation (Ahlquist and Levi, 2013).
Indeed, in their mammoth study of political advocacy organizations, Schlozman,
Verba, and Brady (2012: 400) note that an important route by which such organiza-
tions pursue their interests is through “disseminating information to the public or to
55
the organization’s members... in order to highlight issues, to shape opinions, or to gen-
erate communication to public officials in support of favored political positions”. Yet
as this and related studies on advocacies indicate (e.g. Baumgartner et al. (2009); Gais
and Walker Jr (1991); Kollman (1998)), there is little systematic data on the frequency or
scope of information dissemination efforts, let alone on their actual impact. Perhaps due
to this lack of data, the bulk of work on the political impact of unions has focused on
other routes of influence, such as campaigns to increase voter turnout, mobilization of
members to engage in PAC contributions, and on lobbying activities aimed at affecting
pro-union legislation (Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra, 2011; Leighley and Nagler, 2007;
Masters and Delaney, 1987).
In the context of trade policy, the domain of influence on which we focus in this chap-
ter, prior studies find that union membership is, on average, associated with lower sup-
port for free trade (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001b). Discussing
this finding, scholars surmise that it may be the outcome of unions’ ongoing communi-
cations on the matter with their membership (e.g. Mansfield and Mutz, 2009: 431,436).
Yet again, other than conjecture, little evidence exists to back up this contention.
Cognizant of this deficiency, Ahlquist, Clayton, and Levi (2014) provide what is per-
haps the most careful and nuanced new set of insights on the matter. Focusing on a
case study of a dockworkers’ union (ILWU), and using a survey of workers in three U.S.
localities, the authors employ a matching procedure to get an estimate of the “union
effect" on workers’ attitudes. Overall, they find that members of the ILWU were more
willing than non-members to support a protectionist stance on trade, even though trade
openness was highly beneficial to their own employment. The authors propose that this
seemingly puzzling result is evidence that the union was able to influence its members to
oppose a policy that was injurious to the broader class of workers. The study combines
survey data and a rich historical account of the ILWU’s position on trade policy over a
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period of six decades. Yet as the authors recognize, it remains an open question whether
the findings regarding this case can be generalized to explain the impact of unions on
workers’ policy preferences in the broader economy.
To address this question, one must not only investigate the impact of unions on
a broader set of sectors, but also explore the mechanism underlying the influence of
unions. If unions clarify the interests and shape the preferences of their members, sys-
tematic evidence should show that members: (i) are aware of the information provided
by their unions; (ii) correctly interpret the union’s stance on the matter; and (iii) are
more likely to adopt the position touted by the unions. While these outcomes are at
least plausible ex ante, convincing empirical research on all three questions is lacking. In
the next sections we aim to provide new insights that address each of these contentions
in turn.
2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
Our analysis uses novel survey data of more than 4,000 American workers employed in
a set of selected industries. The survey design followed a customized two-stage sam-
pling approach. First, a set of 12 key industries were identified based on several criteria
reflecting variation in their exposure to the impacts of globalization (e.g., factor inten-
sity, value-added per worker, trade balance, and exposure to offshoring activity).2 Then,
from each of those targeted industries, sizable samples of currently employed workers
were recruited by YouGov/Polimetrix to participate in an online survey fielded between
July 2010 and February 2011.3
To gain greater variation in the industries’ exposure to international commerce, the
2Industries are classified at the 3 digit NAICS level.
3The data was collected as part of the Harvard Globalization Survey in which Margalit was a co-PI.
See Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit (2015) for a more detailed description of the survey. We thank the
other PIs for generously allowing us to use the data for this study.
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survey included firms in both manufacturing and services. As Table 2.1 shows, the in-
dustries provide wide variation of values along a set of pertinent dimensions. For exam-
ple, with respect to trade balance, the selected industries include import-competing in-
dustries (e.g., transportation equipment and computer electronics manufacturing), non-
tradables (e.g., health services) and export-oriented industries (e.g., food manufactur-
ing). Overall, the data include responses from 497 union members (12% of the sample),
with substantial variation across industries.4
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Selected Industries
Total Output Trade Share Median Union Sample
Employed per Worker Balance BA Income Member Size
Industry: (1000s) ($) (B$) Degree ($) (%) (#)
Manufacturing
Food products 1,485 292,093 8,400 22% 51,000 11.0 218
Chemical 850 546,482 -3,100 40% 88,945 8.0 225
Transportation equipment 1,607 362,878 -14,000 24% 76,005 17.4 270
Computer electronics 1,248 412,519 -110,000 48% 96,004 1.2 349
Fabricated metal products 1,528 163,973 -9,900 15% 61,570 9.4 352
Services
Data processing and internet 395 359,059 0 45% 82,557 1.3 320
Financial 858 507,517 41 65% 110,067 0.5 375
Telecommunications 1,022 470,191 2 34% 83,000 15.2 375
Construction 7,215 119,281 0 15% 55,197 12.0 393
Nursing and residential care 3,008 43,584 0 18% 4,590 6.8 382
Ambulatory health care 5,661 112,263 0 48% 73,067 5.8 446
Education 3,037 51,309 13 65% 79,235 34.4 607
Source: March Supplement of Current Population Survey 2009;
2010 United States International Trade Commission data on imports and exports
We use a series of questions that could potentially tap into different aspects of work-
ers’ views on trade policy. Our analysis relies on responses to all three questions:
We would like to learn about your views on trade with other countries -
by trade we mean American businesses and individuals buying goods from
other countries or selling goods to other countries.
• Overall, do you think trade with other countries should be expanded,
reduced, or kept at its current level?
4See appendix for breakdown of union membership by industry.
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• Do you think that trade with other countries is good or bad for you and
your family?
• Do you think that trade with other countries is good or bad for the U.S.
as a whole?
To explore the link between union membership and views on trade, the survey also
contains questions regarding the intensity of communication initiated by the union on
trade policy, as well as a question pertaining to the degree of information that the mem-
bers possess about their unions’ position on the issue (see appendix for exact question
wording).
In order to examine the correspondence between how members assess the stance
of their union and its actual position, we generated a new measure of each union’s
“revealed preference” with respect to trade policy. We did so using information on
each union’s official announcements and lobbying activity on all relevant trade-related
legislation advanced in the two years prior to our study. We code the union’s stance
on a bill on a 7-point scale, and aggregate the codings from all bills to place the unions
along a trade protectionist-liberalizer continuum. In total, we coded the activities of
15 labor unions that represent 75% of the unionized survey respondents who provided
information on their affiliated unions.5
We examine the position of each union on major trade-related bills. We focus on all
the bills on which at least one of the unions under study carried out an official (i.e., reg-
5Of the 497 surveyed union members, 343 respondents provided information on their union affiliation.
The majority provided the exact names of their union. For those respondents who only provided the codes
of their local branches (e.g. local 101) or their firm names, we were able to infer their union affiliation based
on residence, industry, and firm name. For that, we used the records of collective bargaining agreements
between firms and unions available through the Office of Labor-Management Standards (http://www.
dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/cba/) and the Center for Union Facts (http://www.unionfacts.com/).
Among the remaining unionized workers not represented through the 15 unions, 57% belong to other
unions in the education sector which presumably hold a similar stance on policy issues with the primary
unions in the sector that we do examine, namely the National Education Association and the American
Federation of Teachers; the other 33% belong to 32 different organizations for which have only one or two
members in the entire sample.
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istered) lobbying effort and those bills that had potential application across industries.6
For every bill, we code each union’s position along a seven-point scale that ranges from
‘strongly protectionist’ (+3) to ‘strongly pro-trade’ (-3). The coding is based on the posi-
tion expressed by the union (i.e., pro- or anti-liberalization) and the number of quarters
it registered lobbying activity for or against the bill.7 For example, for bills on which
a union lobbied against liberalization for five quarters or more,8 the union’s position is
coded as ‘strongly protectionist’. If the lobbying took place for a shorter period of 1 to 4
quarters, we assign a ‘protectionist’ (+2) score; we code a union as ‘weakly protectionist’
(+1) score if it did not lobby on the bill but had expressed a protectionist stance on the
issue in its official pronouncements. Conversely, we assign scores between -1 and -3
using the same coding criteria when the union takes a pro-liberalization stance. Finally,
a ‘neutral position’ (0) is assigned if the union did not express any view on the issue nor
conducted any related lobbying activity.
Table 2.2 summarizes each union’s score on the trade protectionism scale. Since we
examine each union’s position on eleven different trade bills, the score could theoreti-
cally range from a low of -33 (pro-free trade) to a high of +33 (protectionist). As ex-
pected, unions operating in the import competing sectors – fabricated metal, transporta-
tion equipment, and chemical manufacturing – exhibit the most protectionist stance. We
also find, unsurprisingly, that the least protectionist unions operate in the export ori-
ented sector, food manufacturing, and in the non-tradable service sectors of education,
nursing, and ambulatory health services. Somewhat surprisingly, unions in the build-
6We obtained each union’s lobbying reports from the Lobbying Disclosure Act Database available at
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/Public_Disclosure/LDA_reports.htm. We then examined all the
issues classified as trade-related issues according to the general issue area code in the report. See Appendix
for a detailed description on the bills and the selection criteria.
7We use the union’s official letters to Congress or public statements to code whether the union’s stance
is pro-trade or protectionist when lobbying reports do not have relevant information.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ing construction and the telecommunication sectors, both of which are not significantly
affected by the flows of international trade, nonetheless take a relatively protectionist
stance on the trade bills under study. To compare the views of union members and non-
members that share similar employment interests, we also generate an average protection-
ism score. As an industry has members in multiple unions, we average the protectionism
score of each of union, and weight it by the proportion the union represents among all
workers in the industry.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Do Union Members Have Different Policy Preferences?
We begin by presenting an unconditional comparison of union members’ trade policy
preferences and those of non-members working in the same industry. The panels in
Figure 2.1 present a comparison of the share of respondents in each group who: i)
support reducing trade levels, ii) have a negative perception of trade’s impact on self,
and iii) have a negative perception of trade’s impact on the U.S. as a whole.9
The graphs show that union members’ policy preferences are different from those
of non-members, but the impact of union membership is not uniform across industries.
In the manufacturing industries – transportation equipment, fabricated metal, chemical
manufacturing, and food manufacturing – union members tend to hold more negative
attitudes toward free trade than non-members. Yet, the difference in view associated
with union membership is not homogeneous across the service industries. While union
members employed in building construction are more opposed to trade expansion than
non-members, the opposite pattern is registered in nursing and residential care, as well
9The binary measure uses the bottom two categories on the five-point scale to classify the opposition
to trade.
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Figure 2.1: Trade Policy Views of Union Members vs Non-Members, by Industry










Trade Levels (%) Trade on Self (%) Trade on US (%)
Union Member Non-Member
as in the ambulatory health care industries, where unionized workers are less protec-
tionist. Finally, we find little difference between the preferences of union members and
non-members in both the telecommunication and education sectors.
To get a better sense of the overall ‘union effect’ across all industries, while taking
account of the main potential confounders, we conduct a nearest-neighbor matching ex-
ercise. We match each union member with a non-unionized worker who is employed in
the same industry and sector (private vs. public), and is also of the same gender, eth-
nicity, martial status and education level as the union member.10 After the requirement
for exact matching on these criteria is fulfilled, the matching algorithm is instructed to
seek the closest observation in terms of income level and age.11 With the matched data,
we estimate a probit regression model calculating the average treatment effect of union
membership on all three dependent variables.
The results, presented in Figure 2.2, indicate that the average ‘union effect’ is in-
deed considerable: union members are about 5 percentage points more likely to support
reduction in levels of trade than similar workers from the same industry who do not
10Education level is measured as a binary indicator of completing a 4-year college degree.
11We do not match on the respondent’s party identification that could be influenced by union member-
ship.
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belong to a union and about 5 percentage points more likely to perceive that trade is
adversely affecting them personally. The largest effect is registered with regard to the
view that trade is harming the U.S. as whole, where the estimated union effect is an
increase of 8 percentage points. Even taking account of the uncertainty in the estimates,
the union effect is statistically distinguishable from zero at the 95% for all three of the
dependent variables.








The question, of course, is what accounts for this ‘union effect’ and its variation across
industries. Two plausible answers come to mind. Some unions might be more strongly
opposed to trade expansion and thus more active than other unions in communicating
their views to their members. Alternatively, the variation we observe may perhaps be
explained by different sorting effects. Since unions across industries represent different
interests, they may attract as members those individuals who to begin with hold similar
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views to those of the unions (i.e. a self-selection mechanism). In other words, the first
mechanism holds that unions shape the views of their members through communication
and information provision, while the second mechanism suggests that unions merely
echo the preferences of their members, not shape them. The following sections present
empirical tests that evaluate the relative validity of these two lines of explanation.
2.4.2 Unions as Information Providers
To evaluate the validity of the information provision mechanism, we begin by using
descriptive data to examine the basic expectation that unions do indeed communicate
with their members on trade issue. We then explore the extent to which members are
familiar with their union’s stance on the issue.
Our first analysis examines the issues that unions discuss most prominently in their
communications with their members. As part of the survey, union members were asked
to list up to three issues that were most frequently addressed in their union’s commu-
nications. The answers to this open-ended question, presented in Figure 2.3, indicate
that in some industries a considerable share of members describe trade as one of the
three most discussed issues by the union: 58% of the respondents belonging to the
United Auto Workers and 25% from the International Association of Machinists. In
sharp contrast, none from two of the least protectionist unions – the American Fed-
eration of Teachers and the Service Employees International Union – listed trade as a
frequently discussed issue.
Next, we explore the degree to which workers are familiar with their union’s pol-
icy stance on trade. The panels in Figure 2.4 present the share of members who: i)
answered that they had received at least three communications from their union in the
past year on the issue of trade; ii) are either somewhat, or very familiar with the union’s
position on trade; and iii) think that their union advocates reducing trade. The unions
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Figure 2.3: Issues Unions Discuss Most Frequently
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Note: The unionized respondents were asked to list up to three issues that their union discussed most
frequently in its communications to the respondent. We reclassified open-ended responses to eight
categories presented in the figure, leaving out some answers that appear only rarely in the responses.
are sorted along the vertical axis by their protectionism score. The left panel indicates
that members of more protectionist unions typically received more communication from
their organization on trade-related issues. Those members also tend to express greater
familiarity with their union’s stance on the issue of trade (center panel), and to describe
their union as protectionist (right panel). In the case of the more protectionist unions
such as the UAW or the United Steelworkers, over 70% of the members correctly note
that their union supports reduction of trade levels. Notably, the picture is almost re-
versed among the American Federation of Teachers, the least protectionist union in our
sample.12 These findings are clearly consistent with the notion that unions serve as
12To be sure, these graphs alone do not prove a causal relation. In particular, given that union commu-
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information providers on the issue of trade policy.
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2.4.3 Do Members Internalize Information from the Union?
To assess whether communication from unions affects the preferences of workers on a
given policy, we examine the alignment between the stance of the union and its members’
attitudes toward trade openness. The upper panels in Figure 2.5 compare the stance of
each union with the views of its members, presenting in each sub-graph the responses
to one of the three dependent variable questions. The graphs show quite vividly that
members’ own attitudes on the issue of trade are positively associated with the protec-
tionism score of their union. Put simply, in the more protectionist unions the members
also tend to hold more protectionist views.
This finding, however, is subject to an obvious concern about endogeneity and poten-
tial spuriousness: The association might simply be driven by another factor that shapes
both the unions’ stance as well as that of its members. For example, workers and unions
in import competing sectors might be more protectionist than others simply because of
nications are self-reported, one cannot rule out the possibility that the recollection of communications is
endogenous to respondents’ prior position on trade.
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the adverse consequences that exposure to foreign competition poses to them. As a first
way of dealing with this possibility, we compare the trade preferences of union mem-
bers with those of non-union workers employed in the same industry. If the association is
driven by some industry-level characteristic, we should observe the same pattern within
an industry among both union and non-union members. Yet empirically, that does not
appear to be the case.
The lower panels in Figure 2.5 present the share of union members and non-members
holding negative views toward international trade, and plot them against the industry’s
protectionism score. The graphs highlight that the average protectionism score of unions
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in each industry is positively correlated with union members’ trade preferences, but not
with those of non-members. This suggests that workers from the same industry not only
differ in their views on trade as a function of whether or not they belong to a union, but
also that the differences reveal a distinct pattern: members hold views that correspond
to those of the union while non-members do not. This striking pattern finds support
also when tested formally (see appendix).
2.5 Treatment versus Selection
The results presented so far are consistent with the notion that, among other functions,
unions are information providers that exert effective influence on their members’ policy
preferences. Yet, as noted above, these findings may also reflect a self-selection process.
To address this possibility, this section presents inferential tests designed to help tease
out between the competing explanations.
2.5.1 Cross-State Legal Differences and the Union Effect
To examine whether self-selection accounts for the ‘union effect’ detected in the analyses
above, we leverage state-level differences in their Right-to-Work (RTW) laws, statutes
that govern the extent to which employment in a workplace can be conditional on the
worker becoming a union member. The RTW law, a provision included in the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947, allows individual states to prohibit union “security agreements”.
This means that in states that adopt the RTW provision, labor unions cannot legally re-
quire workers to pay union dues.13 The implication is that union membership in RTW
states depends much more on individual workers’ own discretion and is less a func-
13In some states there is an exemption to government employees, that can be required to pay union
dues.
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tion of an institutional requirement to become members.14 Indeed, union membership
rates are systematically much higher in non-RTW states, even within the same indus-
try. For example, workers in educational services are more than twice as likely to be
union members in non-RTW states (48% vs. 23%), or almost 3 times as likely in building
construction (20% vs 7%). Even in sectors with lower unionization rates, the relative dif-
ference is mostly as large, if not greater (see Figure 2.6). This difference in the regulation
of union membership across states allows us to test the self-selection explanation in the
following manner: if self-selection accounts for members’ preferences, we should ob-
serve that the effect of union membership is larger in those states in which membership
is more likely to arise from a worker’s own volition.
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14For an overview of the Right-to-Work law, see Collins (2012).
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To test this proposition, we estimate the following binary probit model:
Probit(Yi) = α + β1Unioni + β2RTWi + β3Union ∗ RTWi + γIndustryi + θControlsi + εi,
where Yi is a binary measure of respondents’ attitudes toward international trade. Union
is a binary indicator for an individual i’s union membership, and RTW is a binary vari-
able taking the value 1 if i resides in the RTW states at the time of the survey. The
key parameter of interest is the coefficient β3 on the interaction term Union * RTW. A
finding that the interaction term is sizable and significant would point strongly toward
a selection-based explanation, as it would indicate that the ‘union effect’ is less pro-
nounced when workers are “pushed” into their union membership status. The model
also includes fixed effects for Industry as well as Controls, a vector of individual charac-
teristics (income, gender, race, age, education, and marital status).15 In the last column
of each set of specifications, we include the full set of control variables interacted with
RTW, to account for the possibility that individual characteristics may also have varying
effects under the different legal settings. The analysis focuses on private sector workers,
because unions in the public sector are only covered by RTW statutes in some of the
states. Thus, for testing the selection hypothesis, restricting the analysis to private sector
workers is more apropriate.16
We expect unions to affect the policy preferences of their members when they ac-
tively disseminate policy-related information to their membership. Thus, to provide an
effective test of this claim, we conduct a split-sample analysis in which we estimate the
model separately for industries in which the average protectionism score is high (i.e.,
15See appendix for complete details on the coding of each variable.
16Nonetheless, the findings are unchanged when we also include the public sector workers in the anal-
ysis (see Table B.6).
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above median) and low.17
We present the estimation results with all three dependent variables in Table 2.3. For
each dependent variable, we begin by including only a set of basic covariates. The co-
efficient on Union Member is positive and statistically significant in the industry groups
represented by the protectionist unions (top panel), yet it is not significant in the less
protectionist industries (lower panel). This result, which holds across all the model
specifications, suggests that the effect of union membership is conditional on the firm-
ness of the union’s stance on the policy issue in question, perhaps because those unions
communicate their stance on the issue more intensely to their membership.
Yet as explained above, the key coefficient of interest is the interaction term Union
Member * RTW. Notably, this interaction term is not statistically significant in any of the
specifications in the protectionist industries: this is the case when we include only the
basic set of covariates, when we control also for respondents’ partisan affiliation, as well
as when we interact RTW with all other covariates. Moreover, the substantive effect of the
interaction term is either very close to zero or small and slightly negative, a finding that
is inconsistent with the selection mechanism being prominent. In the less protectionist
industries, the finding is similar. The interaction coefficient is either substantively close
to zero or negatively signed.
We subject the results to a series of robustness tests. First, we re-estimate the models
using the preprocessed data from the matching analysis. Second, we estimate the models
with sampling weights. Our main analysis uses unweighted data because we do not
seek to estimate the effect for the U.S. population as whole, but as robustness we check
whether the results are affected by the use of weights. Third, we examine whether the
exclusion of the public sector workers from the sample makes a difference as opposed
17None of the unions in the sample is actively advancing a pro-trade stance. The difference is thus





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to including all workers in the analysis. And lastly, we re-estimate the models while
excluding managers and supervisors, since they cannot join the unions by law. The
estimated results presented in the appendix Tables B.4 - B.7 show that the findings hold
against this variety of robustness tests.
Another plausible alternative explanation for these findings could be a strategic al-
location of effort that unions exert in informing their members. Unions may employ
greater communication effort in non-RTW states, where members are less likely ex ante
to share the political views of the unions. Such strategic effort could then explain the lack
of difference in members’ attitudes across states with different RTW status. Yet, our data
suggest this explanation is highly unlikely given that in both types of states we observe
very similar levels of union communication efforts. In RTW states, 22% of members
received multiple trade-policy related communications from the union in the previous
year, a figure almost identical to the corresponding share of members in the non-RTW
states (21%). This pattern also holds true for other measures of union communication.
To assess the substantive effect of union membership on trade attitudes we estimate
the probability that a worker with characteristics of the sample median supports a re-
duction in trade levels.18 A non-member with such characteristics is, on average, 19%
likely to support a more protectionist measure, but union membership increases this
probability by 8 percentage points to over 27%. This represents a 39% increase over the
baseline level. We also examine the effect of union membership in the less protectionist
group of industries.19 In this case, union membership increases the predicted probability
of supporting trade reduction by less than 1 percentage points on average, and the point
18We estimate the predicted probability based on the second model and set age at its mean value and all
other categorical variables at their median values, assuming a white male, married, with 4 years of college
education. The industry is set to transportation equipment industry when estimating the model for more
protectionist group of industries.
19We estimate the probability setting the industry category to ambulatory health care industry.
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estimate is not statistically significant.
The substantive effect of union membership on the probability that a worker per-
ceives a negative impact of trade on oneself and family is also considerable. A worker
with characteristics of the sample median has a 16% likelihood of perceiving trade as
harmful, but this estimate increases by over 7 percentage points among union members
with similar characteristics, representing a 44% increase compared to the baseline esti-
mate. This effect is comparable in size to that associated with education, a variable that is
widely documented as an important determinant of trade preferences (e.g., Hainmueller
and Hiscox, 2006).
In sum then, the results clearly go against the prediction that arises if self-selection
accounts for the distinct trade policy preferences of union members. Nonetheless, other
unobservable factors can still account for some of the so-called union effect. We therefore
follow the method pioneered by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) and estimate a lower
bound of the treatment, in the presence of other unobservables that influence the out-
come of study. The results indicate that selection on unobservables can account, at most,
for 24% of the estimated effect, implying that the union ‘treatment’ accounts for the bulk
of the observed change in the preferences of its members.20
2.5.2 Members’ Preferences when the Union Changes Position
If unions affect the policy positions of their members by providing policy relevant in-
formation, we would expect that following a change in the policy stance of the union, a
corresponding change in the view of their members would also take place. In contrast,
we would not expect this to occur if members join the union because of their affiliation
with its (original) stance on trade. This section examines the effect of exactly such a type
of reversal in a union’s stance: the sudden and fairly dramatic shift in the United Auto
20See appendix for full description of the method and findings.
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Workers (UAW) position toward a major trade liberalization deal.
For many years, the UAW, a union representing workers primarily in the auto indus-
try, had been consistently and strongly opposed to the expansion of trade. It was also
part of a vocal opposition to the signing of trade agreements with Colombia and with
Korea, agreements that were debated exactly around the time of the survey. With re-
spect to the latter agreement, the UAW’s official statement from April 2010 summarized
its position as follows: “The UAW strongly opposes the free-trade deal negotiated by
President Bush with South Korea (KORUS FTA) in April 2007, and has reiterated that
opposition to the Obama administration and to Congress. The poorly negotiated and
misguided auto provisions of the KORUS FTA would further open the U.S. market to
increased automotive imports from Korea...” The statement ended by calling the union
members to “Tell Congress that this free-trade deal would lead to a surge in automotive
imports from South Korea, worsening our lopsided auto trade deficit and threatening
the jobs of tens of thousands of American workers.”21
Yet, following intense lobbying and negotiations with the Obama administration, a
set of changes advocated by the union were incorporated into the revised agreement.
On December 6th of that same year, the union made a statement pronouncing that “the
changes announced to the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement today... represent an impor-
tant opportunity to break open the Korean market for U.S. businesses and workers and
boost American manufacturing jobs, particularly in the automotive sector... We believe
an agreement was achieved that will protect current American auto jobs, that will grow
more American auto jobs... and that has important enforcement mechanisms.”22
How did this shift in the union’s position influence the views of the autoworkers
on trade? We examine the impact of the UAW’s pro-trade message by focusing on our
21The full statement is at http://www.uaw.org/page/international-trade-and-investment-policy.
22The full statement is at http://www.uaw.org/category/tags/korus.
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sample of auto industry workers. The survey includes 102 auto industry workers, a
quarter of which participated in the survey after the UAW announced its support for
the free trade agreement. Using this sample, we compare the views of union members
with those of non-members before and after the UAW’s endorsement of the free trade
agreement. Figure 2.7 clearly demonstrates that union members working in the auto
industry were more protectionist than non-members before the shift, yet the level of
support for trade restrictions decreased substantially after the UAW endorsed the free
trade agreement. Crucially, this change in attitudes toward trade liberalization is not
observed among non-members also working in the auto industry.




























Pre-Shift Post-Shift Pre-Shift Post-Shift
 Non-Members Union Members
95% Confidence Interval
This pattern is very much consistent with the information provision mechanism dis-
cussed herein, namely that union members became more supportive of trade as they
received a pro-trade message from the union. Yet at least in theory, this observed pat-
tern could be explained also by reversed causality, namely that a shift in members’ trade
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preferences (following the renegotiation of the trade deal) was itself the trigger for the
change in the union’s public stance. Such an explanation, however, is highly implausible
given the very complicated and technical nature of the changes made to the trade agree-
ment. These included new provisions on the schedule of tariff reductions, changes to
the list of safety regulations, incorporation of certain environmental standards, and the
introduction of safeguard provisions pertaining to Korean exports.23 Without the union
communicating and clarifying the overall impact of these changes, the average worker
may not even have been aware that such changes to the agreement were made, let alone
comprehend how these complex technicalities would affect her well-being.
Qualitative evidence from the online discussion forum of the UAW workers further
contradicts this possibility of reverse causality. Examining the entries regarding KORUS
posted by workers in the union’s Facebook page, we find that the discussion was over-
whelmingly critical of the agreement, as well as of the change in the union’s official
stance. While not necessarily representative of the entire UAW membership’s views,
this evidence is inconsistent with the notion that the shift in the union’s stance came as
a result of strong rank-and-file support for the agreement.24
Another alternative explanation for the shift that occurred only in union members’
preferences could be differences in news consumption: if union members follow the
news more than non-members, perhaps the former became supportive of trade openness
because of greater exposure to the media coverage of the agreement. While theoretically
plausible, it should first be noted that the revised agreement was in fact criticized by key
media outlets, some of which took a stance that directly contradicted the union’s assess-
ment of the deal.25 Thus, it is unclear in what direction the effect of news consumption
23See appendix for detailed information on the revised agreement.
24See appendix for full excerpts from the UAW’s discussion forum on the KORUS agreement.
25For example, see the The New York Times’ article “Few New Jobs Expected Soon from Free-Trade
Agreement with South Korea” (December 7, 2010).
78
should exert on one’s attitudes toward trade. Notwithstanding, in the following esti-
mation we also control for respondents’ level of news consumption along with other
potential confounding factors to ensure that the difference between union members and
non-members are not driven by other characteristics. We estimate the model:
Probit(Yi) = α + β1Unioni + β2Post-Shifti + β3Union ∗ Post-Shifti + θControlsi + εi.
This specification is similar to the one estimated in the previous section, only here we
include a Post-Shift indicator instead of a binary variable denoting an RTW state. The
Post-Shift indicator variable takes the value 1 if individual i was interviewed after the
UAW announced its support for the KORUS FTA and the value 0 if interviewed before.
In some models we also include separate indicators for Michigan and Ohio, the two
states in which the auto industry is concentrated, as well as their interaction terms with
a binary indicator for post-shift survey. The main interest in this analysis is the effect
associated with Union membership and the interaction term Union*Post-shift. We expect
union members interviewed before the change in the union’s position to exhibit more
intense protectionist attitudes than non-members because the former were exposed to
the union’s message opposing the free trade deal. In addition, we expect that union
members interviewed after the shift – and who presumably were exposed to the pro-
trade message from the union – to be less protectionist.
The estimation results, presented in Table 2.4, are in line with these expectations:
The coefficient on Union Member is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level
or higher in all specifications estimating support for trade reduction. In addition, the
coefficient on Union Member*Post-Shift is negative and highly significant in all models.
This is also the case when we control for respondent’s news consumption and ideo-
logical affinity. Given the fairly small sample size, the consistency of the finding, both
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Table 2.4: Change in the Union’s Policy Position and Members’ Preferences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trade Level Trade on Self
Union Member 0.541∗∗ 0.492∗∗ 0.501∗∗ 0.477∗∗ 0.397∗∗ 0.299+ 0.415∗ 0.375∗
(0.120) (0.141) (0.143) (0.156) (0.140) (0.157) (0.164) (0.178)
Post-Shift 0.076 0.043 0.021 -0.005 -0.048 -0.070 -0.094 0.035
(0.130) (0.138) (0.139) (0.176) (0.123) (0.127) (0.127) (0.166)
Post-Shift*Union Member -0.453∗∗ -0.473∗∗ -0.478∗∗ -0.507∗∗ -0.074 -0.042 0.022 0.146
(0.076) (0.075) (0.077) (0.072) (0.207) (0.230) (0.253) (0.325)
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
News Consumption No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Party ID No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Auto States No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 100 97 96 96 100 97 96 96
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Demographic Controls: income, gender, race, age, education & martial status
News Consumption: A binary indicator taking a value of 1 if the respondent read a newspaper once a day or more.
Auto States: Michigan, Post-Shift*Michigan, Ohio, Post-Shift*Ohio
unconditionally and when controlling for a host of confounding factors, is quite striking.
Turning to the right panel of the table in which we analyze respondents’ view of trade
as harmful to themselves and their families, we find that union membership was again
associated with a sizable and significant effect on the perception of trade as adversely
affecting oneself. However, in this case we observe a much weaker change following the
union’s u-turn in the pro-trade direction. Taken together, these results suggest that the
union’s change in position influenced the views of its members toward a more liberal
stance, but this shift did not reverse the members’ perception that trade had overall been
harmful to them and their families.
2.6 Unobservable Selection and Bounding of the Treatment Effect
Our empirical analyses demonstrate that the effect associated with union membership
on the policy preferences of its members cannot be accounted for by a self-sorting (i.e.
selection) mechanism. Nonetheless, the evidence does not eliminate the possibility that
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other unobservable factors account for at least some, if not most of the so-called ‘union
effect’. Thus, we estimate a lower bound of the treatment in a condition where other
unobsevables may account for some of the estimated effect.
We do so using the method pioneered by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) and recently
developed in Oster (2014), which estimates the bounds of a treatment effect based on
coefficient movements after inclusion of controls. The logic of this approach is straight-
forward: If we assume that selection on observables is proportional to selection on un-
observables, we can examine how much coefficients change with the inclusion of ob-
servables and form an understanding of the sensitivity of a coefficient to unobservables.
If the coefficient moves little after the inclusion of controls, this suggests that the co-
efficient is robust to unobservables. Yet, this movement must be scaled by movements
in the R-squared because an uninformative control does not change the coefficient in a
significant manner, but also adds little to the model’s explanatory power (see appendix
for the technical details about the approach).
Table 2.5 summarizes the results. The identified set shows the lower and upper
bounds of the union treatment effect. The lower bound refers to the treatment effect
when we assume that the unobservables are as important as the observables in explain-
ing the impact of union membership on trade attitudes. The upper bound denotes the
union treatment effect when we assume that there is no selection on unobservables.
Among protectionist unions, the results show that the lower bound of the union effect is
both positive and sizable for all three dependent variables. For example, in the case of
support for reduction in trade levels, the lower bound is 0.069, which means that union
members are about 7 percentage points more likely to support a reduction of trade than
non-members, even when we assume that the unobservables are as important as the
observables. This represents about a 37% increase from the baseline rate. Crucially,
in all three dependent variables, even the lower bound of the estimated union effect is
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sizable, representing at least 72% of the upper bound estimate. This indicates that se-
lection on unobservables accounts, at most, to a quarter of the estimated effect. Finally,
in the bottom three rows, which show the estimation results for the less protectionist
unions, the finding is very different: the union effect is either not robust to selection on
unobservables or substantively very close to zero.
Table 2.5: Identification of Lower Bound of Treatment Effect
Baseline Effect Controlled Effect Identified Set
(S.E.) [R2] (S.E.) [R2]
Strongly Protectionist Unions
Trade Level 0.115 (.034) [.007] 0.095 (.035) [.059] [0.069, 0.095]
Trade on Self 0.073 (.030) [.004] 0.063 (.031) [.044] [0.049, 0.063]
Trade on US 0.126 (.032) [.010] 0.124 (.033) [.045] [0.121, 0.124]
Not Strongly Protectionist Unions
Trade Level 0.058 (.055) [.001] -0.006 (.054) [.108] [-0.008, -0.006]
Trade on Self 0.033 (.048) [.000] -0.015 (.047) [.061] [-0.015, -0.007]
Trade on US 0.042 (.040) [.000] -0.030 (.050) [.087] [-0.112, -0.030]
2.7 Moderators of the Union Effect
Having demonstrated that union membership exerts significant influence on members’
views, we also explore whether the effect varies across different types of workers in
theoretically predictable ways. First, we examine whether workers with opposed ideo-
logical convictions exhibit a lesser tendency to adopt the union’s stance. Since we do
not have information about workers’ views on trade prior to joining the union, we use
members’ partisan stance instead, with the expectation that Republicans (who tend to be
more pro-trade) would exhibit less openness to the union’s protectionist message. In our
model, we interact a 5-point measure of partisan preference with an indicator variable
denoting union membership. The results provide qualified support for the hypothesis,
indicating that indeed, the “union effect” on member’s views tends to be weaker among
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Republicans (Table B.11). The interactions are always positively signed and in two of the
outcomes significant at the 90% level.
Following Zaller (1992), we also test the prediction that unions’ communication is
more likely to influence the members who are less informed about economic matters.
This is expected both because the union-provided content is likely to be newer for those
individuals, and because it likely to face less countervailing information. To test this pre-
diction, we interact union membership with a measure of economic knowledge, based
on whether the respondent had ever taken an economics class. Examining the results, we
observe that among union members, having no prior economics education is indeed as-
sociated with a more protectionist view, as well as a more negative perception of trade’s
impact on the US. However, the estimated effect is well below statistical significance, a
result we obtain across all models (Table B.12). In sum, we find very limited evidence
that prior economic knowledge is a strong moderator of the union effect.26
Finally, we examine whether the characteristics of the unions themselves are associ-
ated with differences in the influence they exert on their members. Following Ahlquist
and Levi (2013), we expect that the more economically successful unions will also be the
most effective in swaying their members’ views. Using a union’s spending power (mea-
sured per capita in the previous year) as a proxy for its economic success, we interact
this measure with the union’s stance on trade (i.e., the protectionism score). The results
in this case are consistent with the expectation: The interaction term is positive, and sta-
tistically significant at 0.01 level with respect to the perceived impact of trade on self and
on the US (see Table B.13). Thus, the findings are consistent with the argument that the
more economically successful unions are more effective in influencing their members.
26Employing education as an alternative measure to knowledge produces substantively similar results.
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2.8 Conclusion
Labor unions are conventionally seen as organizations fighting for better rights, wages
and benefits for workers. This study has shown that one route by which unions pursue
their objectives is communication of policy-relevant information to their membership.
The frequency and nature of the communications varies across unions, but those that
engage in it more intensely are able to influence the members’ attitudes toward the
union-held position. Thus, it appears that unions are not merely a “voice" of workers’
preferences, but also an effective institution that is able to systematically shape and
cohere that voice toward a given policy objective.
To what extent do the findings speak to the influence of other organized interest
groups on their members? In their most recent study of organized interests in the US,
Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (2012) show that unions are more likely than any other
type of organized interest groups – e.g., trade associations, identity groups, corporations
– to be engaged in multiple activities such as testifying to congressional committees,
lobbying, filing an amicus brief or making a PAC donation.27 Unions are also more
likely to use their websites to promote discussion of public policy issues as well to try to
facilitate political action.28 Even the average spend by unions on lobbying is relatively
high, second only to occupational and trade/business associations.29 Thus, on average,
unions are relatively more active than most organized interest groups, which suggests
that their influence on their membership is probably also more significant than that of
their counterparts.
27Ibid p. 406.
28For example, 72% of union websites try to advance political action (e.g. promote a certain action or
provide a link to facilitate voter registration); the corresponding figures are 37% for identity groups, 33%




Our findings also give rise to the question of whether trade is a representative issue
for testing the unions’ influence on their members. To address this point, consider the
following: In the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES), 45% of respondents
asked about their views on trade policy said that they “haven’t thought much about it".
In contrast, 12% and 13% chose this answer when asked about national spending on
defense and on social services, respectively.30 Given that people’s views tend to be more
malleable on issues on which they possess weaker opinions, this evidence suggests that
the effect we observe with respect to trade is likely to be closer to the upper bound of
the influence organized interest groups are able to exert on their members. Affecting
attitude change on issues on which people tend to have stronger prior views – social
issues, moral values – is likely to be more difficult.
In prior research on public opinion, any consideration of a union effect on mem-
bers’ attitudes has almost exclusively relied on the inclusion of an indicator variable
denoting whether or not the respondent belongs to a union. This approach assumes a
homogeneous effect across unions. Yet our study, which utilizes information not only
on membership but also on the specific unions to which the respondents belong, high-
lights the significant variation in the position that unions take on the same issue as
well as in the intensity with which they correspond about it with their members. Thus,
by estimating only the average union effect, as most prior research has done, scholars
have underestimated the impact of the more active unions on the preferences of their
members. This suggests that for addressing certain questions about the political con-
sequences of unions, particularly in studies that seek to go beyond their overall effect
on the electorate, collecting information not just on membership but also on the specific
union affiliation is pertinent.
In recent years, perhaps due to the declining rates of union membership, the focus in
30See Supplemental Material for a more complete discussion of the ANES data.
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much of the research has shifted to exploring the influence of other institutions such as
the church or business lobbies on various political and electoral outcomes (Green, 2007;
Baumgartner et al., 2009). Yet even today, few organizations have the broad reach and
regular access to such sizable portions of the electorate as unions do. As the findings
of this chapter indicate, a meaningful understanding of the forces shaping public pref-




Who Speaks for Free Trade:
Elite Communications and Public Support for Free Trade
3.1 Introduction
Elites and voters simultaneously influence each other. Electoral accountability compels
politicians to respond to constituent preferences, while politicians also affect how vot-
ers understand policy issues and how they form their policy preferences. While both
bottom-up and top-down mechanisms are theoretically and empirically grounded, the
literature on trade policy has disproportionately focused on bottom-up models (e.g.
Caves, 1976) and has paid relatively less attention to top-down influences. How do
political elites publicly position themselves on the issue of international trade? How
do elite positions influence voter preferences over trade policy? The literature remains
comparatively silent on these questions.
The lack of attention to elite influence reflects the assumptions about voters often
made in the existing trade policy literature. On the one hand, voters are assumed to
understand the distributive consequences of international trade. Individual voters, the
argument goes, are able to infer the likely impact of international trade on their well-
being and to take positions that are consistent with their material interests (Scheve and
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Slaughter, 2001b; Beaulieu, Yatawara, and Wang, 2005). As voters in this perspective form
their policy preferences based on their own calculations, there is little room for political
elites to shape voter preferences. On the other hand, some scholars suggest that voters
are ignorant and apathetic about trade policy. In this view, voters are not well informed
about the material consequences of international trade on the economy and on their
own welfare (Rankin, 2001; Guisinger, 2009). Again, the role of political elites is limited
because voters do not pay attention to politicians’ trade-related legislative activities.
Contrary to these expectations, the effects of elite communications can be quite
strong, especially when it comes to the formation of individual trade preferences, given
the highly politicized nature of trade policy. A wide range of trade issues are often at
the center of political debate, and politicians offer strikingly different interpretations of
the effects of a given trade policy. For instance, on the signing of free trade agreements,
Senator Dianne Feinstein publicly supported free trade on the Senate Floor, saying that
“export growth as a result of these trade agreements will mean more jobs.” Represen-
tative Daniel Lipinski took an opposite stance, calling the bill that outlines those agree-
ments the “job-killing trade bill”.1 If elite communications indeed shape public attitudes,
voters’ views on trade would look very different depending on whose statements voters
are exposed to and influenced by. The key question is whether and to what extent elite
communications exert influence over public attitudes regarding trade.
Answering this question has proven to be a difficult task, in part due to the paucity
of systematic data on trade-related communications by politicians, and in part due to
empirical challenges in addressing the issues of endogeneity and omitted variable bias.
First, investigating the effects of elite communication requires information about the in-





tensity and the contents of trade-related messages that legislators transmit to their con-
stituents. Since such information is not readily available, empirical studies on the link
between elite and public trade preferences have instead examined the influence of party
as a whole (Hicks, Milner, and Tingley, 2014) or focused on the roll-call voting records
of legislators (Guisinger, 2009). These measures, while informative, do not capture the
varying intensity of trade-related communications by legislators. Second, one needs to
disentangle top-down and bottom-up influences in order to identify the effect of elite
communications on public attitudes. The relationship between elites and the public,
however, is subject to an obvious concern of endogeneity, because legislators have elec-
toral incentives to communicate messages that are in keeping with their constituents’
preferences. Omitted variables may also account for both elite and public attitudes, thus
introducing an additional source of potential bias.
I address these empirical challenges by combining an original measure for the ex-
pressed pro-free trade positions of representatives–constructed from an original collec-
tion of press releases–and a survey of a large sample of American workers. I classify
the collected trade-related press releases into a set of categories and create a new metric
for representatives’ trade policy positions, which is based on the share of pro-free trade
and protectionist press releases among all press releases issued in a given congressional
term. I find that representatives’ pro-free trade messages are systematically associated
with a decrease in protectionist attitudes of co-partisan constituents in their districts. Yet,
the messages appear to have little impact on other constituents. This finding remains ro-
bust to the inclusion of a series of demographic controls and fixed effects for employed
industry and district.
Exploiting the difference in political information environments across the states, I
further demonstrate that this association is mainly driven by elite influence. Taking
advantage of the timing of the survey that took place during the months preceding and
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following the 2010 mid-term election, I show that the effects of representatives’ messages
appear stronger in states without reelection-seeking senators, on whom voter attention
tends to be focused. The association appears much weaker in other states where voter
attention is diverted to reelection-seeking senators. As the senate electoral cycle is not
systematically related to the communication strategy of representatives or other charac-
teristics of districts, which I demonstrate empirically below, I can leverage this change
in the informational environment–created by the differential attention paid to repre-
sentatives with and without an incumbent senator running in the state–to disentangle
top-down and bottom-up influences. As additional evidence for the informational mech-
anism underlying elite influence, I also show that voters are fairly well informed about
their representatives’ position on trade when they are extensively exposed to messages
from their representatives.
The findings presented in this study contribute to our understanding of how voters
develop their trade policy preferences. Although voters are not fully guided by their ma-
terial interests, it would be misleading to conclude that voters are completely apathetic
about trade policy. It is fair to say that voters do not have sophisticated economic knowl-
edge about the distributional effects or efficiency gains of trade liberalization (Rho and
Tomz, 2015). It is also probably true that voters do not actively seek out trade-related
information and pay little attention to the trade-related voting records of their elected
leaders (Guisinger, 2009). However, my findings suggest that individual citizens are
better informed and more politically aware than is typically assumed. When exposed
to messages from political elites, individual voters are able to use that information as a
policy heuristic to update their preferences. This implies that voters are potentially able
to form trade preferences that are reasonably aligned with their self-interested consider-
ations, as long as political elites serve the interests of voters.
This study also contributes to an extensive literature on elite communications. First,
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my analysis utilizes actual legislator messages communicated to voters, and it demon-
strates the effects of such messages on the actual policy preferences of voters. This focus
contributes to the literature by demonstrating that the findings from experimental stud-
ies (e.g. Broockman and Butler (2015); Bullock (2011)) generalize to natural political
settings. Second, the findings highlight the importance of how legislators explain their
policy positions to constituents. Importantly, the analysis of press releases by repre-
sentatives reveals significant variation with regard to whether and how representatives
explain their policy positions. Together with the findings from Grose, Malhotra, and
Van Houweling (2015) that legislators strategically tailor their messages to their con-
stituents, my findings suggest that one needs to consider the effect of actual elite messages
rather than elite policy positions per se in examining the effects of elite communications.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the main
insights from the literatures on elite communications and trade policy preferences, fol-
lowed by a discussion of the factors that may account for congressional position taking
on trade and its effects on public attitudes. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 describe my data, em-
pirical approach, and the findings. The final section discusses the broader implications
of the findings for trade policy making.
3.2 Elite Communication and Individual Preference Formation
Questions on how voters form their policy preferences have motivated political scien-
tists for decades and continue to draw important attention from scholars (for reviews,
see e.g. Druckman and Lupia (2000, 2016)). One strand of research on the sources of
policy preferences addresses whether and how political elites influence public opinion.
While elites and the public simultaneously influence each other, accumulated evidence
in the literature suggests that political elites indeed shape public attitudes by provid-
ing policy-relevant information (Zaller, 1992; Chong and Druckman, 2007). As average
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voters are not well equipped to gather and process relevant information, they defer
to legislators’ policy judgement and take positions endorsed by the elites. Legislators
can shape voters’ preferences with persuasive appeals, yet even without sophisticated
reasoning, they can influence voters’ views merely by announcing their own positions
(Broockman and Butler, 2015).
Despite the well-established evidence for elite influence over a range of policy issues
(e.g. wartime public opinion, public support for European integration, or social security
policy preferences (Gabel and Scheve, 2007; Lenz, 2009; Kriner and Shen, 2014)), existing
studies of trade policy preferences have rarely paid attention to potential top-down in-
fluence in preference formation. Much of the scholarship focuses instead on bottom-up
models of trade policy, thereby suggesting that individual trade preferences are largely
shaped by the material consequences of international trade on one’s own well-being
(O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2001; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001b). The implicit assumption
made in the literature is that voters are able to calculate how their economic interests are
affected by international trade, and that political elites then take voter preferences into
account in the process of trade policy making.
A focus on trade policy constrained to bottom-up influences not only presents an
incomplete picture of trade preference formation, but it also leaves the literature at odds
with the mounting evidence regarding voter ignorance on trade policies. Contrary to
the expectations of a bottom-up approach, an increasing number of studies suggest that
ordinary citizens are not well informed about how trade affects their material interests.
For instance, Rankin (2001) asserts that individuals pay little attention to trade policies
and do not know whether the U.S. generally and they as individuals benefit or lose from
trade. In a similar vein, Guisinger (2009) questions the tacit assumption regarding voter
knowledge of the effects of trade. Her study shows that voters place less importance
on trade-related voting records in evaluating legislators, and that they lack knowledge
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of how their legislators voted on trade agreements. Rho and Tomz (2015) further ad-
vances this discussion. From their assessment of voter knowledge on the economic
effects of trade, they surmise that average citizens are economically ignorant: they have
not thought carefully about trade and know little about efficacy and distributional effects
associated with international trade.
It is against this backdrop that scholars of international political economy have be-
gun to recognize the important roles of information and of political elites as information
providers. Given low levels of information among average citizens, how would individ-
ual trade preferences change when provided with more information? Motivated by this
question, Rho and Tomz (2015) explore the effect of information via a series of survey
experiments. Their finding suggests that learning about the distributional consequences
of trade, on average, makes individuals more selfish (i.e., more supportive of policies
advancing their own material interests). As Rho and Tomz (2015) conclude, the substan-
tial effects of information imply that politicians and the media can shape public opinion
through the strategic use of rhetoric. This conjecture, albeit indirectly, is supported by
Hicks, Milner, and Tingley’s (2014) finding of party influence on trade preferences. Their
analysis shows that parties played a critical role in affecting how the public voted in the
referendum on a trade agreement in Costa Rica.
While these recent studies point to the important role of political elites as information
providers, no prior studies offer direct evidence regarding the effect of elite communi-
cation on trade preferences. Evidence from survey experiments demonstrate the effect
of informational cues on individual trade preferences (Hiscox, 2006; Murillo, Pinto, and
Ardanaz, 2013; Rho and Tomz, 2015), yet it remains unexplored whether the results
generalize to real political environments and how trade issues are communicated and
framed by political elites. A study by Hicks, Milner, and Tingley (2014) provides new
evidence of top-down influence, but systematic data are still lacking on the contents and
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the intensity of communication by political elites.
This deficiency in the literature is striking not only due to the accumulated evidence
of elite influence regarding other issue domains, but also because trade policy is one
of the areas where the effects of elite communication are expected to be strong. First,
individual views on trade policy might be more easily swayed by political elites than
other policy domains. The fact that average citizens have low levels of knowledge on
trade issue means that they may have weaker priors, which would thereby make their
trade policy preferences more malleable. Second, trade policy is a frequently politicized
issue. When political elites strategically put the trade issue on the agenda, awareness on
the issue may improve among uninformed and apathetic citizens (McKibben and Taylor,
2014). Yet again, to date, little systematic evidence has been provided to document the
effects of elite communication on trade policy preferences.
In this chapter, I offer new evidence that helps to address this deficiency. By ana-
lyzing legislators’ trade-related messages and the corresponding public opinion in their
districts, I seek to provide new insights on (i) how frequently and in what way legislators
communicate information on trade issues to their constituents, (ii) what determines such
communication strategy by legislators, and (iii) whether and in what way trade-related
messages from legislators shape the views of their constituents.
3.3 Congressional Position Taking on Trade and Its Effects
Before moving to discuss the empirical approach of this study, I draw here a set of expec-
tations on congressional position taking and its effects on public attitudes. Building on
the literature on trade policy, I discuss what factors are likely to be associated with elite
positions on trade. I then discuss the possible effects of elite communication on public
attitudes, paying particular attention to the conditions under which elite communication
can be more influential in shaping the views of individuals.
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3.3.1 Congressional Position Taking on Trade
In explaining who tends to take positions as pro-free traders or protectionists in Congress,
the first factor I consider is legislators’ ideology, which has been consistently found to
shape their foreign economic preferences (Noël and Thérien, 2008; Milner and Tingley,
2011). Since conservatives emphasize the importance of the market, as opposed to lib-
erals who are more supportive of government intervention in the economy, legislators
with more conservative ideology tend to be more likely to express views in favor of free
trade.
Another factor to consider is the socio-economic characteristics of districts. As leg-
islators wish to explain that their congressional activities serve their constituents’ inter-
ests, they take into account the economic effects of international trade on their districts.
When their districts gain from trade liberalization, legislators tend to emphasize their
pro-free trade stance. When many of their constituents lose from trade, on the other
hand, legislators are likely to express more protectionist views. This leads to the follow-
ing expectations. First, districts abundantly endowed with human capital are likely to
benefit from more trade according to the predictions from the Stolper-Samuelson mod-
els (Rogowski, 1989; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001b). Legislators serving those districts,
therefore, are more likely to be pro-free trade in their communications with their voters.
Second, districts where export-oriented (import-competing) industries are concentrated
are expected to win (lose) from international trade. Legislators from these districts have
more (less) incentive to position themselves as pro-free traders.
These expectations may raise the question of why legislators would consider districts’
interests while their voters are ignorant and apathetic to the issue of international trade.
Two mechanisms may explain this. First, legislators have incentives to support economic
policies that serve their constituents. Even when their constituents do not pay attention
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to legislators’ records on specific policies, they may evaluate their legislators based on
the outcome (i.e. job creation, economic growth, etc). As trade policy may affect the long-
term economic performance of legislators, it is in their interests to support policies that
are conducive to their districts. Second, districts with a substantial stake in international
trade are likely to have at least some voters and organized groups (i.e. labor unions, or
agricultural interest groups) who are highly attentive to the issue. Legislators respond
to these interests and emphasize their positions on the issue when explaining their work
to constituents.
3.3.2 Effects of Elite Position Taking on Public Attitudes
Elite position taking on international trade is expected to have downstream effects on
public attitudes, as suggested from the literature, but when is such communication more
influential in shaping individual preferences? Individuals take cues from political elites
because their attentive capacity is limited, compared to the amount of political and non-
political information (Druckman and Lupia, 2016). Yet, given that individuals are ex-
posed to cues from diverse political actors, not all of the information transmitted from
political elites can reach to the public. Furthermore, individuals may not internalize all
of the information delivered to them. For these reasons, one must pay close attention to
when elite-provided information exerts more influence on the public.
Partisanship is a key factor that determines whether and to what extent elite commu-
nication shapes individual trade preferences. While it is widely known that individuals
tend to base their decisions on party cues rather than detailed issue descriptions (Co-
hen, 2003), that tendency may appear even greater in the context of trade policy, due to
its complexity. As the effects of international trade constitute a contentious issue even
among experts, it is not reasonable to expect average citizens to gauge the effects of trade
policy on their own. Even when provided with detailed policy-relevant information, in-
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dividuals may not be able to understand and critically evaluate such information. In
such contexts, individuals may tend to rely more on simple heuristics such as party cues
than other types of complex and technical information (Lau and Redlawsk, 2006).
This discussion implies that legislators’ messages are likely to shape the attitudes of
their co-partisans, but other individuals are unlikely to be influenced. When exposed to
messages on the views of their legislators, individuals may focus more on who their leg-
islators are, and less on why their legislators endorse such policy positions. Co-partisan
voters are likely to assume that their legislators’ views are in line with their interests and
take the same positions as their legislators. However, individuals may not buy the mes-
sages when they come from legislators of other parties. In short, pro-free trade messages
from legislators are likely to move co-partisan constituents in a more pro-trade direction,
but they are expected to have little impact on the views of other constituents.
3.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
My analysis utilizes an original dataset constructed from press releases from the U.S.
representatives along with survey data from approximately 4,000 American workers.
Using these datasets, I examine congressional position taking on international trade and
its effects on individual trade preferences. This section describes the data and outlines
my empirical strategy.
3.4.1 Measuring Congressional Position Taking on Trade
In order to measure how legislators take positions on trade and communicate their po-
sitions to constituents, I focus on their press releases, which a number of prior studies
have examined to study legislators’ communications with their constituents (Grimmer,
Messing, and Westwood, 2012; Grimmer, 2013). Focusing on the 111th Congress (2010-
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11), I collected press releases by the U.S. representatives and selected a total of 2,159
press releases relevant to international trade. I classified the selected documents into a
set of categories using a supervised learning method, and constructed measures for each
representative’s expressed pro-free trade or protectionist position.
I collected press releases from voxgov, the website that provides all official announce-
ments from all government sources. From among the press releases, which cover a
diverse range of topics, I selected documents that contain a carefully chosen set of 127
key phrases related to international trade (e.g. trade agreement, export promot, export
opportun, or import surge).2 This procedure results in the selection of 2,159 press re-
leases. A detailed description of the document selection procedure and a list of key
phrases are available in Section C.1 in the appendix.
I then classified the selected documents using a supervised learning method: hu-
man coders first categorize a set of documents manually, and the algorithm learns how
to classify the documents using the manually coded sets.3 I first decided on the num-
ber of categories after systematic reading of 25% of randomly selected documents and
manually classified those documents into i) pro-free trade, ii) protectionist, iii) trade
adjustment assistance, iv) export assistance, v) foreign countries’ trade barrier against
the U.S., vi) other trade-related, and vii) unrelated. A document is classified as i) pro-
free trade if it contains a legislator’s view in favor of free trade policy reducing U.S.
trade barriers, and as ii) protectionist if a legislator advocates restrictions of U.S. trade
through protectionist measures. Other documents that do not contain a legislator’s view
on trade policy, but that are still relevant to international trade, include those announc-
ing the funds for districts through iii) trade adjustment assistance or iv) export assistance
2All texts were “stemmed” through the Porter Stemming Algorithm (stemming refers to a process for
reducing words to their root). I choose to select on key phrases instead of keywords because selecting on
keywords (e.g. trade, import, or export) results in the inclusion of many irrelevant documents.
3For details about the supervised learning method, see Grimmer and Stewart (2013).
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programs. A document that calls for the reduction of trade barriers by foreign countries
is classified as v) trade barriers of foreign countries. Other trade-related documents and
documents that are only marginally relevant or unrelated to trade are classified as vi)
others and vii) unrelated, respectively. After manual coding of 25% of the documents
based on this coding rule, the rest of the documents were classified by three supervised
learning algorithms - maximum entropy, support vector machine, and generalized linear
models.4 When the three algorithms all made the same prediction for the classification
of a document, I followed the machine-coded classification.5 When the three algorithms
failed to agree on the classification, the documents were manually coded to improve the
accuracy of classification.
The classification results are summarized in Table 3.1. Focusing on press releases
that are directly relevant to the issue of international trade, the table shows that a fair
proportion of documents (13.5%) are pro-free trade while the majority of press releases
(57.6%) show a protectionist tone. In pro-free trade press releases, legislators express
their support for signing free trade agreements or reducing trade barriers and articulate
the economic benefits from trade (i.e. expansion of exports, new markets for firms, or
job creation). In press releases classified as protectionist, legislators criticize free trade
agreements or call for protectionist policies (i.e. increasing tariffs, or buy American),
generally with an explanation of the harmful effects of trade on workers. As hinted at
from the most frequent stemmed words appearing in each classification, congressional
critiques of trade often focus on the negative effects of trade with China on American
workers. The 20 most frequent bigrams (two-adjunct words) in each category are fully
described in Figure C.2 in the appendix.
4The supervised learning was conducted using RTextTools. See Jurka et al. (2013) for details.
5When tested with a training dataset of manually coded documents, the three selected algorithms make
the same prediction for 77% of the documents and its recall rate of 0.94 is comparable to manual-coding.
See Section C.2 in the appendix for details about the supervised learning method.
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Table 3.1: Results from Supervised Text Classificaton
Classification Most Frequent Stemmed Words House
Pro-Free Trade trade, agreement, will, american, export, job, presid 146 (13.5%)
Protectionist trade, china, american, job, manufactur, currenc, worker 622 (57.6%)
TAA worker, assist, job, trade, taa, program, adjust 90 (8.3%)
Export Assistance export, busi, small, program, trade, help, will 55 (5.1%)
Trade Barrier senat, trade, beef, market, export, poultri, product 55 (5.1%)
Others trade, product, drywal, will, import, export, senat 112 (10.4%)
All Trade-Related 1025
I focus on the first two categories (pro-free trade and protectionist) because they ex-
plicitly demonstrate the views of legislators on trade policy while the other categories
do not. I explore the variation in the frequency of pro-free trade and protectionist mes-
sages in Figure 3.1. The figure presents the distribution of the number of press releases
with pro-free trade and protectionist messages; it illustrates that the vast majority of
legislators rarely make public announcements for or against free trade, while only a
small proportion of legislators actively announce their views on international trade. Not
surprisingly, Republican legislators tend to advocate for free-trade, and Democratic leg-
islators tend to demonstrate protectionist stances. Yet, even among legislators from the
same party, there is significant variation in individual members’ propensities to publicly
announce their views on international trade.
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This pattern is more clearly illustrated in Figure 3.2, which contrasts the number of
press releases with pro-free trade and protectionist stances. Clearly, Democratic legis-
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lators seldom communicate pro-free trade messages to their constituents, but not all of
them publicly advocate for protectionist policies. A few Democrats including Dan Lip-
inski from Illinois and John Dingell from Michigan sent protectionist messages ten times
or more during the period of two years. Ten Republican legislators including Chris
Lee from New York and Robert Aderholt from Alabama made multiple protectionist
announcements.














































































Note: The number of protectionist press releases (y-axis) is plotted against the number of pro-free trade
press releases by each representative (x-axis). Data points with a value of 10 and higher are collapsed as
10. Overlapping data points are horizontally jittered. Labels for data points are displayed only up to two
points to make the labels legible due to too many overlapping values.
Based on this dataset, I constructed measures for expressed pro-free trade and protec-
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tionist stances. The main measures I use are (i) the share of press releases with pro-free
trade messages out of all press releases; (ii) the share of protectionist messages; and iii)
the difference between the two, which measures the degree of a pro-free trade stance
relative to a protectionist stance. I consider the share of press releases instead of the raw
number of press releases in order to account for the total number of press releases issued
by legislators within a given period. Given the significant variation in these measures, I
examine what accounts for the variation in the intensity of pro-free trade and protection-
ist communications and what impact this has in terms of individual trade preferences.
3.4.2 Measuring Individual Attitudes toward Trade
In order to examine how trade-related information transmitted from legislators influ-
ences their constituents’ trade preferences, I link the legislator-level dataset of trade-
related communications to survey data from more than 4,000 American workers. The
survey data is a part of the Harvard Globalization Survey that was designed to examine
workers’ attitudes toward various aspects of globalization.6 In my analysis, I mainly rely
on responses to three questions on individual views of trade policy: whether a respon-
dent thinks that (i) trade with other countries should be expanded, reduced, or kept at
its current level; ii) trade with other countries is good or bad for the individual and the
family; and iii) trade with other countries is good or bad for the U.S. as a whole. Using
the five-point response scales to these questions, I construct three binary measures that
use the bottom two categories to assess respondents’ opposition to trade.
In addition to having a series of questions on individual views regarding trade policy,
this dataset is particularly well-suited for examining the effect of elite communications
on trade views for two reasons. First, the survey was fielded between July 2010 and
February 2011, a period that coincides with the mid-term election campaign, when in-
6A more detailed description of the survey is presented in Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit (2015).
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dividuals are particularly attentive to the activities and the views of legislators. Second,
the survey contains a question on how respondents assess their representatives’ view
on trade: “Overall, do you think your district’s Representative in Congress, [name of
Representative], shares your views about trade with other countries?” Responses to this
question allow me to examine the degree of information that individuals have about their
representatives’ view as well as the alignment between the public stance of legislators
and the views of individuals on the issue.
3.4.3 Disentangling Top-Down Influence from Bottom-Up Influence
The reciprocal relationship between elites and voters poses a major empirical challenge
for this analysis. While political elites exert down-stream influence over public opinion,
they also respond to public attitudes. This endogeneity issue raises an empirical problem
in determining whether an observed empirical pattern is due to top-down or bottom-up
influence. Furthermore, it is also possible that both elite and public opinion are jointly
influenced by other common factors that are hard to capture through observational data.
This second issue of omitted variables is relatively easy to address with the inclusion
of district fixed effects, as discussed later in the empirical analysis section. Yet, my
empirical strategy for addressing the endogeneity issue requires a more comprehensive
discussion, to which this section is devoted.
My empirical strategy takes advantage of two things: (1) the timing of the survey
that was conducted during the mid-term election period and the preceding months in
2010, and (2) the different electoral cycles of senators. The survey was conducted from
July 2010 to February 2011, a period during which the primary and general elections
took place for all House seats and for the Senate seats of class III. In each congressional
election, only one of three classes (that were originally determined randomly in 1789)
are up for re-election. In 2010, seats of class III were contested and 25 incumbents
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from 24 states ran for reelection (including special elections), with 12 other incumbents
retiring. The fact that only a proportion of incumbent senators were seeking reelection
for an exogenous reason is unlikely to be related to position taking or the communication
strategies of House Representatives. However, voters in those states with reelection-
seeking senators were likely to be less exposed to information about their representatives
due to more media coverage devoted to incumbent senators running for reelection. Due
to limited attentive capacity, voters themselves in those states may also pay relatively
less attention to their representatives than do other voters whose incumbent senators do
not run for reelection and who can thus pay more attention to their representatives.
This suggests that voters in two types of states (states with reelection-seeking senators
and the rest of the states) find themselves in very different informational environments
for an exogenous reason.7 Voters in states with reelection seeking senators are likely
to be relatively less informed about their representatives, compared to voters in the
other states who are more extensively exposed to information about their representatives
(either due to media coverage or their own information-seeking behavior).
I support this claim empirically with an analysis of individual information-seeking
behavior on the web and a comparison of socio-economic and political characteristics of
districts in the two types of states. First, my analysis of the Google trend index shows
that individuals indeed express the least degree of interest toward representatives in the
states with reelection-seeking senators. This indicates that individuals are less likely
to seek information about their representatives especially when their senators run for
7States with retiring senators are considered as “the rest of the states” because retiring senators presum-
ably do not attract much media and voter attention, creating more room for attention to representatives.
In particular, considering the fact that most of respondents participated in the survey in July (61%) and
August (14%), a few months before the election period, my focus on the presence of reelection-seeking
incumbents (not on the presence of contested senate seats) is warranted. While voter attention can be di-
verted to senate candidates as the election approaches in those states with retiring senators, the empirical
focus here is on the period preceding the survey (up until June 2010), which is used to study the effect of
elite-provided information communicated prior to the survey.
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reelection, probably due to the diversion of media attention toward senators. (See Table
C.4 in the appendix for the empirical results). Second, I also show that districts in the
two types of states are comparable with respect to various pertinent factors. They are on
average very similar with regard to representatives’ trade-related communications, the
skill-level of the population, the importance of the agricultural industry, media income,
and Republican candidate’s vote share in the previous House election, among others.
(See Table C.5 in the appendix for empirics). An overall news consumption pattern of
individuals also appears to be comparable in the two types of states. This suggests that
the electoral cycle of senators is not systematically related to other factors that could be
associated with elite and public trade preferences.
From this discussion, the following expectation can be drawn. If an observed em-
pirical association is driven by top-down influence from representatives, the association
should appear much stronger in states where voters are more highly exposed to infor-
mation from representatives, i.e. in states without reelection-seeking senators. If the
association is mainly driven by bottom-up influence, conversely, the difference in the
informational environment should not affect the level of association between elite and
public influence, because the difference in the informational environment has little in-
fluence on how representatives respond to the public. Exploiting the difference in the
political informational environment, I thus seek to disentangle top-down influence from
bottom-up influence.
3.5 Empirical Analyses
3.5.1 Who Speaks for Free Trade in the US Congress?
I begin by exploring the factors associated with congressional position taking on inter-
national trade. With three different measures for revealed stance on trade as dependent
105
variables, I estimate a linear regression model with each legislator i in state j as the unit
of analysis:
Yij = α + βLegislator Characteristicsi + γDistrict Characteristicsi + θStatej + εij,
where Legislator Characteristics is a set of legislator-specific variables and District Charac-
teristics is a set of socio-economic characteristics for a district that legislator i represents.
For Legislator Characteristics, I include the DW-Nominate score as a measure for ide-
ology, and additionally include the trade-related committee membership and gender
of legislators. Specifically, I include a binary indicator for whether legislators belong
to the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade, because those legislators serving in
the committee may be more active in disseminating information on trade policy-related
legislation. I also include an indicator for female legislators because women have consis-
tently been found to be less favorable toward free trade than men (O’Rourke and Sinnott,
2001; Mansfield, Mutz, and Silver, 2015).
For District Characteristics, I include the share of high-skill (executive and managerial)
workers in the district, which measures the capital endowment of the district as in Broz
(2005) and Broz and Hawes (2006), as well as the agricultural production of the district in
order to examine the effect of the export-oriented sector. Additional variables included in
the analysis are the share of the population that is foreign born, the logarithm of median
income, the unemployment rate, the share of Republican votes in the previous House
election, the African American share of the population, and the share of the population
over 65.8 All district-level variables take the values for 2009.
8Data for agricultural production by districts are from the 2007 Census of Agriculture, published every
five years and available at http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Online_Highlights/
Congressional_District_Profiles/index.asp. Data for the vote share of Republican candidates in the
previous House election come from the CQ voting and election collection. Other data on the share of
high skill workers, median income, unemployment rate, black population, and population over 65 at the
district-level are from the 2009 American Community Survey collected from http://factfinder.census.
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Table 3.2: Pro-Free Trade and Protectionist Communication by Representatives
Free Trade Protectionist Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DW-Nominate Score 0.220∗ 0.197 -0.928∗∗ -0.938∗ 1.148∗∗ 1.135∗∗
(0.097) (0.140) (0.255) (0.368) (0.277) (0.399)
Trade-related Committee 1.712∗∗ 1.714∗∗ 1.343∗ 1.401∗ 0.370 0.312
(0.256) (0.256) (0.675) (0.672) (0.733) (0.729)
Female -0.147 -0.148 -0.304 -0.274 0.157 0.126
(0.093) (0.093) (0.245) (0.244) (0.266) (0.265)
High Skill, % 0.002 -0.002 -0.055∗∗ -0.057∗∗ 0.057∗ 0.055∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Agriculture Products, $1B 0.085∗ 0.082∗ -0.155+ -0.183∗ 0.241∗ 0.265∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.089) (0.089) (0.096) (0.097)
Foreign Born Population, % 0.014∗∗ 0.015∗∗ -0.029∗ -0.018 0.043∗∗ 0.033∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Median Income, Log 0.173 0.241 0.373 0.668 -0.199 -0.428
(0.278) (0.289) (0.734) (0.757) (0.796) (0.822)
Unemployment Rate, % 0.011 -0.006 -0.105+ -0.047 0.116+ 0.041
(0.021) (0.026) (0.056) (0.068) (0.061) (0.073)
Republican Vote Share, % 0.001 -0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.007) (0.008)
Black Population, % 0.006 -0.007 0.012
(0.004) (0.010) (0.011)
Population over 65, % 0.009 0.104∗ -0.095∗
(0.017) (0.044) (0.047)
Observations 433 433 433 433 433 433
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
All models include state fixed effects.
Table 3.2 presents the estimation results. The dependent variable is the share of press
releases with pro-free trade messages in the first two models, the share of protectionist
messages in the next two, and the difference between the two measures (with higher val-
ues indicating a stronger pro-free trade stance) in the last two. Representatives included
in the analysis are those who served the district as of June 2010.9
Legislators’ ideology appears to be substantially associated with congressional posi-
tion taking on trade. Consistent with the expectation that conservatives are more likely
gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/download_center.xhtml.
9Dependent variables for two representatives who served in the House only for a short period by the
cutoff point are thus missing.
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to be supportive of free trade than liberals, the measure of liberal-conservative ideology
(DW-Nominate), ranging from -1 for liberal to 1 for conservative, appears to be positively
associated with a pro-free trade stance. Specifically, a 1-point increase in the measure
is associated with a 0.2 percentage-point increase in the share of pro-free trade press
releases and a -0.9 percentage-point decrease in the share of protectionist press releases.
Given that representatives on average devote only 0.2 percent of their press releases
to pro-trade contents and 0.7 percent of them to protectionist contents, the association
between a representative’s ideology and her trade-related stance is fairly substantial.
The economic characteristics of districts are also substantially associated with the
expressed pro-free trade and protectionist stances of representatives. The coefficient on
High Skill is close to 0 in the first two models but is negative and statistically significant
at conventional levels in the next two; it is positive and also statistically distinguishable
from zero in the last two models. This suggests that legislators from districts abundant
with human capital tend to send less protectionist messages. An increase of high-skilled
workers by 1 percent is associated with a 0.05 percentage-point decrease in the share
of protectionist messages. A district’s agricultural production appears to be positively
associated with a pro-free trade stance and negatively associated with a protectionist
stance, meeting conventional levels of statistical significance across all the estimated
models. This suggests that legislators from export-oriented districts are more likely to
advocate free trade policies and less likely to call for protectionist policies. Another
factor worth discussing is the share of the population that is foreign born, which is
positively and systematically associated with a pro-free trade stance.
The results suggest that legislators respond to the interests of their districts, but at
the same time, that the ideological predisposition of legislators also plays a significant
role in how they position themselves on trade issues. This suggests important implica-
tions regarding whether and how elite communication influences public attitudes toward
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trade.
First, the significance of ideology implies that legislators are not merely influenced
by voter interests but are also guided importantly by their own beliefs. Legislators from
districts with similar socio-economic and political characteristics may have markedly
different beliefs about free trade policy. As they communicate their beliefs to their con-
stituents, individuals in different districts are exposed to different messages about how
trade influences the U.S. or the local economy, as well as their own well-being.
Second, legislators may serve as information providers for their constituents. Average
individuals, even when their local economy is negatively affected by international trade,
may need additional information to understand the connection between the expansion
of trade and increasing job loss, for example. In a similar vein, individuals who poten-
tially gain from free trade policy may not have a sophisticated enough understanding
of the benefits that free trade may bring to their own wellbeing. For these individuals,
the information provided by legislators may serve as a heuristic for understanding how
a given policy influences their interests. In this sense, legislators are not merely rep-
resenting their voters’ interests but are also proactively providing information to their
constituents about the potential gains and losses from policy implementation. The fol-
lowing section turns the focus to examining whether such information indeed shapes
public views toward international trade.
3.5.2 Do Constituents Internalize Messages from Legislators?
I next examine whether pro-free trade messages from legislators increase public support
for free trade in their districts. As individuals rely on party cues, I expect pro-free
trade messages from legislators to exert influence over the trade-related views of co-
partisan constituents in their districts but not the views of other constituents. To test
this expectation, I estimate the following binary probit model with each individual i in
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district j as a unit of analysis:
Probit(Yij) = α + β1Pro-Free Tradej + β2Co-Partisanij
+ β3Pro-Free Trade ∗ Co-Partisanij + γIndustryi + θControlsi + εi,
where Yi is a binary measure of respondents’ protectionist attitudes, Pro-Free Trade is a
measure for pro-free trade stance of representatives, and Co-Partisan is a binary indi-
cator taking the value 1 if i shares the same party affiliation with her representative.10
The model also includes Industry fixed effects along with Controls, a vector of individual
characteristics (income, gender, race, age, education, marital status, and union member-
ship). I also include district-fixed effects in some models to account for any unobservable
district-level characteristics that influence both elite and public attitudes toward trade.
The key parameter of interest here is the coefficient β3 on the interaction term Pro-Free
Trade*Co-Partisan. A finding of sizable and significant coefficient would indicate an asso-
ciation between the expressed stance of representatives and co-partisan attitudes toward
trade in their districts. In order to probe whether such association is driven by top-down
influence, I estimate the model separately for (1) states with no reelection seeking incum-
bent senators where voters are more extensively exposed to information about represen-
tatives (high information environment) and (2) states with reelection seeking senators
where voters are relatively less exposed to the views of representatives (low information
environment). Leveraging the different electoral cycles of senators, which creates the
difference in the political information environment for voters, I examine whether the
effect of elite communication appears to be stronger in “high information environment”
10Pro-Free Trade is calculated as the difference between the proportion of press releases with pro-free
trade and protectionist messages. As one only wants to consider press releases issued before the survey,
the measure is based on the number of press releases distributed from January 2009 to June 2010. Co-
Partisan is based on respondent i’s 3-point party identification. It takes the value of 0 for all those who
identify themselves as independent.
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than in “low information environment.”
Table 3.3: Pro-Trade Messages from Representatives and Public Attitudes toward Trade
High Information Environment
Trade Reduction Trade on Self Trade on US
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pro-Free Trade by Representative -0.012 0.005 -0.001 0.016+ -0.005 0.003
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Copartisanship w/ Representative 0.004 -0.006 0.006 -0.016 -0.023 -0.023 -0.012 -0.016 -0.010
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023)
Pro-Free Trade * Copartisanship -0.052∗∗ -0.072∗∗ -0.037∗∗ -0.051∗∗ -0.020 -0.040∗
(0.017) (0.020) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.020)
State FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
District FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1918 1918 1778 1908 1908 1655 1906 1906 1703
Low Information Environment
Trade Reduction Trade on Self Trade on US
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pro-Free Trade by Representative 0.006 0.010 0.007 0.013∗ 0.006 0.009
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Copartisanship w/ Representative -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.002 0.026 0.022 0.040+
(0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
Pro-Free Trade * Copartisanship -0.016 -0.015 -0.022+ -0.025 -0.011 -0.010
(0.016) (0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015)
State FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
District FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1761 1761 1623 1759 1759 1448 1762 1762 1572
Marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
All models include fixed effects for Industry as well as Controls (income, gender, race, age, education, martial status, and union membership).
The estimation results with all three dependent variables are presented in Table 3.3.
For each dependent variable, I begin with a base model without an interaction term. In
the base models, Pro-Free Trade by Representative and Copartisanship appear to have little
meaningful effect on individual attitudes toward trade as the coefficients are indistin-
guishable from 0 at the conventional level of significance. However, the interaction term
included in the next two models appear to be negative in all the estimated models, sug-
gesting that pro-free trade messages by representatives are negatively associated with
protectionist attitudes of their co-partisan constituents.
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A more important pattern to be noted is the difference of the coefficient on the in-
teraction term between high and low information environment. Where individuals are
more extensively exposed to messages from representatives or pay more attention to
their representatives (high information environment), the interaction term is substan-
tively meaningful and statistically significant in five out of six estimated models. In low
information environment where individual attention is diverted toward senators, the co-
efficient is consistently negative, but statistically significant at the 0.01 level in only one
out of six estimated models while the substantive effect of the interaction term is far less
meaningful. This finding is consistent with the expectation of elite-driven influence in
trade preference formation.
Specifically, for the subsample of individuals in high information environment, one
percentage point increase in the share of pro-free trade messages is associated with about
5-7 percentage points decrease in the probability that a co-partisan individual supports
the reduction in trade level. Given that about 30 percent of surveyed respondents show
protectionist attitudes with regard to trade-level reduction, this effect translates into an
18-24% reduction from the baseline. Substantively, the effect is more pronounced with
respect to individual support for trade reduction, yet relatively less pronounced with
respect to individual perception of trade on the US. For the case of low information
environment, the messages from legislators are not likely to reach to the public and have
very little influence on their co-partisan voters. To be specific, for the case of individual
support for trade reduction, one percentage point increase in the share of pro-free trade
message is on average associated with about -0.06 and -0.15 percentage points decrease
in the second and third models, respectively. The difference in the effect of representative
messages between the two information environments is also observed from another set
of estimations where a binary indicator for High Information is interacted with Pro-Free
Trade and Copartisanship. The results are presented in Table C.6 in the appendix.
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As an additional check for the finding of elite influence, I further examine whether the
informational mechanism accounts for the observed pattern. Do co-partisan voters show
attitudes that correspond to their representatives’ stance because they are informed of
the views of representatives? In order to explore whether voters are more or less aware
of their representatives’ policy positions, I utilize survey responses to the question that
asks whether respondents think their representatives share their views on trade. The
responses to this question do not directly capture the degree of voter knowledge on rep-
resentatives, but the responses are, probablty, the second best measure that allows me
to indirectly examine whether voters are correctly informed about their representatives’
position. With a binary indicator taking the value of 1 if a respondent thinks the rep-
resentative shares her views on trade and 0 otherwise, I estimate the following binary
probit model:
Probit(Yij) = α + β1Negative View on Tradej + β2Pro-Trade Messagesj
+ β3Negative View on Trade ∗ Pro-Trade Messagesij + γIndustryi + θControlsi + εi,
where Negative View on Trade indicates a binary indicator for a respondent i’s protectionist
attitude (negative perception of trade on one self), Pro-Trade Messages is a representative
j’s expressed pro-trade view, and the interaction term is a key variable of interest.
The estimation results, presented in Table 3.4, demonstrate the association between
pro-free trade messages from representatives and voter perception of representatives as
pro-free traders in high information environment. Specifically, the findings suggest that
individuals with negative perception on trade are more likely to think that their rep-
resentatives do not share their views on trade when their representatives communicate
pro-free trade messages more frequently. The association, however, is much wekaer in
low information environment.
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Table 3.4: Pro-Trade Messages and Voter Perception of Representatives’ Policy Positions
High Information Low Information
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Negative View on Trade -0.102∗∗ -0.104∗∗ -0.134∗∗ -0.023 -0.019 -0.032
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.036)
Pro-Trade Messages 0.034∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.010 0.011
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Negative View on Trade * Pro-Trade Messages -0.049∗∗ -0.051∗∗ -0.136∗∗ -0.008 -0.008 -0.015
(0.018) (0.018) (0.036) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
State FE No Yes No No Yes No
District FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1902 1902 1750 1764 1756 1590
Marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
All models include fixed effects for Industry.
All models control for co-partisanship, income, gender, race, age, education, martial status, and union membership.
While the overall evidence points toward a considerable role of elite communication
in shaping trade-related attitudes, one should consider the possibility that the observed
pattern can also be attributed to bottom-up influence. If representatives are merely being
responsive to their co-partisan voters in high information environment, but not in low
information environment, the finding presented here can be also consistent with the
bottom-up influence.
Yet, this alternative explanation is unlikely. First, it is not reasonable to assume that
representatives adjusted their responsiveness to constituents and their communication
strategy taking into account of senate electoral cycle. This possibility is highly unlikely
especially because my press releases for this analysis cover the period prior to the sur-
vey, from January 2009 to June 2010, at a time far preceding the election. Especially
during the earlier period, representatives could not predict whether senators in their
states would retire or seek reelection, which makes it difficult to predict political infor-
mation environment in advance and adjust their strategy accordingly. Second, districts
of the two types of states are very similar in their socio-economic and political charac-
teristics, as described earlier, and representatives in the two types of states appear to be
very similar in their communications with their constituents. During the given period,
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representatives on average sent 179 and 186 press releases in the states with and with-
out reelection-seeking senators, respectively. Among the issued press releases, 0.1% are
pro-free trade in both types and 0.4% and 0.3% are protectionist, respectively. Overall,
two types of states do not systematically differ in a series of pertinent dimensions.
3.6 Conclusion
This study has investigated how legislators communicate their trade policy positions to
their constituents and whether such messages have any impact on the views of their
constituents. I first documented that the majority of legislators are relatively silent on
the issue of international trade while a few legislators actively explain their trade-related
positions to constituents. The findings suggest that position taking of legislators is asso-
ciated with their ideological beliefs as well as the economic characteristics of districts. By
linking the legislator-level dataset to survey data of individuals, I examined the impact
of legislators on the views of constituents and uncovered considerable effects of elite
communications on co-partisan constituents’ attitudes toward trade.
These findings offer important implications for trade policy, by underscoring the role
of legislators as information providers. Evidence that voter preferences are shaped by
legislators raises the question of whether the interests of voters are represented in the
process of trade policy making. If legislators can sway the views of voters with per-
suasive appeals or an announcement of support for a given policy, this may imply that
politicians are not strongly constrained by public opinion and that, as a consequence,
they may not serve the interests of voters. Nevertheless, other types of constraints are
placed on legislators even when they are only weakly constrained by public opinion. For
instance, legislators are still incentivized to serve constituent interests in that voters may
reward or punish them according to the policy outcomes. My findings of an association
between the economic characteristics of districts and legislators’ positions indeed sug-
115
gest that the policy positions of legislators are largely in line with the economic interest
of districts. This implies that legislators can serve as information providers who eval-
uate the likely outcome of trade policy on their constituents, on behalf of voters, and
inform them about why a given policy would or would not serve their interests. How-
ever, it should also be noted that this pattern hinges on the extent to which legislators
take voter interests into account. If legislators respond more resolutely to concentrated
interests–such as trade associations or corporations–rather than diffuse voter interests,
and then try to sway voters toward a position in line with the concentrated interests, the
end result may reflect more of those concentrated interests.
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Appendices
Appendix A for “Media Bias against Foreign Firms as a Veiled Trade
Barrier: Evidence from Chinese Newspapers”
A.1 Data Description
A.1.1 List of Newspapers
Table A.1 presents the list of newspapers included in the analysis, their sponsoring in-
stitution and classification. Official newspapers are the ones sponsored by the party
organizations at the central or the regional level and circulated among offices, class-
rooms, factory workshops and to government offices. Non-official newspapers include
party evening papers that are sponsored by party organizations but that rely on sales at
newsstands and subsidiary newspapers sponsored by other parent newspapers or press
groups.
Table A.1: List of Newspapers Included in the Analysis
Newspaper Classification Sponsor
Central-Level Newspapers
People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) Official CCP Central
Guangming Daily (Guangming Ribao) Official CCP Central Propaganda Department
Economic Daily (Jingji Ribao) Official CCP Central Propaganda Department
Legal Daily (Fazhi Ribao) Official CCP Political and Law Commission
Xinhua News Agency (Xinhua She) Official State News Agency
China Youth Daily (Zhongguo Qingnian Bao) Official Central Communist Youth League
Anhui
Anhui Daily (Anhui Ribao) Official CCP Anhui Provincial Party Committee
Hefei Evening News (Hefei Wanbao) Non-Official CCP Hefei Municipal Party Committee
Anhui Commercial News (Anhui Shang Bao) Non-Official Anhui Daily Press Group





Beijing Daily (Beijing Ribao) Official CCP Beijing Municipal Party Committee
Beijing Youth Daily (Beijing Qingnian Bao) Official Communist Youth League (Beijing)
Beijing Times (Jinghua Shibao) Non-Official People’s Daily
The Beijing News (Xin Jing Bao) Non-Official Guangming Daily Press Group
Beijing Evening News (Beijing Wanbao) Non-Official Beijing Daily Press Group
Beijing Daily Messenger (Beijing Yule Xin Bao) Non-Official Beijing Daily Press Group
Beijing Morning Post (Beijing Chenbao) Non-Official Beijing Daily Press Group
The First (Jing Bao) Non-Official Beijing Daily Press Group
The Mirror (Fazhi Wanbao) Non-Official Beijing Youth Daily
Chongqing
Chongqing Economic Times (Chongqing Shang Bao) Non-Official Chongqing News Center
Chongqing Evening News (Chongqing Wanbao) Non-Official Chongqing Daily Press Group
Chongqing Morning Post (Chongqing Chenbao) Non-Official Chongqing Daily Press Group
Fujian
Fujian Daily (Fujian Ribao) Official CCP Fujian Provincial Party Committee
Strait News (Haixia Dushi Bao) Non-Official Fujian Daily Press Group
Gansu
Lanzhou Daily (Lanzhou Ribao) Official CCP Lanzhou Municipal Party Committee
Gan Su Daily (Gansu Ribao) Official CCP Gansu Provincial Party Committee
Lanzhou Morning Post (Lanzhou Chenbao) Non-Official Gansu Daily Press Group
Xi Bu Business (Xibu Shang Bao) Non-Official Gansu Daily Press Group
Lanzhou Evening News (Lanzhou Wanbao) Non-Official Lanzhou Daily
Guangdong
Shan Tou Daily (Shantou Ribao) Official CCP Shan Tou Municipal Party Committee
Shenzhen Special Zone Daily (Shenzhen Tequ Bao) Official CCP Shenzhen Municipal Party Committee
Guangzhou Daily (Guangzhou Ribao) Official CCP Guangzhou Municipal Party Committee
Nan Fang Daily (Nanfang Ribao) Official CCP Guangdong Provincial Party Committee
Yangcheng Evening News (Yangcheng Wanbao) Non-Official CCP Guangdong Provincial Party Committee
Shan Tou Te Qu Evening Post (Shantou Tequ Wanbao) Non-Official CCP Shan Tou Municipal Party Committee
Shantou City Daily (Shantou Dushi Bao) Non-Official Shangtou SEZ Newspaper
Southern Metropolis Daily (Nanfang Dushi Bao) Non-Official Nan Fang Daily Press Group
Daily Sunshine (Jing Bao) Non-Official Shenzhen Press Group
Shenzhen Evening News (Shenzhen Wanbao) Non-Official Shenzhen Press Group
Shenzhen Economic Daily (Shenzhen Shang Bao) Non-Official Shenzhen Press Group
New Express Daily (Xin Kuaibao) Non-Official Yangcheng Evening Press Group
Information Times (Xinxi Shibao) Non-Official Guangzhou Daily Press Group
Panyu Daily (Panyu Ribao) Non-Official Guangzhou Daily Press Group
Baoan Daily (Bao’an Ribao) Non-Official Shenzhen Press Group
Securities Times (Zhengquan Shibao) Non-Official People’s Daily
Private Economy News (Minying Jingji Bao) Non-Official Yangcheng Evening Press Group
Guangxi
Guangxi Daily (Guangxi Ribao) Official CCP Guangxi Party Committee
Southern China Morning Post (Nanguo Zaobao) Non-Official Guangxi Daily
Modern Life Daily (Dangdai Shenghuo Bao) Non-Official Guangxi Daily
Nan Guo Jin Bao (Nanguo Jin Bao) Non-Official Guangxi Daily
Hainan
Hainan Daily (Hainan Ribao) Official CCP Hainan Provincial Party Committee
Haikou Evening News (Haikou Wanbao) Non-Official CCP Haikou Municipal Party Committee
Hebei
Shijiazhuang Daily (Shijiazhuang Ribao) Official CCP Shijiazhuang Municipal Party Committee
Yanzhao Evening News (Yan Zhao Wanbao) Non-Official Shijiazhuang Daily Press Group
Heilongjiang
Harbin Daily (Ha’erbin Ribao) Official CCP Harbin Municipal Party Committee
Modern Evening Times (Xin Wanbao) Non-Official Harbin Daily Press Group
Henan
Henan Daily (Henan Ribao) Official CCP Henan Provincial Party Committee
Dahe Daily (Dahe Bao) Non-Official Henan Daily Press Group
Henan Business Daily (Henan Shang Bao) Non-Official Henan Daily Press Group
Hubei




Hubei Daily (Hubei Ribao) Official CCP Hubei Provincial Party Committee
Wuhan Evening News (Wuhan Wanbao) Non-Official Changjiang Daily Press Group
Wuhan Morning Post (Wuhan Chenbao) Non-Official Changjiang Daily Press Group
Chutian Metropolis Daily (Chu Tian Dushi Bao) Non-Official Hubei Daily Press Group
Sanxia Evening News (Sanxia Wanbao) Non-Official Hubei Daily Press Group
Chu Tian Golden Newspaper (Chu Tianjin Bao) Non-Official Hubei Daily Press Group
Hunan
Changsha Evening Newspaper (Zhangsha Wanbao) Non-Official CCP Changsha Municipal Party Committee
Jiangsu
Nanjing Daily (Nanjing Ribao) Official CCP Nanjing Municipal Party Committee
Wuxi Daily (Wuxi Ribao) Official CCP Wuxi Municipal Party Committee
Jinling Evening News (Jinling Wanbao) Non-Official Xinhua Daily Press Group
Jiang Nan Evening News (Jiangnan Wanbao) Non-Official Wuxi Daily
YangTse Evening News (Yangzi Wanbao) Non-Official Xinhua Daily Press Group
Jiang Nan Times (Jiangnan Shibao) Non-Official People’s Daily
Jiangxi
Nanchang Daily (Nanchang Ribao) Official CCP Nanchang Municipal Party Committee
Jiangxi Daily (Jiangxi Ribao) Official CCP Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee
Information Daily (Xinxi Ribao) Non-Official Jiangxi Daily
Jiang Nan City Daily (Jiangnan Dushi Bao) Non-Official Jiangxi Daily
Jilin
Cheng Shi Wan Bao (Chengshi Wanbao) Non-Official Jilin Daily Press Group
Liaoning
Dalian Daily (Dalian Ribao) Official CCP Dalian Municipal Party Committee
Shenyang Daily (Chenyang Ribao) Official CCP Shenyang Municipal Party Committee
Liaoning Daily (Liaoning Ribao) Official CCP Liaoning Provincial Party Committee
Dalian Evening News (Dalian Wanbao) Non-Official Dalian Daily Press Group
Peninsula Morning (Bandao Chenbao) Non-Official Liaoning Daily Press Group
Liao Shen Evening News (Liao Chen Wanbao) Non-Official Liaoning Daily Press Group
Shenyang Evening News (Chenyang Wanbao) Non-Official Shenyang Daily Press Group
Ningxia
Yinchuan Evening News (Yinchuan Wanbao) Non-Official CCP Yinchuan Municipal Party Committee
Qinghai
Qinghai Daily (Qinghai Ribao) Official CCP Qinghai Provincial Party Committee
Xining Evening News (Xining Wanbao) Non-Official CCP Xining Municipal Party Committee
XiHai DuShi Bao (Xihai Dushi Bao) Non-Official Qinghai Daily
Shaanxi
Xi An Daily (Xi’an Ribao) Official CCP Xi’an Municipal Party Committee
Xi’an Evening News (Xi’an Wanbao) Non-Official CCP Xi’an Municipal Party Committee
San Qin Du Shi Bao (San Qin Dushi Bao) Non-Official Shaanxi Daily
Shandong
Jinan Daily (Jinan Ribao) Official CCP Jinan Municipal Party Committee
Qingdao Daily (Qingdao Ribao) Official CCP Qingdao Municipal Party Daily
Dazhong Daily (Dazhong Ribao) Official CCP Shandong Provincial Party Committee
QiLu Evening News (Qilu Wanbao) Non-Official Dazhong Press Group
Bandao Metropolis (Bandao Dushi Bao) Non-Official Dazhong Press Group
Shanghai
Jiefang Daily (Jiefang Ribao) Official CCP Shanghai Municipal Party Committee
Youth Daily (Shanghai Qingnian Bao) Official Shanghai Municipal Communist Youth League
Oriental Morning Post (Dongfang Zaobao) Non-Official Wenhui Xinmin United Press Group
Shanghai Morning Post (Xinwen Chenbao) Non-Official Jiefang Daily Press Group
Shanghai Evening Post (Xinwen Wanbao) Non-Official Jiefang Daily Press Group
Wen Hui Daily (Wenhuibao) Non-Official Wenhui Xinmin United Press Group
XinMin Evening News (Xinmin Wanbao) Non-Official Wenhui Xinmin United Press Group
News Times (Tiantian Xin Bao) Non-Official Wenhui Xinmin United Press Group
Shanxi
Shanxi Daily (Shanxi Ribao) Official CCP Shanxi Provincial Party Committee
Sichuan
Chengdu Daily (Chengdu Ribao) Official CCP Chengdu Municipal Party Committee
Sichuan Daily (Sichuan Ribao) Official CCP Sichuan Provincial Party Committee




Western China Metropolis Daily (Huaxi Dushi Bao) Non-Official Sichuan Daily Press Group
Chengdu Business Daily (Chengdu Shang Bao) Non-Official Chengdu Daily Press Group
Tianjin
Tianjin Daily (Tian Jinribao) Official CCP Tianjin Municipal Party Committee
Today Evening Post (Jin Wanbao) Non-Official Jinwan Media Group
Morning Post (Mei Ri Xin Bao) Non-Official Tianjin Daily Press Group
Yunnan
Kunming Daily (Kunming Ribao) Official CCP Kunming Municipal Party Committee
Yunnan Daily (Yunnan Ribao) Official CCP Yunna Provincial Party Committee
Chunchen Evening News (Chuncheng Wanbao) Non-Official Yunnan Daily Press Group
Du Shi Shi Bao (Dushi Shibao) Non-Official Kunming Daily
Zhejiang
Zhejiang Daily (Zhejiang Ribao) Official CCP Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee
Qianjiang Evening News (Qian Jiang Wan Bao) Non-Official Zhejiang Daily Press Group
Morning Express (Jin Ri Zaobao) Non-Official Zhejiang Daily Press Group
A.1.2 Examples of Newspaper Articles Included in the Analysis
I present below two newspaper articles on auto recall incidents as examples of newspa-
per articles included in the analysis. The first article, published by Beijing Daily (Beijing
Ribao) on May 15, 2009 is on a recall by Dongfeng Motor Corporation, a Chinese state-
owned automotive firm. The second article, published by Guangzhou Daily (Guangzhou
Ribao) on August 18, 2010 is on a recall by BMW, a Germany-based automotive firm.
• “Dongfeng to Recall 153,065 Teana Sedans, Starting Next Month,” Beijing Daily (Beijing
Ribao), May 15, 2009
In accordance to Administrative Regulation on Recall of Defective Motor Vehicles,
Dongfeng Motor Co., Ltd. submitted recall report to the General Administration of
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the PRC(GAQSIQ). In the report,
Dongfeng decided to recall 153,065 Teana sedans built between July 1, 2004 and April
18, 2008 due to the engine defects since June 12. Affected Teana sedans are equipped
with VQ engines. An air tube inside the engine may become disconnected as it was
found to have substandard heat-resistance, which may lead to unstable running or
flameout of the engine, hence affect driving safety. Dongfeng promised to exchange
engine air tubes and clasps of all defective sedans for free to eliminate risks. For parts
preparation, recall will take place since June 12. Fault found before that date can be
fixed in Dongfeng workshops for free. Detailed information can be found on the web-
site of GAQSIQ www.aqsiq.gov.cn or the hotline of Defective Product Administrative
Center 010-59799616.
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• “Late Recall in China: BMW Made Recall Announcement in China One Month Later than
in the US,” Guangzhou Daily (Guangzhou Ribao), August 18, 2010
Yesterday, BMW China Automotive Trading Ltd submitted recall report to the General
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine. It decided to recall
part of the imported 2010 BMW 5 series GT cars (535i, 550i) built between January 12,
2010 and June 30, 2010. The action would start from August 20, 2010, and the number
of affected cars in mainland China is 5,308, according to BMW’s estimation.
Does the car company treat Chinese market differently? Owners of BMW 5 series in
China have finally received the recall announcement from the company half a month
after the same announcement was released in the US (reported by Guangzhou Daily
on July 27, on Page AII7). Some owners suspect: why do multinational car companies
always recall in other countries earlier than in China? If an accident happened because
of the defect, will the car company be responsible? We have interviewed lawyers
regarding this matter.
Same recall reason as in the US Yesterday, this reporter heard that BMW China Auto-
motive Trading Ltd submitted recall report to the General Administration of Quality
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine to recall 5,308 affected cars in mainland China.
This reporter studied that as early as July 21, BMW has announced to recall 6,080 se-
ries 5 cars in the US, because of the same reason as the recall in China. The reason of
the recall is manufacture fault. The detector in the fuel tank could be stuck by the air
tube, hence couldn’t detect the lower fuel level. The dashboard won’t be able to tell
when the fuel has run out. The problem could stall the engine without warning and
the engine might not restart following this flameout, causing safety risks.
Late recall caused query On the time difference, BMW didn’t explain why the recall
in China happened almost one month later than in the US. As a matter of fact, the
late action by BMW has caused an anxiety from Chinese owners. Reporter checked
the reports on China Car Recall website where owners have raised criticism since July
29. One owner raised a question: “I’m an owner of a BMW series 5 car. I heard BMW
has recalled series 5 cars in the US. But why not in China? The cars in China have
better quality than in the US?” An expert from the website comforted: “If the defect
exists in China, BMW will surely recall in China.” The Chinese market has become
the largest automobile market in the world surpassing the U.S. For BMW, China is the
third largest market in the world following Germany and North America. However,
the recall announcement made yesterday still shows a discrimination against Chinese
market.
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Lawyer: Unequal announcement will be considered as malicious act.
From the incidents of Toyota oversea recalls and BMW recalls, there’s possibility of dis-
crimination, said Beiyuan Chen, senior partner of Dacheng Law Offices in Guangzhou,
who is consistently following the consumers’ right. “When there is a quality prob-
lem, oversea companies normally consider protecting the US consumers first. These
incidents happen not only in automobile industry, but also in medical and other in-
dustries. These companies have divided the world into several regions, and they treat
these regions differently.” As the Chinese automobile market have developed quickly,
these car companies should treat us more importantly. But in fact, since the lack of
consumers’ right protection and communication channels, multinational companies
still overlook Chinese market chronically. Accidents happened during this period,
should be considered as malicious act by the car company, Beiyuan Chen added. “The
biggest pressure of the companies is not from consumers, but the reputation, which
affect their real sales records.” He suggests China to make further effort on improving
consumers’ right protection system.
A.2 Robustness
I present the robustness analysis of recall reporting pattern. All models are variation of
the original Model 3 and Model 7 from Table 3 and Model 6 from Table 5 presented in the
main paper. Each table contains three sub-tables: the first sub-table presents the results
of the models that distinguish official newspapers from non-official ones; the second sub-
table presents the results of the models that make a distinction between central party-
controlled official newspapers and regional party-controlled official newspapers, and
the final sub-table presents the results of the models that estimate the effect of regional
governmental stake in the automobile industry. The main findings remain robust.
Auto Prices Control Imported cars are more expensive than domestic cars on aver-
age, and this price difference may account for the reporting pattern if official newspapers
target luxury models instead of imported cars. I account for price difference by estimat-
ing the models controlling for the price of recalled cars (Model 1), controlling for luxury
models (Model 2), and excluding luxury models from the observations (Model 3) as
131
presented in Table A.2. I collected information on automobile prices from the website
http://car.bitauto.com/. As the price varies depending on different options within
the same car model, I choose to use the lowest price for each model. When one re-
call involves several car models, I take the average of the lowest prices of all involved
models. As the price of all recalled cars is not available, I additionally created a binary
variable indicating luxury cars (i.e. automobiles manufactured by the following makers:
Aston Mading, Audi, Bentley, BMW, Cadillac, Ferrari, Infiniti, Land Rover, Lamborghini,
Lexus, Maserati, Mercedes-Benz, Porsche, Rolls-Royce, Volvo). The results demonstrate
that the price difference between domestic and imported cars does not drive the main
results.
Recall Frequency Control In order to account for the difference in the frequency of
recalls between domestic and foreign cars, I control for the cumulative number of recalls
by each manufacturer from 2005 to the time of recall under analysis. Table A.3 shows
that the main results remain robust to the inclusion of this additional control.
Regional Exclusions I estimate the models successively excluding major provinces
or province-level cities from the sample. In Table A.4, I exclude all newspapers with
headquarters in the specific region, from Beijing, Guangdong, Hubei, and Shanghai to
Sichuan.
Country Exclusions I also estimate the models successively excluding recalls cars of
manufacturers of specific countries from the sample. Table A.5 presents the results from
excluding from France, Germany, Japan, and the U.S. to the U.K., one by one.
Different Clustering Table A.6 presents the estimation results of the models with two
different clustering – one with clustering by newspapers and another with clustering by
two-dimensions: recall-newspapers.
Different Coding of Official Newspapers In Table A.7, I experiment with different
coding of official newspapers by treating semi-official newspapers as official newspapers.
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A.2.1 Auto Prices Control
Table A.2: Robustness Analysis of Recall Reporting with Auto Prices Control
(1) (2) (3)
Auto Price Control Luxury Model Control Non-Luxury Only
The Effect of Government Control over Newspapers on Recall Reporting
Foreign 0.029∗ 0.023+ 0.013
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016)
Official -0.041∗∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.044∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Official * Foreign 0.027∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.031∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Observations 29834 35246 23168
The Effect of Central Party Control over Newspapers on Recall Reporting
Foreign 0.028∗ 0.023+ 0.012
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016)
Central Party Official -0.139∗∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.137∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Regional Party Official -0.008 -0.009 -0.013∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Central Party Official * Foreign 0.096∗∗ 0.098∗∗ 0.115∗∗
(0.022) (0.020) (0.027)
Regional Party Official * Foreign 0.017+ 0.020∗ 0.019
(0.010) (0.009) (0.012)
Observations 29834 35246 23168
The Effect of Regional Party Interest in Auto Industry on Recall Reporting
Foreign 0.029+ 0.025+ 0.015
(0.016) (0.015) (0.019)
Officials with Auto -0.056∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.056∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Officials without Auto -0.008 -0.013 -0.023
(0.016) (0.014) (0.015)
Officials with Auto * Foreign 0.043∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.046∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015)
Officials without Auto * Foreign -0.027 -0.022 -0.026
(0.019) (0.017) (0.023)
Observations 21698 25810 16545
Marginal effects; Standard errors clustered by recall in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
All models include fixed effects for province and half year as well as recall-level controls: the logarithm of recall size and
binary indicators for recall type. Models for estimating the effect of regional party interest in the auto industry include
additional province-level controls as in the Model (6) of Table 5.
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A.2.2 Recall Frequency Control
Table A.3: Robustness Analysis of Recall Reporting with Recall Frequency Control
(1)
Recall Frequency Control





Official * Foreign 0.012+
(0.007)
Observations 35057
The Effect of Central Party Control over Newspapers on Recall Reporting
Foreign 0.019
(0.014)
Central Party Official -0.132∗∗
(0.006)
Regional Party Official -0.009
(0.006)
Central Party Official * Foreign 0.099∗∗
(0.020)
Regional Party Official * Foreign 0.020∗
(0.009)
Observations 35246
The Effect of Regional Party Interest in Auto Industry on Recall Reporting
Foreign 0.016
(0.015)
Officials with Auto -0.056∗∗
(0.007)
Officials without Auto -0.013
(0.014)
Officials with Auto * Foreign 0.047∗∗
(0.011)
Officials without Auto * Foreign -0.022
(0.017)
Observations 25810
Marginal effects; Standard errors clustered by recall in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
All models include fixed effects for province and half year as well as recall-level controls: the logarithm of
recall size and binary indicators for recall type. Models for estimating the effect of regional party interest
in the auto industry include additional province-level controls as in the Model (6) of Table 5.
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A.2.3 Regional Exclusions
Table A.4: Robustness Analysis of Recall Reporting with Region Exclusions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Beijing Guangdong Hubei Shanghai Sichuan
The Effect of Government Control over Newspapers on Recall Reporting
Foreign 0.013 0.022+ 0.027∗ 0.021+ 0.025∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Official -0.001 -0.062∗∗ -0.012∗ -0.013∗ -0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Official * Foreign 0.039∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.031∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 31741 27874 32814 31819 32996
The Effect of Central Party Control over Newspapers on Recall Reporting
Foreign 0.013 0.022+ 0.027∗ 0.021+ 0.025∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Central Party Official 0.422∗∗ 0.400∗∗ 0.451∗∗ 0.429∗∗ 0.445∗∗
(0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Regional Party Official 0.006 -0.052∗∗ -0.005 -0.005 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Central Party Official * Foreign 0.102∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.097∗∗ 0.097∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Regional Party Official * Foreign 0.027∗∗ 0.007 0.021∗ 0.016+ 0.018+
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 31741 27874 32814 31819 32996
The Effect of Regional Party Interest in the Auto Industry on Recall Reporting
Foreign 0.019 0.027∗ 0.033∗ 0.027+ 0.028+
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Officials with Auto 0.029∗∗ -0.076∗∗ -0.002 0.004 -0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Officials without Auto -0.016 -0.017 -0.011 -0.013 -0.014
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015)
Officials with Auto * Foreign 0.037∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.028∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Officials without Auto * Foreign -0.011 -0.015 -0.017 -0.022 -0.020
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018)
Observations 21494 18509 22469 21572 24063
Marginal effects; Standard errors clustered by recall in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
All models include fixed effects for province and half year as well as recall-level controls: the logarithm of re-
call size and binary indicators for recall type. Models for estimating the effect of regional party interest in the
auto industry include additional province-level controls as in the Model (6) of Table 5.
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A.2.4 Country Exclusions
Table A.5: Robustness Analysis of Recall Reporting with Country Exclusions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
France Germany Japan US UK
The Effect of Government Control over Newspapers on Recall Reporting
Foreign 0.028∗ 0.007 0.021 0.026∗ 0.027∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Official -0.040∗∗ -0.042∗∗ -0.040∗∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.040∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Official * Foreign 0.031∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.026∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 33604 29427 28750 33460 32224
The Effect of Central Party Control over Newspapers on Recall Reporting
Foreign 0.027∗ 0.006 0.020 0.026+ 0.027∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Central Party Official -0.132∗∗ -0.134∗∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.135∗∗ -0.131∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Regional Party Official -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Central Party Official * Foreign 0.104∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.099∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Regional Party Official * Foreign 0.020∗ 0.022∗ 0.023∗ 0.020∗ 0.015+
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 33604 29427 28750 33460 32224
The Effect of Regional Party Interest in Auto Industry on Recall Reporting
Foreign 0.030∗ 0.021 0.022 0.032∗ 0.031∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Officials with Auto -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Officials without Auto -0.015 -0.013 -0.012 -0.015 -0.013
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Officials with Auto * Foreign 0.031∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.034∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Officials without Auto * Foreign -0.018 -0.015 -0.018 -0.023 -0.036∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
Observations 23119 20456 19968 22908 22258
Marginal effects; Standard errors clustered by recall in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
All models include fixed effects for province and half year as well as recall-level controls: the logarithm of
recall size and binary indicators for recall type. Models for estimating the effect of regional party interest
in the auto industry include additional province-level controls as in the Model (6) of Table 5.
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A.2.5 Different Clustering
Table A.6: Robustness Analysis of Recall Reporting with Different Clustering
(1) (2)
Clustering by Newspaper Two-way Clustering





Official * Foreign 0.030∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.014) (0.008)
Observations 35246 35246
The Effect of Central Party Control over Newspapers on Recall Reporting
Foreign 0.024∗∗ 0.024+
(0.006) (0.013)
Central Party Official -0.132∗∗ -0.132∗∗
(0.029) (0.008)
Regional Party Official -0.009 -0.009
(0.028) (0.006)
Central Party Official * Foreign 0.098∗∗ 0.098∗∗
(0.017) (0.002)
Regional Party Official * Foreign 0.020 0.020∗
(0.013) (0.004)
Observations 35246 35246
The Effect of Regional Party Interest in Auto Industry on Recall Reporting
Foreign 0.029∗∗ 0.029∗
(0.007) (0.015)
Officials with Auto -0.004 -0.004
(0.043) (0.008)
Officials without Auto -0.013 -0.013
(0.025) (0.014)
Officials with Auto * Foreign 0.035∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.014) (0.011)
Officials without Auto * Foreign -0.021 -0.021
(0.020) (0.018)
Observations 24313 24313
Marginal effects; Standard errors clustered by newspaper (1) and by recall-newspaper (2) in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
All models include fixed effects for province and half year as well as recall-level controls: the logarithm of recall size
rand binary indicators for recall type. Models for estimating the effect of regional party interest in the auto industry
include additional province-level controls as in the Model (6) of Table 5.
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A.2.6 Different Coding of Official Newspapers
Table A.7: Robustness Analysis with Different Coding of Official Newspapers
(1)
Different Coding of Official Newspapers





Official * Foreign 0.027∗∗
(0.008)
Observations 35246
The Effect of Central Party Control over Newspapers on Recall Reporting
Foreign 0.024+
(0.013)
Central Party Official 0.442∗∗
(0.065)
Regional Party Official -0.009
(0.006)
Central Party Official * Foreign 0.098∗∗
(0.020)
Regional Party Official * Foreign 0.020∗
(0.009)
Observations 35246
The Effect of Regional Party Interest in Auto Industry on Recall Reporting
Foreign 0.032∗
(0.014)
Officials with Auto -0.004
(0.008)
Officials without Auto -0.012
(0.014)
Officials with Auto * Foreign 0.020+
(0.011)
Officials without Auto * Foreign -0.025
(0.015)
Observations 24313
Marginal effects; Standard errors clustered by recall in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
All models include fixed effects for province and half year as well as recall-level controls: the logarithm of
recall size and binary indicators for recall type. Models for estimating the effect of regional party interest
in the auto industry include additional province-level controls as in the Model (6) of Table 5.
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A.3 Distinguishing Joint Venture from Domestic Automakers
In the main analysis, I broadly classified automobiles into two categories: domestic and
foreign. The domestic category includes cars produced by China’s indigenous brand
as well as joint-venture companies. Here, I examine if and how newspapers treat joint-
venture automobiles differently from domestic ones by creating a separate binary indi-
cator for joint-venture cars and an interaction variable of this indicator and official news-
papers. In Table A.8, I present the estimation results for the sample of all newspapers
including central-party and regional-party controlled officials and non-official newspa-
per in Models (1) and (2), for a subset of regional newspapers located in provinces where
regional governments have their own automotive SOEs in Models (3) and (4), and for a
subset of newspapers in the rest of regions in Models (5) and (6).
Throughout the models, the coefficients for Foreign and for Joint Venture appear to be
positive and statistically significant. This suggests that both foreign and joint-venture
automotive manufactures, compared to domestic ones, are discriminated by Chinese
newspapers in their recall coverage. When it comes to official newspapers with stakes
in the automotive industry (Models 1-4), foreign automotive companies are particularly
more subject to biased coverage as demonstrated by positive and statistically significant
coefficients on the interaction term Official * Foreign, but joint-venture companies are not
subject to this additional bias from official newspapers as shown by coefficients on the
interaction term Official * Joint that are close to zero and far from being significant at the
conventional level. Official newspapers’ bias against foreign companies is also not found
in regions where governments do not own automotive SOE (Models 5 and 6).
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Table A.8: Distinguishing Joint Venture from Domestic Automakers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Newspapers Regions with Auto Regions without Auto
Foreign 0.057∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.026+
(0.007) (0.007) (0.023) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015)
Joint Venture 0.049∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.059∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.030+ 0.030+
(0.009) (0.009) (0.026) (0.026) (0.018) (0.017)
Official -0.025∗∗ -0.006 -0.004 0.011 -0.028∗∗ -0.034∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011)
Official * Foreign 0.025∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.033∗ 0.029∗ -0.004 0.013
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014)
Official * Joint Venture -0.008 -0.012 -0.002 -0.011 -0.007 0.010
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015)
Province FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Halfyear FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 35246 35246 19317 19317 14138 14138
Marginal effects; Standard errors clustered by recalls in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
All models control for the logarithm of recall size and binary indicators for recall type.
A.4 Comparison of Newspaper Readership: Official vs. Non-Official
I describe the readership characteristics of official and non-official newspapers in order
to provide counter evidence to an alternative mechanism that official newspapers ex-
hibit home bias because their readers are more nationalistic than readers of non-official
newspapers. Using the 2004 Beijing Area Studies survey data, I compare nationalistic
attitudes as well as socio-economic characteristics of individuals of different newspa-
pers. I analyze the 2004 survey data because the questions about respondents’ news
consumption pattern were included only in 2004 but removed from the following years.
Table A.9 describes the characteristics of survey respondents by news media con-
sumption pattern. Based on the list of newspapers each individual reads, I classify indi-
viduals into four groups: 1) those who only read official newspapers, 2) those who only
read non-official newspapers, 3) those who read both types of newspapers, and 4) those
who do not read newspapers at all. Individuals do not differ in age or education level
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across different types of newspapers although official newspaper readers, on average,
have higher income and include more members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Yet, most importantly, on the two questions measuring nationalistic attitudes of respon-
dents, readers of different types of newspapers do not show distinctive difference. When
respondents were asked to choose from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) to the
statement that they want to be born again as Chinese citizens, the average score appears
to be very similar across different groups, ranging from 3.4 to 3.6. To the statement that
China is a better country than most of other countries, the average score again appears
to be very similar across different groups, ranging from 3.2 to 3.3. This demonstrates
that nationalistic attitudes are quite prevalent among Chinese citizens regardless of their
news consumption pattern. Thus, differences between official and non-official newspa-
per readers are unlikely to account for the reporting pattern of official and non-official
newspapers presented in the main analysis.
Table A.9: Descriptive Statistics of Beijing Citizens by Media Consumption Pattern
Official Non-Official Both Do Not Read
Newspapers Newspapers Types Newspapers
Age 50.2 47.4 48.2 47.4
Years of Education 11.9 11.0 12.4 10.0
Monthly Income (Yuan) 2038.5 1248.7 2336.5 1356.4
Female (%) 47.4% 42.3% 36.9% 50.4%
CCP Members (%) 36.8% 23.7% 36.9% 11.8%
Nationalism, Born again as PRC Citizen (1-4) 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.4
Nationalism, China Better than Others (1-4) 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2
Number of Respondents 57 241 198 119
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A.5 Estimation of Structural Topic Model
I collected additional news articles on all auto-related issues, and estimated the Struc-
tural Topic Model (STM) (Roberts et al., 2014). This section provides a detailed descrip-
tion on data collection, model estimation, and estimation result.
A.5.1 Data Collection
To explore the existence of media bias beyond recall reporting, I collected additional
news articles that contain the names of automakers that have at least 0.5% of market
share according to the sales data in the 2014 China Auto Market Almanac (Zhongguo qiche
shichang nianjian). I used 55 keywords containing the name of automakers and searched
for newspaper articles that have these keywords in their headlines through WiseNews. I
did not use the names of joint ventures as keywords when the part of their names is al-
ready included in other keywords (e.g. FAW-Toyota (yiqi fengtian), Shanghai Volkswagen
(shanghai dazhong), or Dongfeng Honda (dongfeng bentian)). Due to the large number of
articles that satisfy this condition, I restricted the sample of newspapers to four newspa-
pers with headquarters in Beijing (Beijing Daily, Beijing Youth Daily, Beijing Morning Post,
and Beijing Evening News) that WiseNews provides a full coverage from 2000 to 2014.
Also, I restricted the sample to those news articles that contain the word car (che) or
the measure word that counts cars (liang) to sort out auto-related news articles because
some automakers’ brand names are not unique proper nouns in Chinese (e.g. Great Wall
(changcheng), or Hyundai (xiandai), which means modern in Chinese).
A.5.2 Model Estimation
With 15,141 collected newspaper articles, I estimated the STM with 25 topics. Before es-
timating the model, I preprocessed texts following a standard approach (see Lucas et al.
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(2015) for detailed information on processing and analyzing textual data). I segmented
texts into words using the Stanford Word Segmenter (Chang, Galley, and Manning, 2008)
because Chinese language does not have spaces between words. I then removed punc-
tuation and stop words that frequently occur but do not convey important meaning to
the text such as de (of) or shi (be). I additionally removed the name of automakers in
order to avoid text being classified according to automobile brands. Once I completed
all preprocessing, I constructed a document-term matrix (DTM) where each row repre-
sents a document and each column represents a unique word, with each cell indicates
the number of times the word occurs in the document. To build the DTM, I used the
Python/Lucene-based application txtorg developed by Lucas et al. (2015).
With the constructed DTM, I estimated a range of STM models using a varying num-
ber of topics from 10, 15, 20, 25, to 30. I present the estimation results with 25 topics. The
models with the lower number of topics do not capture distinct topics, while the model
with 30 topics does not provide additional categories that are meaningful for interpre-
tation compared to the model with 25 topics. One key difference of the STM with other
topic models is its ability to incorporate structural information into the analysis. As I am
interested in exploring the difference between domestic and foreign automobiles in the
news coverage, I included a binary indicator in the analysis as well as the year of news
publication that may influence the proportion of topic in news articles.
A.5.3 Estimation Result
I present the expected topic proportions of selected topics and words highly associated
with each topic. Among 25 topics, I only present the results for topics that are relevant
to automobile products. I excluded topics that are irrelevant to automobile products.
These are topics that are not relevant to automobiles at all but included in the sample
due to the non-unique name of automaker. I also excluded topics that are related to
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automobiles but not to automobile products such as car accidents, transportation, or car
racing as well as topics on company-related news (i.e. company mergers, establishment
of joint-venture). Figure A.1 presents the expected topic proportion of eight selected
topics. Most frequent topics are price or sales-related news. These news articles do
not explicitly convey positive or negative implication about automobile companies, but
could contribute to improving brand awareness. While other topics also could contribute
to promoting company products, two topics – recalls and quality problems – have nega-
tive implications on products. The calculated effect of being foreign on topic proportions
is presented in Figure 3 in the main paper.
Figure A.1: Structural Topic Model Results from the Analysis of Automobile-related
News Articles
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Appendix B for “Informed Preferences? The Impact of Unions on
Workers’ Trade Preferences”
B.1 Survey Questions on Unions and Trade
The following survey items were used to measure members’ views and knowledge about
the position of their union on trade policy and the frequency with which the union
communicated about the topic:
• Overall, where do you think the union stands on the question of whether trade
with other countries should be expanded, reduced or kept at its current level?
• How familiar would you say you are with the union’s view on trade with other
countries? Do you think that trade with other countries is good or bad for you and
your family?
• During the past year, approximately how often would you estimate the union has
communicated with you about trade with other countries?
B.2 Matching Procedure and Diagnostics
We conduct a nearest-neighbor matching exercise to estimate the overall ‘union effect’
across all industries. We match each union member with non-unionized workers em-
ployed in the same industry and sector (private vs. public), and require that they are
also of the same gender, ethnicity, martial status and education level (measured as a
binary indicator denoting completion of a 4-year college degree). After the requirement
for exact matching on these criteria is fulfilled, the matching algorithm is instructed to
seek the closest observation in terms of income level and age. Each union member can be
matched with up to ten non-unionized workers, conditional on the exact matching crite-
ria being fully satisfied. We then estimate a probit regression model using the matched
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data and calculate the average treatment effect of union membership on all three out-
come variables, as presented in Figure 2.2. Matching diagnostics are presented here in
Table B.1. As we impose the exact matching requirement for all the variables except
income level and age, the matched data is perfectly balanced for those variables.
Table B.1: Matching Summary Statistics for the Union Effects
Full Data (N=3991) Matched Data (N=2018)
(Treated: 462, Control: 3449) (Treated: 421, Control: 1597)
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Variable Treated Control Difference Treated Control Difference
Distance 0.121 0.118 0.003 0.121 0.121 0.000
Family Income 9.446 9.956 -0.510 9.437 9.311 0.126
Age 50.883 50.602 0.281 51.235 49.521 1.715
College Education 0.465 0.511 -0.046 0.444 0.444 0.000
Married 0.630 0.692 -0.062 0.637 0.637 0.000
Black 0.089 0.050 0.039 0.057 0.057 0.000
Hispanic 0.028 0.039 -0.010 0.024 0.024 0.000
White 0.786 0.841 -0.056 0.848 0.848 0.000
Female 0.400 0.362 0.038 0.382 0.382 0.000
Public Sector 0.394 0.065 0.329 0.352 0.352 0.000
Building Construction 0.093 0.091 0.002 0.100 0.100 0.000
Food Manufacturing 0.050 0.052 -0.003 0.055 0.055 0.000
Chemical Manufacturing 0.035 0.054 -0.019 0.033 0.033 0.000
Fabricated Metal Manufacturing 0.067 0.086 -0.019 0.069 0.069 0.000
Computer Electronics 0.009 0.088 -0.079 0.007 0.007 0.000
Transportation Equipment 0.097 0.056 0.041 0.100 0.100 0.000
Telecommunications 0.113 0.084 0.028 0.121 0.121 0.000
Data Processing 0.009 0.083 -0.074 0.005 0.005 0.000
Securities 0.004 0.097 -0.093 0.005 0.005 0.000
Educational Services 0.413 0.107 0.307 0.401 0.401 0.000
Ambulatory Health 0.054 0.106 -0.052 0.057 0.057 0.000
Nursing and Residential Care 0.056 0.097 -0.040 0.048 0.048 0.000
Nursing and Residential Care 0.057 0.096 -0.039 0.049 0.049 0.000
B.3 Calculation of the Union Protectionism Score
To measure a union’s stance on trade policy we generated a new metric that is based on
the union’s lobbying activity and its official announcements on trade-related legislation.
Focusing on the two years prior to the study, we coded the positions the unions took
on trade-related bills and used this data to place the unions along a trade protectionist-
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liberalizer scale. For every bill, we code the union’s position along a seven-point scale
that ranges from ‘strongly protectionist’ (+3) to ‘strongly pro-trade’ (-3).
B.3.1 Trade-related Bills
Our analysis focuses on the the position of each union on trade-related issues that were
tied to a legislative bill during the period under examination. We only exclude bills that
were purely industry-specific (e.g. the United Steelworkers lobbying on an antidumping
case on coated paper), since such bills do not allow for a comparison with the position
taken by unions outside the industry. Based on these criteria, we used the fourteen bills
in Table B.2 to generate the unions’ protectionism measure.
Table B.2: Congressional Bills on Foreign Trade Lobbied by Unions
Lobbied Bills Included for Measuring Union’s Protectionist Stance Coding
Trade Reform, Accountability, Development and Employment Act of 2009 protectionist
US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement free trade
US-Panama Free Trade Agreement free trade
US-Korea Free Trade Agreement free trade
US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act free trade
Withdrawal of the US from NAFTA protectionist
Reauthorizing Trade Adjustment Assistnace protectionist
Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act; Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2009 protectionist
Trade Enforcement Act of 2009 protectionist
Buy Amreican Provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 protectionist
Reciprocal Market Access Act of 2009 protectionist
Trade Agreement Benchmarks and Accountability Act protectionist
Export Promotion Act of 2010 free trade
B.3.2 Coding Scheme
For the selected bills, we code each union’s position along a seven-point scale based on
the position expressed by the union (i.e., pro- or anti-liberalization) and the number of
quarters it registered lobbying activity for or against the bill. For bills on which a union
lobbied against liberalization for five quarters or more, the union’s position is coded as
‘strongly protectionist’ (+3). If the lobbying took place for a shorter period of 1 to 4
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quarters, we assign a ‘protectionist’ (+2) score; we code a union as ‘weakly protectionist’
(+1) score if it did not lobby on the bill but had expressed a protectionist stance on the
issue in its official pronouncements. Conversely, we assign scores between -1 and -3
using the same coding criteria when the union takes a pro-liberalization stance. Finally,
a ‘neutral position’ (0) is assigned if the union did not express any view on the issue nor
conducted any related lobbying activity.11 Importantly, when we revise the threshold to
four or six quarters for distinguishing a strong position from a weak position, our results
regarding the measured union stance remains robust.
With respect to the coding of unions’ position on specific bills, we made the following
determinations:
• We code support for the “Trade Reform, Accountability, Development and Em-
ployment Act” of 2009 as a protectionist stance, because the bill: i) Required a re-
evaluation of US free trade agreements every two years; ii) Would have restricted
the applicability of trade agreements with regard to trade in services, foreign in-
vestment, government procurement, IPR protection, trade remedies, among other
areas; and iii) Required the President to submit to Congress a plan to renegotiate
any trade agreement that does not meet the stated requirement already in effect.
• Support for the Trade Enforcement Act of 2009 and the Reciprocal Market Access
Act of 2009 is coded as protectionist. The Trade Enforcement Act of 2009 proposes
to apply countervailing duties to non-market economy countries. The Reciprocal
Market Access Act proposes to limit the President’s authority to reduce or elimi-
nate tariffs pursuant to trade agreements until certain conditions are met, as well
as to withdraw tariff concessions against trade partners who violated the trade
agreement.
11In the few instances where information was provided only about the lobbying activity taking place
but not about the actual stance taken by the union, the position value was coded as missing.
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B.4 Measuring Alignment between the Union’s Stance and Workers’
Policy Preferences
Figure 5 in the main chapter graphically illustrates the alignment between a union’s
stance and the policy preferences of its members. It also shows the correlation between
the Average Protectionism Score of unions in the industry and the policy preferences of
union members and non-members working in the industry. We also examined this
empirical relationship in a regression format that included a full set of controls. We
estimated a probit model:
Probit(Yi) =α + β1Industry Protectionism Scorei + β2Union Memberi
+ β3Industry Protectionism Stance*Union Memberi + θControlsi + εi,
where Yi is a binary measure of individual i’s view on trade and Average Protectionism
Stance is the average protectionism score for unions in i’s industry of employment. Union
Member is a binary indicator for union members, and Industry Protectionism Stance*Union
Member is the key variable of interest, capturing the interaction between the two vari-
ables. The controls we include are education, age, income, gender, race and martial
status.
Table B.3: Union Average Protectionism Stance and Worker’s View on Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Trade Level Trade on Self Trade on US
Industry Protectionism Score -0.002 -0.004∗ -0.003 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Union Member 0.024 -0.063+ -0.005 0.038+ -0.015 0.019 0.057∗ -0.023 0.018
(0.024) (0.035) (0.043) (0.021) (0.032) (0.038) (0.023) (0.033) (0.040)
Industry Protectionism Score 0.011∗∗ 0.007 0.007∗ 0.003 0.010∗∗ 0.006+
*Union Member (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Demographic Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 3194 3194 2911 3194 3194 2911 3194 3194 2911
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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The results of the estimation, presented as marginal effects in Table B.3, suggest that
the unions’ stance on trade has a notable impact on the attitudes of the union mem-
bers, but not on the attitudes of the non-members. We find a positive and statistically
significant coefficient for the interaction term β3, but the coefficient for β1 is in most spec-
ifications very small in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero (When
we include the full set of controls, the estimated effect remains positive and fairly large
in magnitude but drops below the 95% confidence level). Union members thus exhibit
attitudes on trade that are much closer to the position staked by the unions than the
attitudes of the non-members employed in the same industry.
B.5 Robustness Tests
B.5.1 Cross-State Legal Differences and the Union Effect
We conduct a broad set of robustness tests for all the analyses reported in the main
chapter. Below, we briefly describe each of these tests.
• Estimating the Models Using Pre-processed Data: We estimate the same mod-
els using pre-processed data from the matching exercise. We estimate the models
with the subset of the data that includes individuals matched exactly on college
education, industry, marital status, race, gender, and employment sector. Respon-
dents are also additionally matched on income and age with the nearest neighbor
technique. The results presented in Table B.4 show that the findings remain intact
when using the pre-processed data.
• Estimating the Models Using Weighted Data: We re-estimate the same models
using weighted data. Our main analyses use unweighted data because we do
not aim to estimate the magnitude of the effects for the general US population.
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Yet, we demonstrate here that our results are both substantively and statistically
unchanged when we re-estimate all models with weights. The results are presented
in Table B.5.
• Including Public Sector Workers in the Analysis: Our main analysis focuses on
private sector workers because the Right-to-Work laws do not cover some public
sector workers. To assess whether this trimming of the sample affects our results,
we reanalyze all the same models, this time including both private and public
sector workers . Table B.6 presents the results and shows that all the findings of
interest are unaffected by the the inclusion of the public sector workers.
• Excluding Individuals in Management: Managers and supervisors cannot join
unions or be part of the bargaining unit because they are not protected by the
National Labor Relations Act. As these individuals comprise about one fourth of
non-union members in our dataset, the observed difference between members and
non-members could in theory be driven by distinct characteristics of individuals in
management. We therefore reanalyze all the original set of models while excluding
all individuals in management. The results, reported in Table B.7, indicate that
all the findings hold. In other words, the share of managers in the sample of























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.5.2 Members’ Preferences when the Union Changes Position
We also conduct the robustness tests for the analysis of the UAW’s change in poisition
on KORUS.
• Estimating the Models Using Pre-processed Data: We re-analyze the models using
pre-processed data. The results are shown shown in Table B.8.
• Estimating the Models Using Weighted Data: We estimate the models using the
weighted data. The results remain substantively unchanged, as shown in Table B.9.
• Excluding Individuals in the Business and Management Sectors: As discussed
above, we reanalyze all the same models while excluding workers in the manage-
ment and business sectors. The results presented in Table B.10 again show that our
findings remain robust to the exclusion of these individuals.
Table B.8: Change in the Union’s Policy Position and Members’ Preferences with Pre-
processed Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trade Level Trade on Self
Union Member 0.489∗∗ 0.396∗ 0.421∗ 0.401∗ 0.325∗ 0.168 0.262 0.206
(0.138) (0.167) (0.166) (0.180) (0.151) (0.176) (0.189) (0.205)
Post-Shift -0.047 -0.085 -0.108 -0.051 -0.024 -0.039 -0.090 0.044
(0.150) (0.159) (0.159) (0.189) (0.147) (0.157) (0.159) (0.190)
Post-Shift*Union Member -0.442∗∗ -0.443∗∗ -0.431∗∗ -0.480∗∗ -0.081 0.050 0.170 0.327
(0.117) (0.138) (0.154) (0.149) (0.236) (0.290) (0.306) (0.346)
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
News Consumption No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Party ID No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Auto States No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 81 81 80 80 81 81 80 80
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Demographic Controls: income, gender, race, age, education & martial status
News Consumption: A binary indicator taking a value of 1 if the respondent read a newspaper once a day or more.
Auto States: Michigan, Post-Shift*Michigan, Ohio, Post-Shift*Ohio
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Table B.9: Change in the Union’s Policy Position and Members’ Preferences with Sam-
pling Weight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trade Level Trade on Self
Union Member 0.608∗∗ 0.596∗∗ 0.534∗∗ 0.485∗∗ 0.691∗∗ 0.542∗∗ 0.715∗∗ 0.657∗∗
(0.095) (0.107) (0.117) (0.126) (0.097) (0.149) (0.172) (0.184)
Post-Shift 0.122 -0.022 -0.064 -0.423+ -0.067 -0.199 -0.204 -0.294+
(0.177) (0.210) (0.195) (0.218) (0.187) (0.159) (0.147) (0.151)
Post-Shift*Union Member -0.636∗∗ -0.630∗∗ -0.670∗∗ -0.742∗∗ -0.309∗ -0.204 -0.185 -0.286∗
(0.093) (0.110) (0.094) (0.063) (0.153) (0.183) (0.179) (0.115)
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
News Consumption No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Party ID No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Auto States No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 100 97 96 96 100 97 96 96
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Demographic Controls: income, gender, race, age, education & martial status
News Consumption: A binary indicator taking a value of 1 if the respondent read a newspaper once a day or more.
Auto States: Michigan, Post-Shift*Michigan, Ohio, Post-Shift*Ohio
Table B.10: Change in the Union’s Policy Position and Members’ Preferences with Indi-
viduals in Management Excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trade Level Trade on Self
Union Member 0.494∗∗ 0.439∗∗ 0.438∗∗ 0.428∗ 0.383∗∗ 0.267+ 0.390∗ 0.343+
(0.130) (0.152) (0.163) (0.186) (0.143) (0.162) (0.175) (0.191)
Post-Shift 0.018 -0.076 -0.153 -0.488∗∗ -0.065 -0.086 -0.106 0.040
(0.150) (0.163) (0.165) (0.178) (0.144) (0.156) (0.160) (0.219)
Post-Shift*Union Member -0.485∗∗ -0.495∗∗ -0.507∗∗ -0.588∗∗ -0.063 -0.022 0.039 0.134
(0.102) (0.108) (0.108) (0.084) (0.232) (0.259) (0.281) (0.338)
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
News Consumption No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Party ID No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Auto States No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 84 82 81 81 84 82 81 81
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Demographic Controls: income, gender, race, age, education & martial status
News Consumption: A binary indicator taking a value of 1 if the respondent read a newspaper once a day or more.
Auto States: Michigan, Post-Shift*Michigan, Ohio, Post-Shift*Ohio
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B.6 Moderators of the Union Effect
B.6.1 Ideology as a Moderator
We examine the effect of union membership conditional on respondents’ partisan prefer-
ence. We interact a 7-point measure of partisan preference (7 as strong Democrat and 1 as
strong Republican) with a binary indicator for union membership. The analyses in this
section use the full sample, including private and public sector workers, because we are
not exploring the differential effect of the RTW laws in these analyses. The results, pre-
sented in Table B.11, show that the interactions among the strongly protectionist unions
are positively signed across all the estimated models and are borderline significant. This
is not conclusive evidence, but it suggests that Democratic-leaning individuals are more
willing to embrace the union’s message. As expected, we find a null effect among unions
that are not strongly protectionist.
B.6.2 Economic Knowledge as a Moderator
We also examine the union effect conditional on economic knowledge. We measure eco-
nomic knowledge with a binary indicator denoting whether the respondent had taken a
college-level economics class. We interact this measure with a union membership indi-
cator. The results, presented in Table B.12, show that the signs of the interaction terms
are not consistent across different outcomes. Among union members, economic knowl-
edge is associated with more support for trade level expansion and less negative views
on the impact of trade on the US, yet with more negative views on the impact of trade
on oneself. Moreover, the estimated effects are well below statistical significance and
substantivelly small across the models. The results thus provide very limited evidence
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.6.3 Economic Success of the Union as a Moderator
We test whether the more economically successful unions are more effective in shaping
their members’ views. We measure the union’s success using union’s spending power
(total spending per capita in the previous year, logged)12. We the spending power and
the protectionism score of the union to examine whether its economic success is a strong
moderator of its influence on the members’ views. We find some support for this con-
jecture. Table B.13 shows that the interaction term is positive and statistically significant
with respect to the perceived impact of trade on self and on the US, but is substantively
small and not statistically significant with respect to the trade levels question.
Table B.13: Union’s Protectionism Stance and Members’ View on Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Trade Levels Trade on Self Trade on US
Protectionism Score 0.010∗∗ -0.032 -0.043 0.011∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ -0.065∗ -0.071∗
(0.005) (0.035) (0.038) (0.004) (0.031) (0.035) (0.004) (0.034) (0.037)
Union Spending -0.012 -0.090 -0.089 0.010 -0.192∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗ 0.016 -0.124∗ -0.131∗
(0.035) (0.073) (0.084) (0.031) (0.066) (0.075) (0.033) (0.070) (0.079)
Protectionism Score 0.008 0.009 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗
* Union Spending (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Party ID No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 244 244 226 244 244 220 244 244 226
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Demographic Controls: income, gender, race, age, education & martial status
12Data are from www.unionfacts.com.
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B.7 Additional Information on the Analysis of Auto Sector Workers
This section provides additional information on the analysis of how the United Auto
Workers’ changing stance on trade policy affected the preferences of the workers.
B.7.1 Changes in the United States - Korea Free Trade Agreement
The United States and the Republic of Korea initially signed the free trade agreement on
June 30, 2007, but later reached a new agreement that entailed revised provisions for the
automotive sector on December 3, 2010. Below, we briefly describe the key revisions in
the agreement.13 Note that these revisions are highly technical in nature. We therefore
contend that it is unlikely that the workers would read and understand these changes
without the information communicated by their union.
• Tariffs: For motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons, the
United States shall keep duties at the base rate during years one through four,
and eliminate duties effective January 1 of year five. Korea will reduce duties to
four percent ad valorem on the date KORUS enters into force and eliminate duties
effective January 1 of year five.
• Safety Standards: “Korea shall provide that an originating motor vehicles of the
United States produced by a manufacturer that sold no more than 25,000 originat-
ing motor vehicles in the territory of Korea during the previous calendar year shall
be deemed to comply with Korean Motor Vehicle Safety Standards if the manu-
facturer certifies that the motor vehicle complies with U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards.”
13The full legal texts are available here: https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/korus-fta/legal-texts-reflecting-december-3-2010-agreement.
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• Motor Vehicle Safeguards: “Neither Party may apply a safeguard measure for
a period exceeding two years, except that the period may be extended by up to
two years if the competent authorities of the importing Party determine [...] that
the measure continues to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and
to facilitate adjustment and that there is evidence that the industry is adjusting,
provided that the total period of application of a safeguard measure, including the
period of initial application and any extension thereof, shall not exceed four years.”
• Environmental Standards: “With regard to Korea’s new automobile fuel economy
and greenhouse gas emissions regulation, [...] Korea will provide that, from 2012 to
2015, a manufacture that sold up to 4500 motor vehicles in the territory of Korea in
calendar year 2009 shall be deemed to comply with the target level set forth in the
regulations if either the average fuel economy or the average CO2 emissions level
for the vehicles the manufacturer sold in the territory of Korea during the relevant
calendar year meets a target level that is 19 percent more lenient than the relevant
target level provided in the regulation that would otherwise be applicable to that
manufacturer.”
B.7.2 Trade-Related Discussion among the UAW Members
Our analysis of the effect of the United Auto Workers (UAW)’ stance on the preferences
of workers focuses on the idea of a ‘top-down’ influence: the union communicated the
meaning of the changes in KORUS to its members. However, the findings could also be
consistent with a ’bottom up’ story: members changed their preferences and pressured
the union leadership to change its policy stance as well. As noted in Chapter 2, this
is unlikely given the highly technical nature of the changes made to the revised agree-
ment. We provide additional qualitative evidence against the bottom up explanation, by
examining the online discussion among the UAW members regarding the agreement.
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Figure B.1: Discussion on the Free Trade Agreement at the UAW Facebook Page
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One active online discussion forum among the UAW members was the union’s Face-
book page that had 72,986 subscribers. We examined the reactions of the members to-
ward the union’s statement anouncing its change in support for the KORUS Agreement.
As presented in Figure B.1, the majority of the comments on the union’s announcement
are very negative, while the remaining few responses are not quite relevant. For sure,
this forum may not be representative of entire membership of the union. Yet this limited
evidence is clearly consistent with the thrust of our claim that the views of the members
on the agreement were unlikely to have been the cause of the union’s change in stance.
B.8 Unobservable Selection and Bounding of the Treatment Effect
The method advanced in Oster (2014) shows that we can identify the bounded set of the
treatment effect using the regression values from uncontrolled and controlled regres-
sions and assumptions about: (i) δ̄, the proportional selection between observables and
unobservables related to the treatment and (ii) Rmax, the R-squared of the full regression
with the treatment, observable controls and unobservable controls.
The δ̄ captures the relative importance of the index of observed and unobserved
variables in explaining the treatment. The bound δ̄ = 1 means that the unobservables are
as important as the observables. This is considered an appropriate upper bound because
“researchers typically focus their data collection efforts (or their choice of regression
controls) on the controls they believe ex ante are the most important” (Oster 2014: 11).
It is thus quite unlikely that unobservables are more important than the whole set of
observable controls that are relevant to the treatment. Regarding Rmax, it is necessarily
bounded between R̄, the R-squared of the controlled regression, and 1. The simulated
results suggest that the upper bound of min{2.2R̄, 1} is an appropriate assumption to
make. We therefore calculated the lower bound of the “union effect” assuming δ̄ = 1
and 2.2R̄.
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Appendix C for “Who Speaks for Free Trade Matters: Elite Communi-
cations and Public Support for Free Trade”
C.1 Data Selection Procedure
This section provides a detailed description on the data selection procedure for press re-
leases that are relevant to the topic of international trade. The procedure is summarized
in Figure C.1.
• First, I collected press releases containing trade(s), export(s/ing/ed/ation), im-
port(s/ing/ ed/ation), and tariff(s) anywhere in the documents.
• Second, I selected a set of bigrams that are directly related to international trade
to exclude irrelevant ones (e.g. cap-and-trade, world trade center). After all texts
are stemmed through the Porter Stemming Algorithm, I selected a set of bigrams
among the top 50 bigrams associated with trad, export, import, and tariff. The list
of bigrams is fully described in Table C.1.
• Third, I narrowed down the set of documents to that contain the selected 116 bi-
grams anywhere in the documents.
• Fourth, I examined a random selection of excluded documents (25%) to see whether
any relevant documents are exlucded from the collection.
• Fifth, I additionally selected 11 keywords (ag export, agricultur trade, promot
trade, trade repres, import product, import catfish, import steel, restrict export,
rare earth export, drywall, drug import), and included the documents that contain
these phrases.
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Figure C.1: Summary of Text Collection Procedure
Step 1
Text Collection Based on Selected Keywords
Keywords: trade, export, import, tariff
Step 2
Selection of 75 Bigrams Related to International Trade
Examples: trade agreement, export promotion, retaliatory tariff
Step 3
Selection of Documents Containing the Selected Bigrams
Step 4
Manual Examination of Unselected Documents
Step 5
Additional Selection of Key Phases Related to International Trade
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Table C.1: Top 50 Bigrams Associated with Selected Keywords
Trade Export Import Tariff
trade agreement us export import from tariff on
trade commiss export promot on import retaliatori tariff
intern trade export market chines import miscellan tariff
free trade export council import oil ethanol tariff
world trade agricultur export import of mexican tariff
trade adjust export assist import into import tariff
unfair trade export control import food impos tariff
trade practic dairi export increas import these tariff
trade deficit export opportun tire import tariff suspens
fair trade export initi subsid import tariff relief
trade polici increas export poultri import invert tariff
trade center export to oil import tariff bill
trade repres chines export foreign import percent tariff
trade partner poultri export import surg elimin tariff
us trade export incent import deterr tariff prefer
trade organ export good import ethanol centpergallon tariff
feder trade export subsidi paper import high tariff
and trade and export import water tariff benefit
proprietari trade beef export radioact import limit tariff
trade act largest export import or harmon tariff
trade barrier doubl export beef import secondari tariff
futur trade export seminar import terrorist smoothawley tariff
frequenc trade american export import drywal steep tariff
trade law nation export octg import feedin tariff
trade the promot export import duti the tariff
our trade pork export casein import tariff impos
trade pact export of import fossil tariff rate
trade imbal presid export food import to tariff
commerc trade export and tube import tariff schedul
trade to busi export import tariff addit tariff
trade enforc export financ import seafood fabricyarn tariff
trade deal export their import gasolin tariff would
trade of our export current import tariff reduct
pend trade export cheaper import 20000 colombian tariff
deriv trade their export drug import suspend tariff
trade prefer export the import relief unnecessari tariff
publicli trade boost export import assault korean tariff
drug trade export strategi import good tariff equiti
trade associ state export import fdaapprov includ tariff
trade relationship wine export ethanol import tariff the
trade remedi export enhanc safe import tariff invert
trade agenda expand export import lowerpr tariff shrank
trade subcommitte subsid export import the tariff concess
trade a export over import chines magnesium tariff
trade system export restraint to import preliminari tariff
highfrequ trade paperboard export import wood gallon tariff
trade and ash export dump import tariff mexico
global trade potato export grape import averag tariff
trade mission arm export import quota advalorem tariff
trade issu export abroad ban import tariff are
Note: The table lists the 50 most frequent bigrams associated with each term (trade, export,
import, and tariff). I reviewed the top 50 bigrams from the initial selection of documents, and
selected the ones that are closely related to trade. Selected ones are written in bold.
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C.2 Supervised Learning Method
I classified the collected press releases using the supervised learning method. I first
decided on the number of categories through a systematic reading of randomly selected
documents (25% of documents), and manually coded those documents into a set of
categories. I then tested five algorithms with the coded documents to compare the
performance of each algorithm. The coded documents are partitioned into 10 sets. Each
algorithm learns the classification rule from 9 of 10 sets (training sets) and classifies the
rest of documents (testing set).
I then assess the performance of each algorithm by comparing the machine coding
and the human coding. Table C.2 summarizes the overall algorithm accuracy of five
tested algorithms. Precision refers to a proportion of correctly classified documents
among the documents that an algorithm classifies as a given category. Recall refers
to a proportion of correctly coded documents among the documents within a given
category. F-scores produce a weighted average of both precision and recall, which could
range from 0 to 1 with a higher value indicating better performance (Jurka et al. 2013).
Table C.2 shows that three algorithms (maximum entropy, support vector machine, and
general linearized models) outperform the other two (random forests and decision trees).
Table C.2: Overall Algorithm Accuracy
Algorithm Precision Recall F-score
Maximum Entropy 0.77 0.75 0.75
Support Vector Machine 0.80 0.71 0.73
General Linearized Models 0.80 0.65 0.69
Random Forests 0.73 0.49 0.53
Decision Trees 0.49 0.48 0.47
I therefore decided to classify the rest of documents relying on the three mechanisms
(maximum entropy, support vector machine, and general linearized models). Table C.3
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shows that at least two out of three algorithms agree on the classification for 98 per-
centage of documents, yet in such casees, recall rate is 0.86. When all three mechanisms
make the same prediction, the coverage is down to 0.77 but the recall rate reaches 0.84,
which is comparable to human coding. To enhance the accuracy of classification, I fol-
low the machine classification only when the three algorithms agree on the classification.
The rest of documents where the three algorithms make a different prediction, I recoded
documents manually for the accuracy of classification.




C.3 Document Classification Results
With the supervised learning methods, the documents are classified into seven cate-
gories: i) pro-free trade, ii) protectionist, iii) trade adjustment assistance, iv) export as-
sistance, v) trade barriers of foreign countries against the US, vi) other trade-related,
and vii) unrelated. Figure C.2 describes the 20 most frequent bigrams in each of cate-
gory, excluding the unrelated category. Bigrams are listed in the order of their frequency
with their size proportional to the frequency as well. The figure shows that press re-
leases in the pro-free trade category frequently use the terms such as “trade agreement,”
“free trade,” “create job,” “us export,” and “new market,” while press releases in the
protectionist category frequently use the terms such as “currency manipulation,” “buy
american”, “level playing field,” and “trade deficit.”
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Pro−Free Trade Protectionist TAA Export Assistance Trade Barrier Others
Note: The figure lists the 20 most frequent bigrams in each classified category. The bigger the size of a
given bigram in the column, the more frequently it appears in each category.
C.4 Supporting Evidence for Empirical Strategy
My empirical strategy exploits the different electoral cycles of senators, which creates
the difference in the degree of voter attention to incumbent representatives. In the states
where incumbent senators seek for reelection, media and voter attentions are diverted
to senators while representatives receive a relatively lesser degree of attention. In other
states where incumbent senators retire or have more time in their electoral cycles, in-
cumbent representatives receive relatively more attention from media and voters.
C.4.1 Senate Electoral Cycle and Voter Attention to Representatives
In order to empirically validate this claim, I analyze the web-searching pattern of in-
dividuals in different states using the Google trend data. I collected the weekly index
for all senators and representatives who were in the office as of June 2010 in each state.
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Specifically, I have an index value for House Representative Don Young, Senator Mark
Begich, and Senator Lisa Murkowski from the Google-searching data of individuals liv-
ing in Alaska. I collected all the weekly index values from July to December 2010 (when
the survey was being conducted) for representatives and senators for all the states.14
With the average value for each legislator as a dependent variable, I estimate the model:
Yij = α + βHouse Representativei
+ γHouse Representative * Reelection-Seeking Senator in Stateij + θStatej + εij.
House Representative is coded 1 if i is a member of House and 0 if a senator. Reelection-
Seeking Senator in State is a binary indicator for whether state j had a senator seeking for
reelection in the 2010 mid-term election, and this variable is interacted with House Repre-
sentative. As I include state fixed effects for the model, Reelection-Seeking Senator in Statej
is not included. The estimation result presented in Table C.4 suggests that representa-
tives receive less attention in general, compared to senators, but this tendency becomes
stronger when incumbent senators seek for reelection in a given state.








Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
14As Google does not provide an absolute value for index, all the values are relative to each other. As
only five terms are allowed to be directly compared, I set a reference value for one senator in each state
and adjusted the value for other senators and representatives in the same state. The original value ranges
from 0 to 100, but the adjusted value ranges from 0 to 238.
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C.4.2 Senate Electoral Cycle and District Characteristics
I also examine whether the socio-economic and political characteristics of districts are
similar across the two types of states – one type with reelection-seeking senators and
another type without such senators. As presented in Table C.5, the two types of states
appear to be comparable across a series of pertinent dimensions. High information envi-
ronment denotes the states without reelection-seeking ssenators, where representatives
receive more attention, and low information denotes the states where incumbent sena-
tors seek reelection, where voter attention is diverted to senators. As the shares of press
releases with pro-free trade and protectionist messages indicate, the communication stat-
egy of representatives appears to be comparable. Districts also appear to be similar in
terms of the share of high-skill population, foreign born population, agriculture produc-
tion, and the overall income level.
Table C.5: Political Information Environment and District Characteristics
High Information Low Information
mean sd count mean sd count
Free Trade Press Releases, % 0.11 0.51 216 0.09 0.43 217
Protectionist Press Releases, % 0.34 1.24 216 0.32 1.03 217
Difference in Free-Trade and Protectionist Measure -0.23 1.36 216 -0.23 1.11 217
High Skill, % 34.86 6.40 216 35.40 7.80 219
Foreign Born Population, % 10.73 9.69 216 14.27 12.10 219
Agriculture Products, $1B 0.67 1.46 216 0.69 1.18 219
Median Income, Log 10.80 0.25 216 10.85 0.26 219
Unemployment Rate, % 10.07 3.03 216 9.94 2.41 219
Republican Vote Share, % 44.31 23.39 216 40.26 23.36 219
Black Population, % 11.79 14.08 216 12.12 14.95 219
Population over 65, % 13.31 3.11 216 12.57 2.61 219
Observations 435
Note: High information denotes the states witout reelection-seeking senators where voter attention is
focused on representatives; Low information denotes the states with reelection-seeking senators where
voter attention is diverted to senators.
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C.5 Additional Test
I further explore the effect of elite communications conditional on the presence of reelection-
seeking senators by including a three-way interaction term of High Information, Pro-Free
Trade, and Copartisanship. The estimation results are presented in Table C.6. The coef-
ficient on the three-way interaction term is consistently negative across the estimated
models. While the coefficient is less substantial with respect to individual perception
on self/family and the US, the difference in the effect is more clearly demonstrated for
individual support for trade reduction as shown in the estimation results of the first two
models.
Table C.6: Pro-Trade Messages from Representatives and Public Attitudes toward Trade
Trade Reduction Trade on Self Trade on US
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pro-Free Trade by Representative 0.010 0.014∗ 0.009
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
Copartisanship w/ Representative -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.025 0.041+
(0.023) (0.027) (0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025)
Pro-Free Trade * Copartisanship -0.016 -0.014 -0.021 -0.024 -0.010 -0.009
(0.016) (0.019) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015)
High Information * Pro-Free Trade -0.006 0.001 -0.007
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
High Information * Copartisanship -0.000 0.008 -0.021 -0.023 -0.037 -0.043
(0.032) (0.037) (0.026) (0.031) (0.027) (0.030)
High Information * Pro-Free Trade * Copartisan -0.037 -0.058∗ -0.015 -0.027 -0.010 -0.028
(0.023) (0.027) (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023)
State FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
District FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3679 3401 3667 3103 3668 3275
Marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
All models include industry FE and Controls (income, gender, race, age, education, martial status, and union membership).
174
